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Displaying: 41-45 of 45 documents


comments and criticism
41. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 116 > Issue: 2
Raphael van Riel Lying beyond a Conversational Purpose: A Critique of Stokke's Assertion-Based Account of Lying
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In this paper, I argue that a particular assertion-based account of lying, which rests on Stalnaker’s theory of assertions, proposed by Andreas Stokke, is both too broad and too narrow. I tentatively conclude that the account fails because lying does not necessarily involve a conversational purpose.
book reviews
42. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 116 > Issue: 2
Zoltán Gendler Szabó Barry Schein: 'And': Conjunction Reduction Redux
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43. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 116 > Issue: 1
Florian Steinberger Three Ways in Which Logic Might Be Normative
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According to tradition, logic is normative for reasoning. Gilbert Harman challenged the view that there is any straightforward connection between logical consequence and norms of reasoning. Authors including John MacFarlane and Hartry Field have sought to rehabilitate the traditional view. I argue that the debate is marred by a failure to distinguish three types of normative assessment, and hence three ways to understand the question of the normativity of logic. Logical principles might be thought to provide the reasoning agent with first-personal directives; they might be thought to serve as third-personal evaluative standards; or they might underwrite our third-personal appraisals of others whereby we attribute praise and blame. I characterize the three normative functions in general terms and show how a failure to appreciate this threefold distinction has led disputants to talk past one another. I further show how the distinction encourages fruitful engagement with and, ultimately, resolution of the question.
44. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 116 > Issue: 1
Peter Tan Counterpossible Non-vacuity in Scientific Practice
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The longstanding philosophical orthodoxy on counterfactuals holds, in part, that counterfactuals with metaphysically impossible antecedents (“counterpossibles”) are indiscriminately vacuously true. Drawing on a number of examples from across scientific practice, I argue that science routinely treats counterpossibles as non-vacuously true and also routinely treats other counterpossibles as false. In fact, the success of many central scientific endeavors requires that counterpossibles can be non-vacuously true or false. So the philosophical orthodoxy that counterpossibles are indiscriminately vacuously true is inconsistent with scientific practice. I argue that this provides a conclusive reason to reject the orthodoxy.
45. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 116 > Issue: 1
In Memoriam: Isaac Levi
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