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Displaying: 41-50 of 12005 documents

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41. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 115 > Issue: 7
Alexandra Zinke A BULLET for Invariance: Another Argument against the Invariance Criterion for Logical Terms
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According to the classical invariance criterion, a term is logical if and only if its extension is isomorphism-invariant. However, a number of authors have devised examples that challenge the sufficiency of this condition: accepting these examples as logical constants would introduce objectionable contingent elements into logic. Recently, Gil Sagi has responded that these objections are based on a fallacious inference from the modal status of a sentence to the modal status of the proposition expressed by that sentence. The present paper demonstrates that Sagi’s response, though successful, is futile. There is another objection, based on the same type of example, that is not susceptible to Sagi’s criticism: accepting the examples as logical terms would have the fatal consequence that any contingent metalanguage sentence is entailed by the truth of some logically true object-language sentence. I conclude with a sketch of an alternative to the classical invariance criterion.
42. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 115 > Issue: 6
Nicholas Shackel Scope or Focus? Normative Focus and the Metaphysics of Normative Relations
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A prolonged debate about the nature of norms has been conducted in terms of the scope of a modal operator. Here I argue that the features of what I call Normative Focus are more fundamental than scope. We shall see limitations of scope contrasted with better analysis in terms of Normative Focus. Some authors address such limitations by extending what they mean by scope. I show that scope is still not doing the work: what does it is their elicitation of our tacit knowledge of Normative Focus. Finally, I show that scope cannot capture Normative Focus because scope allows us to make only one distinction where we need to make three. So we should leave scope to the philosophers of language and turn instead to the ontology of Normative Focus.
43. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 115 > Issue: 6
Kevin Reuter, Michael Messerli Transformative Decisions
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Some decisions we make—such as becoming a parent or moving to a different part of the world—are transformative. According to L. A. Paul (Transformative Experience, 2014), transformative decisions pose a major problem to us because they fall outside the realm of rationality. Her argument for that conclusion rests on the premise that subjective value (that is, the value of experiencing a certain outcome of a decision) is central in transformative decisions. This paper challenges that premise and hence the overall conclusion that transformative decisions usually are not rational. In the theoretical part of the paper, we specify conditions under which transformative decisions are possibly rational and likely rational. The data we present in the empirical part of the paper reveal that subjective value often plays only a minor role in people’s decision-making process. Putting both parts together, we argue that people have a great chance of making rational transformative choices.
44. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 115 > Issue: 5
Franz Dietrich, Christian List From Degrees of Belief to Binary Beliefs: Lessons from Judgment-Aggregation Theory
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What is the relationship between degrees of belief and binary beliefs? Can the latter be expressed as a function of the former—a so-called “belief-binarization rule”—without running into difficulties such as the lottery paradox? We show that this problem can be usefully analyzed from the perspective of judgment-aggregation theory. Although some formal similarities between belief binarization and judgment aggregation have been noted before, the connection between the two problems has not yet been studied in full generality. In this paper, we seek to fill this gap. The paper is organized around a baseline impossibility theorem, which we use to map out the space of possible solutions to the belief-binarization problem. Our theorem shows that, except in limiting cases, there exists no belief-binarization rule satisfying four initially plausible desiderata. Surprisingly, this result is a direct corollary of the judgment-aggregation variant of Arrow’s classic impossibility theorem in social choice theory.
book reviews
45. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 115 > Issue: 5
David Heyd Lisa Tessman: When Doing the Right Thing Is Impossible
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46. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 115 > Issue: 5
Sven Ove Hansson Hannes Leitgeb: The Stability of Belief: How Rational Belief Coheres with Probability
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47. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 115 > Issue: 4
Marc Lange What Would Normative Necessity Be?
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Fine and Rosen have argued that normative necessity is distinct from and weaker than metaphysical necessity. The first aim of this paper is to specify what it would take for this view to be true—that is, what normative necessity (as weaker than metaphysical necessity) would have to be like. The author argues that in order for normative necessity to be weaker than metaphysical necessity, the metaphysical necessities must all be preserved under every counterfactual antecedent with which they are all collectively logically consistent—even when their preservation requires that a normative necessity fail to be preserved. By exhibiting some examples that fail to display this pattern of counterfactual invariance, the author argues against the view that normative necessity is weaker than (and perforce distinct from) metaphysical necessity. To give this argument (and to address some possible replies to it) is the second aim of this paper.
48. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 115 > Issue: 4
Kevin J. Lande The Perspectival Character of Perception
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You can perceive things, in many respects, as they really are. For example, you can correctly see a coin as circular from most angles. Nonetheless, your perception of the world is perspectival. The coin looks different when slanted than when head-on, and there is some respect in which the slanted coin looks similar to a head-on ellipse. Many hold that perception is perspectival because you perceive certain properties that correspond to the “looks” of things. I argue that this view is misguided. I consider the two standard versions of this view. What I call the PLURALIST APPROACH fails to give a unified account of the perspectival character of perception, while what I call the PERSPECTIVAL PROPERTIES APPROACH violates central commitments of contemporary psychology. I propose instead that perception is perspectival because of the way perceptual states are structured from their parts.
comments and criticism
49. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 115 > Issue: 4
Mihnea D. I. Capraru Note on the Individuation of Biological Traits
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Bence Nanay has argued that we must abandon the etiological theory of teleological function because this theory explains functions and functional categories in a circular manner. Paul Griffiths argued earlier that we should retain the etiological theory and instead prevent the circularity by making etiologies independent of functional categories. Karen Neander and Alex Rosenberg reply to Nanay similarly, and argue that we should analyze functions in terms of natural selection acting not on functional categories, but merely on lineages. Nanay replies that these lineages cannot be individuated except by reference to functional categories. Worryingly, Neander and Rosenberg themselves have previously argued persuasively that homology often depends on function. This article addresses their arguments and shows how to escape them: Regardless whether the arguments are right about long-term homological categories, they do not apply to generation-to-generation homology. The latter, moreover, is sufficient for individuating the lineages needed to explain teleological functions.
50. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 115 > Issue: 4
New Books
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