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Displaying: 41-50 of 177 documents

41. Journal of Indian Philosophy and Religion: Volume > 19
Hiren Sarkar Can Religion be Given a Role in Promoting Economic Development?: A Future Research Agenda for India
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Religion consists of a set of beliefs about supernatural; heaven, hell, afterlife, understanding acts of sin and piety, and belief in the existence of God through which people relate to the non-nnaterialistic world. Economics, on the other hand, deals with ways and means through which people make money and spend it to satisfy their materialistic needs. Evidences suggest that the former influences the latter and economic performance can be related to religiosity. In this situation can religion be used as an instrument for bettering economic and social performance in India? If so, are there any specific observed modalities for this phenomenon? The paper reviews and analyses selected studies and research from the West and one study from India which can help answer the million dollar question stated above. The paper concludes that a systematic study on assessing the role of religion in shaping economic performance in India is needed before a debate on the issue can start. A future research agenda is suggested in this regard.
42. Journal of Indian Philosophy and Religion: Volume > 19
Chandana Chakrabarti The Divinity in Hinduism
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43. Journal of Indian Philosophy and Religion: Volume > 19
Heather Salazar Descartes' and Patañjali's Conceptions of the Self
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Rene Descartes (1596-1650) and Patanjali, author of the Yoga Sutras (c. 400 CE?), are both famous for articulating paradigmatic expressions of substance dualism, the view that the true self or mind is a fundamentally different kind of substance than the physical body. Typically, each is cited as the case study of dualism, for the Western tradition and for the Indian tradition respectively. This paper examines Desartes'and Pataiijali's conceptions of the self, the methods for how to discover it, and what its purpose and limitations are. It explores to what extent these two conceptions of the self are reconcilable and in the process of doing so, tries to illustrate the way in which such comparative philosophy, across traditions, helps to illuminate each tradition.
44. Journal of Indian Philosophy and Religion: Volume > 19
Kisor K. Chakrabarti AAtmatattvaviveka (Analysis of the Nature of the Self) An Annotated Translation: Proof of Permanence
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45. Journal of Indian Philosophy and Religion: Volume > 18
Kisor Kumar Chakrabarti, Stephen H. Phillips Counterinference
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Counterinference is one of five kinds of pseudo-prover (similar to fallacy in Western logic) recognized in the Nyaaya school. Typically in counterinference while one side seeks to prove the thesis that a probandum belongs to an inferential subject because an inferential mark pervaded by the probandum belongs to that subject, an opponent challenges that by arguing that the probandum does not belong to the inferential subject because another inferential mark pervaded by absence (negation) of the probandum belongs to that subject. A common example is: sound is eternal, since it is audible and audibility is pervaded by eternality (i.e. all that is audible is eternal, like sound-ness, the common property of all sound particulars); but sound is non-eternal, since it is originated (by clapping hands, etc.) and all that is originated is non-eternal, like a pot, etc. Critics from other philosophical schools have objected that counterinference is not an additional kind of pseudo-prover. Since it is impossible for an inferential subject both to have and not to have a probandum, either at least one of the inferential marks does not belong to the inferential subject (the fallacy of being unestablished) or at least one of the inferential marks lacks pervasion (the fallacy of deviation) and, accordingly, counterinference should be subsumed under those fallacies. Nyaaya philosophers have responded by pointing out that the formal structure of counterinference is different from that of the other fallacies: in counterinference we have two different inferential marks but not in the other candidates. The epistemic result of counterinference is also different from that of the other fallacies mentioned, it is argued further. Moreover, it is contended (against a Nyaaya faction) that the epistemic result is not doubt as specifically understood in Nyaaya but desire to know the truth about the chosen inferential mark and the probandum. Accordingly, counterinference may be explained as that which provides the ground for inquiring what is the truth about the original inferential mark and its probandum due to presentation of an inferential assimilation (paraamarsha) that contradicts the original inferential assimilation. The discussion yields also a broader normative principle that contradiction or counterproof provides the epistemic ground for further inquiry even if there is proof. The selection is from the Tattva-cintaa-maNi, the canonical Navya-Nyaaya work of GaMgesha (14th century CE?). The selection is from a large work and presupposes some things explained elsewhere in the text. Further, though written with great precision the work paradoxically belongs to the old Indian philosophical oral tradition in which a beginner is expected to read it with the help of additional information supplied by an expert. Hence paying close attention to what is implied in the context and supplementing certain ideas is necessary for interpretation and understanding.
46. Journal of Indian Philosophy and Religion: Volume > 18
James A. Dunson III The Accidental Optimist: Arthur Schopenhauer, The Veil of Maya, and Moral Philosophy as a Way of Life
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47. Journal of Indian Philosophy and Religion: Volume > 18
L. Brooke Schueneman Tragedy and Reconciliation in the RaamaayaNa
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48. Journal of Indian Philosophy and Religion: Volume > 18
J. Randall Groves The Aryan Hypothesis and Indian Identity: A Case Study in the Postmodern Pathology of National Identity
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In this paper I trace various uses of the Aryan hypothesis by different groups of Indian and non-Indian scholars of Indian history in order to show how this hypothesis has taken several forms as it was put to use in the construction of Indian identity. These constructions of Indian identity will show that India is suffering a pathology of identity in response to the modern and postmodern stresses it is undergoing. India is not alone in its present postmodern pathology. We see the same phenomenon in various parts of the world with the conservative and religious revivals in the Islamic world, Israel and the United States.
49. Journal of Indian Philosophy and Religion: Volume > 18
Ilana Maymind A Comparative Case Study: Memory, Law and Morality
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50. Journal of Indian Philosophy and Religion: Volume > 18
Michael Yudanin Merciless Justice: The Dialectic of the Universal and the Particular in Kantian Ethics, Competitive Games, and Bhagavad Gîtâ
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Morality is traditionally understood as comprised of two components: justice and mercy. The first component, justice, the universal component of the form, is frequently seen as foundational for any moral system . which poses a challenge of explaining the second component, mercy, the particular component of content. Kantian ethics provides an example of this approach. After formulating his universalist theory of ethics in the Groundwork of the metaphysics of morals and further developing it in the Critique of practical reason, he attempts to use it in order to establish the morality of mercy in the Metaphysics of morals. Yet can universal morality of justice necessitate particular ethics of mercy? Using the example of competitive games, the relations between the ethics of justice and that of mercy are demonstrated, and it is shown that the former does not lead to the latter. Moreover, the universality of the rules of moral behavior can serve as a form for blatant brutality. Analyzing the characteristics of particular morality, we can conclude that physical humanity of the moral object, perceived as such by the subject, is a required condition for mercy. Removal of object.s humanity is a necessary step toward an ethical system that allows cruelty . a system that can still be based on universal moral rules. Bhagavad Gîtâ, on the other hand, can be seen as an example of combining nî?kâmakarma, the formal, universal ethics of desireless action, with a variety of particular motivations originating in the nature and social context of the moral agent.