Already a subscriber? Login here
Not yet a subscriber? - Subscribe here

Browse by:

Displaying: 41-50 of 1843 documents

discussion papers
41. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 38 > Issue: 3
Mark Michael, Environmental Pragmatism, Community Values, and the Problem of Reprehensible Implications
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
Environmental pragmatists such as Bryan Norton and Ben Minteer argue that environmental philosophers should look to the values of real people and communities to determine which environmental policies and legislation should be put into place. But they want to avoid a kind of simplistic relativism, since that view entails all sorts of reprehensible conclusions about what is right and wrong and what is valuable, both generally and with respect to the environment. Their solution is to distinguish between the community’s surface or apparent values and its true values—the community’s true values serve as the basis for the moral appraisal and justification of policies and legislation, and they believe that these will neither endorse nor justify reprehensible principles or policies. The community’s true values, according to Norton, are those that survive a critical, deliberative process. However, there is no reason to think that the process described by Norton will yield normatively better values—values that do not have reprehensible implications. Even if the process described by Norton were to have this effect, he cannot consistently appeal to it, since it runs counter to his overall account of value as being nothing more than actual instances of real people caring about and valuing something. If value is a function of what people actually value here and now, then what people would value under conditions that are unlikely to occur is irrelevant to what is valuable and what can count as the true values of a community. Thus, Norton’s view, and environmental pragmatism, at least to the extent that Norton’s account is representative of that view, remains susceptible to the reprehensible implications problem.
42. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 38 > Issue: 3
Ovadia Ezra, Global Distributive Justice: An Environmental Perspective
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
The environmental crisis in general, especially the problem of global warming, as well as the poverty and distress that a large part of the world experiences, demands a solution in terms of global distributive justice. This solution should focus on greenhouse emissions into the atmosphere throughout the world. If developed countries think that they have the right to do whatever they like with regard to the natural resources that are within their territories which then affect global greenhouse emissions, then developing countries should have the same right with regard to such emissions above their territories when they consequently make uninhibited and unrestrained use of their own resources. Rich countries that reject this idea have to accept the idea that they should share part of their wealth with poor countries when they ask them to engage in restrained development.
book reviews
43. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 38 > Issue: 3
Andrea R. Gammon, Emplotting Virtue: A Narrative Approach to Environmental Virtue Ethics
view |  rights & permissions | cited by
44. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 38 > Issue: 3
Brian Treanor, The Wisdom of Frugality: Why Less is More—More or Less
view |  rights & permissions | cited by
45. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 38 > Issue: 2
view |  rights & permissions | cited by
46. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 38 > Issue: 2
Lars Ursin, The Ethics of the Meat Paradox
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
The meat paradox—to like eating meat, but dislike killing and harming animals—confronts omnivores with a powerful contradiction between eating and caring for animals. The paradox, however, trades on a conflation of the illegitimacy of harming and killing animals. While harming animals is morally wrong, killing animals can be legitimate if done with minimal suffering and respect for the moral status of the animal. This moral status demands the ac­knowledgement of a certain justification for killing animals that makes modesty a virtue of the omnivore. The psychological problem with regard to killing animals can persist even if the moral tension is weakened, but only to a certain degree, since emotions and principles are interdependent in moral reasoning. Virtuous meat consumption demands a willingness to face the conflicting feelings involved in killing animals and to tolerate the resulting tension.
47. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 38 > Issue: 2
Chin-Fa Cheng, Environmental Ontology in Deep Ecology and Mahayana Buddhism
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
Environmental ontology, as formulated by Arne Naess, includes both an “external side,” Ecosophy T and his gestalt framework, and an “internal side” to his project, the “peaceful mind” that accompanies an external transformation of living within a relational community of life. The roots of Ecosophy T are in Spinoza. It may be possible to remedy the shortcomings of Naess’ view by extending his view to connect with key ideas in Mahayana Buddhism, show­ing that human nature, the process of realization, and gestalt thinking all cooperate together.
48. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 38 > Issue: 2
Erik Persson, Option Value, Substitutable Species, and Ecosystem Services
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
The concept of ecosystem services is a way of visualizing the instrumental value that nature has for human beings. Most ecosystem services can be performed by more than one species. This fact is sometimes used as an argument against the preservation of species. However, even though substitutability does detract from the instrumental value of a species, it also adds option value to it. The option value cannot make a substitutable species as instrumentally valuable as a non-substitutable species, but in many cases, it can add enough value to make the species more valuable than the projects that threaten its existence.
49. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 38 > Issue: 2
Yogi Hale Hendlin, Konrad Ott, Habermas on Nature: A Postnormal Reading between Moral Intuitions and Theoretical Restrictiveness
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
Environmental ethicists typically consider Jürgen Habermas’s theory of communicative action to exclude moral consideration for nonhuman animals. Habermas's early work indeed limits relationships with nature to instrumental ones. Yet, interspersed throughout Habermas's writings are clear indications that nonhuman life deserves moral consideration, and that humans can enter into communicative relationships with nonhumans, however asymmetrical. Habermas’s anthropocentric theoretical foundations can achieve a revised, reflective equilibrium congruent with his persistent intuitions that nonhumans also possess powers of communication (but not discourse) that would grant them moral consideration, perhaps allowing us to enter into non-linguistic interspecies communicative activity. Habermasians can incorporate non-instrumental relationships with nature into discourse ethics’ set of applications without ignoring the special role of language in communication. Rather than holding that the differencia specifica between humans and nonhumans exists in communication, it makes more sense instead to displace this distinction between communicative action as a general category and the special case of discourse. Doing so permits intuitions of nonhuman moral considerability and communicative possibility without altering the discursive core of Habermas’s theory.
50. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 38 > Issue: 2
Thomas Heyd, Bertrand Guillaume, The Natural Contract in the Anthropocene
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
In view of humanity’s vast and accelerating environmental impacts on the planet in its more recent past it has been proposed to think of this period as a new geologic epoch called “the Anthropocene.” While some suppose that our present situation justifies large-scale, corrective interventions, Michel Serres has proposed “a contract with nature,” which, to the contrary, calls for a reduction in our interventions on the planet. Although there are difficulties in engaging in a contract with something lacking autonomous agency, rationality, and sentience, the idea of a natural contract does make sense. It offers a richly suggestive reconception of socio-political relationships between human society and the natural world, and has enough precedents to serve as a source of inspiration and guidance for the urgently needed transformation of our approach to the natural environment.