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Displaying: 41-50 of 720 documents

41. Forum Philosophicum: Volume > 20 > Issue: 2
Douglas A. Shepardson Maximus and Socrates on Trial: A Historic-Literary Consanguinity of Rebellion
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Although the similarities between the trial of Socrates and the trial of Jesus have been discussed since the age of the Apologists, the same cannot be said about the anonymously written Trial of Maximus the Confessor and Plato’s Apology. My paper seeks to start this discussion. First I look at the historical context of each trial, finding that each was preceded by a rebellion that the accused was suspected of inciting (the Thirty Tyrants’ in one, the Exarch Gregory’s in the other). Then I summarize the Trial, noting numerous similarities between it and the Apology. After this, I examine some of these similarities in detail. In particular, I show that the defense speeches of both Socrates and Maximus reveal a layer of duplicity endemic to the text: while both Socrates and Maximus appear to exonerate themselves, their defense speeches actually contain harsh mockeries of their accusers. Next, I elucidate the consanguinity between the defendants’ opposition to their cities’ god(s), whom they feel compelled to reject, and their introduction of new gods into their cities (the god of reason and the Christ of Dyothelitism)—a charge for which both defendants were tragically convicted. Finally, I examine the manner in which both figures play gadfly to their city.
42. Forum Philosophicum: Volume > 20 > Issue: 2
Cullan Joyce Unity, Interdependence, and Multiplicity in Maximus the Confessor: An Engagement with Heidegger’s Topology
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This paper explores how Heidegger’s discussion of experience as topos (place) can illuminate some elements of Maximus’ writings. In Heidegger’slater work, the experiencing subject emerges from, and experiences only within, place. Experience is only ever constituted when the conditions of its emergence come together concretely, which is to say, somewhere. Topos, a place, such as a city or my home, is a unity of the elements that make it up. The essay first examines how Heidegger sees philosophical inquiry as a drawing out of the different elements that constitute the unity of experience as place. Many works of Maximus the Confessor, including his ascetic writings, examine how the subject experiences within the world. Using the topological account of experience described by Heidegger, the paper examines several distinctions that emerge from Maximus’ ascetic thought. Using examples, the essay suggests it is possible to see Maximus’ analyses as being engagements with an understanding to the effect that experience emerges with a unity, in topos. The essay suggests that reading Maximus through topos helps explain why it is that so many structures can arise interdependently through his engagement with experience.
book reviews
43. Forum Philosophicum: Volume > 20 > Issue: 2
Anna Zhyrkova George E. Karamanolis: The Philosophy of Early Christianity
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44. Forum Philosophicum: Volume > 20 > Issue: 2
Reviewers of Articles Published in 2015
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45. Forum Philosophicum: Volume > 20 > Issue: 2
Note about Forum Philosophicum
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46. Forum Philosophicum: Volume > 20 > Issue: 1
Marcin Podbielski A Note from the Editor
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47. Forum Philosophicum: Volume > 20 > Issue: 1
Paul Kabay Nonetheism: A Non-atheistic Account of a Non-existent God: A Non-atheistic Account of a Non-existent God
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I briefly defend a view I call nonetheism: the claim that God is a non-existent item. I develop a defense that might be acceptable to a theist, but I also note that arguments for atheism would also support this claim. As such, nonetheism is a form of theism that is actually supported by the case for atheism. I begin by showing that it is possible for there to be a non-existent object—that such an idea is coherent. I then argue that a non-existent item is actual and follow this with a defense of the coherency of claiming that God is a non-existent object. The paper concludes by demonstrating that the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo entailsthe non-existence of God and so any evidence in support of creation from nothing is evidence in support of nonetheism.
48. Forum Philosophicum: Volume > 20 > Issue: 1
Paul Kucharski Speaking Rationally About the Good: Karol Wojtyła on Being and the Normative Order
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In this paper, I explain and defend Karol Wojtyła’s claim that “if we wish to speak rationally about good and evil, we have to return to the philosophyof being. If we do not set out from such ‘realist’ presuppositions, we end up in a vacuum.” I begin by outlining Wojtyła’s existential understanding of the good,according to which the good for x is found in those ends that complete the being that is lacking in x, or that enhance its existence in keeping with its nature.(Here Wojtyła is drawing from, and building upon, Thomas Aquinas’s account of goodness and being.) Then I explain how Wojtyła moves from an existentialunderstanding of the good to the thesis that “exemplarism is the very heart of the normative order.” Finally, using representative thinkers from both the Continentaland Analytic traditions, I defend Wojtyła’s claim that when we divorce goodness from being we end up in a moral vacuum, in a kind of nihilism wherethe good signifies nothing other than the rationalized articulation of one’s subjective needs, desires, or wishes. In such a state, the only means for resolving moraldisagreements is through the consensus of the majority or the forceful rule of the strongest will.
49. Forum Philosophicum: Volume > 20 > Issue: 1
Leland Harper Epistemic Deism Revisited
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In 2013 I wrote a paper entitled “A Deistic Discussion of Murphy and Tracy’s Accounts of God’s Limited Activity in the Natural World,” in which I criticized the views of Nancey Murphy and Thomas Tracy, labeling their views as something that I called “epistemic deism.” Since the publication of that paper another,similar, view by Bradley Monton was brought to my attention, one called “noninterventionist special divine action theory.” I take this paper as an opportunityto accomplish several goals. First, I take it as an opportunity to clarify and correct some of my previous claims. Secondly, I present and analyze Monton’sview. And, finally, I discuss the similarities that Monton’s view holds with those of Murphy’s and Tracy’s and discuss how they all can be reduced to being partof the same family of ontological views which are, ultimately, implausible.
50. Forum Philosophicum: Volume > 20 > Issue: 1
Francis Jonbäck How to Be a Very Friendly Atheist Indeed
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Friendly atheists hold atheism to be true, and believe that theists may be rational when holding theism to be true. Theists may be rational, they claim, either because they lack the evidence for atheism, or because they are mistaken regarding the evidential force of the arguments for theism. Both these reasons canbe interpreted as suggesting that theists are making a mistake, and perhaps even that they are blameworthy for having made that mistake. In this paper, I arguethat friendly atheists might even say that the most intellectually oriented theists are rational and blameless for holding theism to be true. I give two reasons forthis. The first reason is based on the denial of doxastic voluntarism regarding at least some of our beliefs. Theists might not have voluntary control with respect totheir belief that God exists. The second reason is based on a meta-epistemological consideration. Often, we choose our epistemology by looking at paradigm examples of knowledge. Growing up in a theistic context might lead one to regard the belief that God exists as a paradigm example of knowledge, and a theist could be considered perfectly rational and blameless for doing so, even though they may be aware of reasonable arguments for atheism. With these odifications, I suggest that Friendly Atheism is very friendly indeed.