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Displaying: 41-50 of 1660 documents


articles
41. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 35 > Issue: 1
Patrick Todd Does God Have the Moral Standing to Blame?
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In this paper, I introduce a problem to the philosophy of religion—the problem of divine moral standing—and explain how this problem is distinct from (albeit related to) the more familiar problem of evil (with which it is often conflated). In short, the problem is this: given how God would be (or, on some conceptions, is) “involved in” our actions, how is it that God has the moral standing to blame us for performing those very actions? In light of the recent literature on “moral standing,” I consider God’s moral standing to blame on two models of “divine providence”: open theism and theological determinism. I contend that God may have standing on open theism, and—perhaps surprisingly—may also have standing even on theological determinism, given the truth of compatibilism. The topic of this paper thus sheds considerable light on the traditional philosophical debate about the conditions of moral responsibility.
42. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 35 > Issue: 1
Katherine Dormandy Resolving Religious Disagreements: Evidence and Bias
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Resolving religious disagreements is difficult, for beliefs about religion tend to come with strong biases against other views and the people who hold them. Evidence can help, but there is no agreed-upon policy for weighting it, and moreover bias affects the content of our evidence itself. Another complicating factor is that some biases are reliable and others unreliable. What we need is an evidence-weighting policy geared toward negotiating the effects of bias. I consider three evidence-weighting policies in the philosophy of religion and advocate one of them as the best for promoting the resolution of religious disagreements.
43. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 35 > Issue: 1
Martin Pickup Answer to Our Prayers: The Unsolved But Solvable Problem of Petitionary Prayer
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There is a concern about the effectiveness of petitionary prayer. If I pray for something good, wouldn’t God give it to me anyway? And if I pray for something bad, won’t God refrain from giving it to me even though I’ve asked? This problem has received significant attention. The typical solutions suggest that the prayer itself can alter whether something is good or bad. I will argue that this is insufficient to fully address the problem, but also that the problem requires another assumption which can be doubted, thereby opening up a new way to solve the problem.
44. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 35 > Issue: 1
Myron A. Penner Cognitive Science of Religion, Atheism, and Theism
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Some claim that cognitive science of religion (CSR) either completely “explains religion away,” or at the very least calls the epistemic status of religious belief into question. Others claim that religious beliefs are the cognitive outputs of systems that seem highly reliable in other contexts, and thus CSR provides positive epistemic support for religious belief. I argue that (i) CSR does not provide evidence for atheism, but (ii) if one is an atheist, CSR lends “intellectual aid and comfort,” (iii) CSR does not provide evidence for theism, but (iv) if one is a theist, CSR provides qualified support for Reformed Epistemology.
45. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 35 > Issue: 1
Brian Embry On (Not) Believing That God Has Answered a Prayer
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Scott Davison has raised an epistemic challenge to the doctrine of petitionary prayer. Roughly, the challenge is that we cannot know or have reason to believe that a prayer has been answered. Davison argues that the epistemic challenge undermines all the extant defenses of petitionary prayer. I argue that it does not.
book reviews
46. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 35 > Issue: 1
C. R. Dodsworth The Good and the Good Book: Revelation as a Guide to Life, by Samuel Fleischacker
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47. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 35 > Issue: 1
Trent Dougherty Taking Pascal’s Wager: Faith, Evidence, and the Abundant Life, by Michael Rota
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articles
48. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 34 > Issue: 4
Brandon Warmke God’s Standing to Forgive
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It is generally thought that we cannot forgive people for things they do to others. I cannot forgive you for lying to your mother, for instance. I lack standing to do so. But many people believe that God can forgive us for things we do to others. How is this possible? This is the question I wish to explore. Call it the problem of divine standing. I begin by cataloging the various ways one can have standing to forgive a wrongdoer. I then provide two solutions to the problem of divine standing.
49. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 34 > Issue: 4
Claire Brown Peterson Humility in the Deficient
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Contemporary treatments of humility typically treat humility as a virtue that is reserved for the accomplished. I argue that paradigmatic humility can also be possessed by the deficient, and I provide an extended example of such humility. I further argue that attending to such a case helps us to appreciate the way in which the humble have released both the desire for superiority and the aversion to inferiority. Accordingly, when necessary, the humble will exhibit an extremely low concern with their own status relative to that of others.
50. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 34 > Issue: 4
John Ross Churchill Determinism and Divine Blame
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Theological determinism is, at first glance, difficult to square with the typical Christian commitment to the appropriateness of divine blame. How, we may wonder, can it be appropriate for God to blame someone for something that was determined to occur by God in the first place? In this paper, I try to clarify this challenge to Christian theological determinism, arguing that its most cogent version includes specific commitments about what is involved when God blames wrongdoers. I then argue that these commitments are not essential to divine blame, and that there are plausible alternative accounts of such blame that would not court similar challenges. I end with a case for the intelligibility of divine blame within theological determinism, in light of its possible similarity in relevant respects to certain instances of intelligible human blame.