Already a subscriber? - Login here
Not yet a subscriber? - Subscribe here

Displaying: 41-50 of 461 documents

41. Epoché: A Journal for the History of Philosophy: Volume > 22 > Issue: 2
Robert Clewis Kant’s Physical Geography and the Critical Philosophy
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
Kant’s geographical theory, which was informed by contemporary travel reports, diaries, and journals, developed before his so-called “critical turn.” There are several reasons to study Kant’s lectures and material on geography. The geography provided Kant with terms, concepts, and metaphors which he employed in order to present or elucidate the critical philosophy. Some of the germs of what would become Kant’s critical philosophy can already be detected in the geography course. Finally, Kant’s geography is also one (though not the only) source of some of the empirical claims in his philosophical works, including the Critique of the Power of Judgment. To give an example of this, I examine his account of the sublime.
42. Epoché: A Journal for the History of Philosophy: Volume > 22 > Issue: 2
John H. Zammito Kant and the Medical Faculty: One "Conflict of the Faculties"
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
The conflict between Kant and the medical faculty was far more complex and substantial than is indicated in the section of his famous Conflict of the Faculties addressing this matter. In this essay I will consider not only what Kant, as a philoso­pher, thought of medicine as a faculty, but what medicine as a faculty thought of Kant as a philosopher.
43. Epoché: A Journal for the History of Philosophy: Volume > 22 > Issue: 2
Karin De Boer Hegel’s Non-Revolutionary Account of the French Revolution in the Phenomenology of Spirit
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
Focusing on the section ‘Absolute Freedom and Terror’ of the Phenomenology of Spirit, this article argues that the method Hegel employs in this work does not capture the full significance of the French Revolution. I claim that Hegel’s method is reformist rather than revolutionary: Hegel deliberately restricts his analyses to transformations that occur within the element of thought and presents the changes that occur within this element as logically ensuing from one another. This approach, I argue, is at odds with the very concept of a revolution. Seen in this way, efforts to frame Hegel’s philosophy as revolutionary are misguided.
44. Epoché: A Journal for the History of Philosophy: Volume > 22 > Issue: 2
Dilek Huseyinzadegan Between Necessity and Contingency: A Critical Philosophy of History in the Dialectic of Enlightenment
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
In this essay, I argue for a revival of Adorno and Horkheimer’s critical philosophy of history on account of the fact that their construction articulates both the necessity of various aspects of our current socio-political conditions given the past tendencies of rationality and domination, and the contingency of the present miseries by problematizing the continuous historical narratives that justify a certain version of the present. After demonstrating that the accomplishment of critical philosophy of history has to be located in the dialectic of the necessary as well as the contingent elements of historical developments, I turn to the Dialectic of Enlightenment as a particular constellation that exemplifies this accomplishment. I show that in this book we find a critical philosophy of history that narrates a story that both makes fascism the necessary corollary and conclusion of instrumental rationality and shows its contingent entanglement with domination. In this way, the initial question of how reason and rationality can lead to domination is now transformed into one that asks how we can we reinterpret and re-animate them such that they are no longer complicit with domination.
45. Epoché: A Journal for the History of Philosophy: Volume > 22 > Issue: 2
Karen Robertson Heidegger and the Ambivalent Status of Human Interpretation: Art, History, Modernity
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
Drawing on Heidegger’s essay “The Origin on the Work of Art,” I argue that works of art reveal human experience to be simultaneously finite and ecstatic and that art is part of the way our experience unfolds. Secondly, I argue that the dynamic of experience that art enables and in which it is implicated is precisely what historical experience is; this historical character of our experience is also always intersubjective and relational. Next, I turn to “Why Poets?” to analyse Heidegger’s critique of Rilke’s work in terms of the idea that works of art are involved in our self-constitution as historical and relational beings. Reading these two essays together, finally, allows me to conclude by characterising the demands of a distinctly modern experience of interpretation and by identifying the need to question what it means to be a “we” as the defining question of modernity.
46. Epoché: A Journal for the History of Philosophy: Volume > 22 > Issue: 2
Pamela Carralero A Holy Aesthetic: Recognizing an Art that is Otherwise than Art in the Work of Emmanuel Levinas
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
Despite Emmanuel Levinas’s famous denigration of art in “Reality and Its Shadow” as an egregious evasion of ethical responsibility, discussions of poetic art in his later writings court the ethical rhetoric that lies at the heart of his philosophy. Refuting claims that a more mature Levinas simply changed his attitude towards art, this article argues the existence of a poetic art that equates to a Jewish understanding of Temimut, or holiness, and describes the written word as a “holy aesthetic” born of ethical artistic intentions. Through these claims, this article seeks to add an interdisciplinary dimension to existing Levinas scholarship on ethical aesthetics, which has yet to consider how Levinas’s later discussions of art emerge from Talmudic thought.
47. Epoché: A Journal for the History of Philosophy: Volume > 22 > Issue: 2
Mirela Oliva Hermeneutics and the Meaning of Life
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
Hermeneutics approaches the meaning of life quite uniquely: it grasps the intrinsic intelligibility of life by employing a universal concept of meaning, applicable to all phenomena. While other conceptions identify the meaning of life with values or scopes, hermeneutics starts from a grass-roots work on the meanings that are embedded at every level of reality. In this paper, I analyze this approach, especially focusing on Husserl, Heidegger, and Gadamer. First, I outline Husserl’s philosophy of meaning as developed in response to the crisis of meaning. Second, I discuss Heidegger’s concept of meaning and his understanding of life as self-movement. Third, I analyze Gadamer’s concept of common sense (viewed as the grasp of the totality of life) and his idea of hermeneutic mediation that conveys the meaning of life itself.
48. Epoché: A Journal for the History of Philosophy: Volume > 22 > Issue: 1
Nancy Tuana, Charles Scott Guest Editors' Introduction
view |  rights & permissions | cited by
49. Epoché: A Journal for the History of Philosophy: Volume > 22 > Issue: 1
Dennis J. Schmidt Letter of Thanks
view |  rights & permissions | cited by
50. Epoché: A Journal for the History of Philosophy: Volume > 22 > Issue: 1
Charles Scott Lives of Idioms
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
Dennis Schmidt is developing a way of thinking that has at its core his understanding of "idiom," especially in what he calls "original ethics" and "idiomatic truth." This paper engages that understanding, distinguishes linguistic idioms and "event idioms," shows the transformative effects in both his thought and his life that his focus on idioms has had and is having in the present direction of his constructive philosophy, and further shows that this direction has the potential to change considerably major aspects of contemporary continental philosophy.