Ancient Philosophy

I will deal with a much-discussed passage of Aristophanes’ Birds, in which Socrates is depicted as a psuchagogos, a conjurer of souls. This is the only passage in Socratic literature in which such an activity is attributed to Socrates. In the Clouds, which was staged nine years prior to Birds, Aristophanes defines Socrates’ school as the ‘thinkery of wise souls’, and the endeavors of his pupils as a ‘taking care’ of their own souls. In the Clouds, Socrates is portrayed training his pupils in natural philosophy, eristic arguments and Orphic-Pythagorean rituals: but what Socrates specifically does with the souls of his pupils is not clear at all. For this, we have to look to Birds, and in particular to verses 1553-1564, a passage I examine in detail. I first discuss the passage itself and how it relates to the comedy as a whole, I then provide a reading of parallel passages from the Clouds and Pythagorean literature, before finally returning to the verses in the Birds to draw some conclusions.

This article responds to scholars that claim that Xenophon’s Socrates, unlike Plato’s Socrates, never professes ignorance about moral matters (§1). I cite instances when the behavior of Xenophon’s Socrates implies that he acknowledges ignorance about particular moral matters. Implied acknowledgement of ignorance amounts to implicit profession (§2). I then consider passages that are evidence that Xenophon’s Socrates professed his ignorance about ‘the greatest things’, which include ethical matters much larger than particular (§3).

English translates ‘genos’ as kind and ‘eidos’ as form, which differ in meaning as much as ‘herd’ and ‘brand’ do. But there are hard passages where ‘genos’ and ‘eidos’ have appeared to be synonyms, usually given the new meaning class. We show that, although ‘genos’ and ‘eidos’ are never synonyms and continue to mean kind and form, the word ‘eidos’ can be used figuratively, as a metonym, for a genos.

In the Gorgias, Socrates claims that painful bodily punishment like flogging can improve certain wrongdoers. I argue that we can take Socrates’ endorsement seriously, even on the standard interpretation of Socratic motivational intellectualism, according to which there are no non-rational desires. I propose that flogging can epistemically improve certain wrongdoers by communicating that wrongdoing is bad for oneself. In certain cases, this belief cannot be communicated effectively through philosophical dialogue.

The four most prominent myths of Plato’s Republic oddly share a common motif, namely, the depiction of a subterranean locale to and from which individuals are depicted as traveling. This analysis offers an account of this motif that complements the themes of the “ascent” and “descent” of the philosopher, but draws more deeply upon katabasis mythology to reveal a subtext about individual transformation that enriches our understanding of justice.

This article investigates how Plato thinks we secure necessary motivational conditions for inquiry. After presenting a typology of zetetic breakdowns in the dialogues, I identify norms of inquiry Plato believes all successful inquirers must satisfy. Satisfying these norms requires trust that philosophy will not harm but benefit inquirers overall. This trust cannot be secured by protreptic argument. Instead, it requires divine intervention—an extra-rational foundation for rational inquiry.

Phantastic interpreters of the emotions in Aristotle argue that a quasi-perceptual faculty, phantasia, is responsible for grasping the relevant value content. This article argues that phantasia cannot do this work. Rather, it claims, a phantastic account either collapses into the straight-up perceptual account or it fails to offer a cognitive account at all (despite the claims made by some of its adherents). According to the first option the focal value properties, such as slights and danger, are part of perceptual content from the start. It ends by proposing that phantastic interpreters are better off opting for the straight-up perceptual account, a view that has wide-ranging implications for our interpretation of Aristotle.

This article traces the limits of the understanding of beauty as unified multiplicity in Plotinus’ Enneads vi 2 and vi 6. These treatises can be read as insisting on the significance of multiplicity for beauty and as implying a distinction between the illuminated and the unilluminated beauty of Intellect. In treatise vi 7, this distinction is made explicit and a deeper understanding of beauty as the manifestation of the Good in Intellect is introduced.

In Sextus’ discussion of ‘place’ we find an attempt to insulate the philosophical questions about the conception of place and the ordinary answers to questions about where certain things are from one another. Common moves in dialectical practice against begging the question are used to delimitate the two contexts. Contrary to Myles Burnyeat’s interpretation, I argue, through close reading of the relevant texts, that there is no inconsistency in Sextus’ attempt.

In commenting on Aristotle’s κοινότατος λόγος of the soul – which portrays it as ‘the first actuality of a natural body having life in potentiality’– Philoponus suggests that seeds and embryos are not potentially alive bodies, despite ‘having become ready to receive life from the soul’ (209.17). To the extent that something’s suitability to be ensouled turns it eo ipso into a potentially alive thing, Philoponus’ remark may betray a contradiction, that can be handled by tinkering with the scope of a closely attached adverb. This paper argues that no such intervention is required, however, and that apparent inconsistencies vanish as soon as Neoplatonic embryology and Philoponus’ lexical background are given their due.

The article reconstructs a late ancient debate concerning a dilemma raised by Aristotle’s De anima: How can an impassive soul account for perceiving qua being affected by perceptual objects? It is argued that Alexander and Themistius developed radically different approaches which can be better understood within a larger context of the dialogue between Aristotelianism and Platonism. The debate is shown to be instructive in underlining difficulties inherent in Aristotle’s account.

This essay pursues the question of vegetal respiration in Presocratics’ doctrines in contrast to Aristotle’s categorical circumscription of this vital process to the blooded animals. It finds that epithelial respiration in DK31 B100 is central to Empedocles’ conception of plants’ breathing, linked to their fructification, deciduousness, and overall life preservation. It also discusses plants’ respiration in relation to their body temperature in Menestor, then, concludes by analyzing Democritus’ psychological doctrine, arguing that the intake of fiery atoms pertained to all living beings, plants included.

In suggesting that its last chapter’s purpose is to provoke the reader to begin reconsidering and thus rereading the book they have just read, this article attempts to negotiate the interpretive quarrel as whether Xenophon’s Cyropaedia deserves a “sunny” reading—in which Cyrus straightforwardly embodies Xenophon’s own political ideals—or a more critical “dark” one, that separates the author from his protagonist. To help us get the most advantage from the paideia his book was intended to provide, Xenophon made a “sunny” first reading plausible, but he also sowed in his text the kind of clues—especially with respect to pleonexia—that would reveal his full intentions only to those who reread his book.

This paper aims to shed light on a difficult passage from Plato’s Alcibiades, in which Socrates presents an analogy between vision and knowledge. It argues that we can make sense of some puzzling Socratic claims if we acknowledge that the analogy points to the Theory of Forms. In urging Alcibiades to come to know himself, then, Socrates is urging him to come to know the Forms.