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31. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 35 > Issue: 1
Kenneth L. Brewer Fashion and the Judgment of Taste: Coming to Terms with Kant
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32. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 35 > Issue: 1
Richard Galvin, John Harris Collective Action Problems and the Ethics of Virtue
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33. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 35 > Issue: 1
Stuart Rosenbaum Once Again: “God, Freedom and Immortality”
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34. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 35 > Issue: 1
Mark Piper Struggling for Clarity on Well-Being
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35. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 35 > Issue: 1
Chris King Authority, Particularity and the Districting Solution
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There are at least two ways to explain the presence of political obligations – by appeal to general duties (like a duty of justice) or by appeal to authority (a power to create duties through commands). The fi rst sort of account is familiar but, according to some, is defeasible by the Particularity Problem – the problem of showing why there is a duty of persons to obey the laws of a particular State exclusively. Authority accounts can seem promising in this light but bring a few problems of their own. In this essay, I will examine one such possible solution – the Districting Solution – and outline a few considerations that limit the possibility of its success.
36. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 35 > Issue: 1
Alyssa Lowery Investigating Integrity in Public Reason Liberalism
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Public reason liberalism has been challenged by religious critics who make the “Integrity Objection.” That is, they argue that public reason’s stringent limits on the kinds of reasons which can serve as justificatory prevent them from living lives of integrity wherein their political activity and personal commitments are in sync. Convergence forms of public reason liberalism adopt this critique and respond to it by rejecting the dominant model of public reason, consensus justification, replacing the Rawlsian standard of shared reasons with merely intelligible ones. In this paper I look at two formulations of the integrity objection and make brief rebuttals of both, ultimately arguing that convergence liberalism cannot claim to provide a more compelling response to religious critics than consensus liberalism.
37. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 35 > Issue: 1
Leigh C. Vicens Agentive Phenomenology and Moral Responsibility Agnosticism
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Most incompatibilist theories of free will and moral responsibility require, for a person to count as morally responsible for an action, that specific events leading up to the action be undetermined. One might think, then, that incompatibilists should remain agnostic about whether anyone is ever free or morally responsible, since whether there are such undetermined events would seem to be an empirical question unsettled by scientific research. Yet, a number of incompatibilists have suggested that the phenomenological character of our experiences already gives us good reason to believe that much of our behavior is freely undertaken, so that we are justified in believing that the free will condition for moral responsibility is often satisfied. I argue, however, that on the assumption that free will is incompatible with determinism, reflections on the character of our experiences do not provide good support for the claim that we ever act freely.
38. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 35 > Issue: 1
Madeleine Hyde The Rationality and Cognitive Phenomenology of Deliberation
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The phenomenal character of a perceptual experience describes ‘what it is like’ for an agent undergoing it. This is a familiar notion when it comes to our sensory states. Recently, there has been increased discussion about how certain cognitive states can also have phenomenal characters. A further, more interesting question asks what links, if any, might between what the phenomenal character of a mental state and when that mental state is considered rational. I will assume that some cognitive states can have phenomenal characters and will focus on a prominent phenomenal feature of a particular cognitive state: namely, deliberation over how to act. I aim to expose one way in which we can describe the phenomenology of deliberating, as well as its potential link to the rationality of deliberation.
39. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 35 > Issue: 1
Daniel Campana The Coherence of Emerson’s Epistemology
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40. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 35 > Issue: 1
Michael J. McNeal, Ph.D. Subversive Joy: Nietzsche’s Practice of Life-Enhancing Cheerfulness
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