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31. The Owl of Minerva: Volume > 46 > Issue: 1/2
New Books
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32. The Owl of Minerva: Volume > 46 > Issue: 1/2
Recent Dissertations
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33. The Owl of Minerva: Volume > 45 > Issue: 1/2
Jeffrey Reid Comets and Moons: The For-another in Hegel's Philosophy of Nature
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This paper examines the Hegelian moment of the for-another in its negative relation to the other moment of particularity: the for-itself. I identify the dissolving, fluidifying action of the for-another by examining figures within the Philosophy of Nature, particularly comets and moons, but also Hegel’s physics of light and sound. The dissolution of the lunar for-itself at the hands of the cometary for-another illustrates how the dynamic relation between the two moments of particularity participates in the presentation of essence, within the Hegelian syllogism, i.e. as mediating between the universal and the singular. The dynamic action of cometary negativity occurs throughout the Philosophy of Nature and therefore should be pivotal to how the work is read.
34. The Owl of Minerva: Volume > 45 > Issue: 1/2
Jon Stewart Hegel, Creuzer, and the Rise of Orientalism
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Commentators generally neglect Hegel’s analyses of the religions of Asia, presumably for fear of being charged with Eurocentrism, racism or colonialism. Hegel’s engagement with these religions, however, occurs during the time when the birth of fields such as Egyptology and Indology gave rise to increased scholarly interest in Asia. Hegel supported the work of Georg Friedrich Creuzer, whose book on symbolism showed the debt that the Greek and Roman religions owed to Egypt, Persia and India. Creuzer’s methodology inspired Hegel, and his support of Creuzer is evidence that Hegel was not the political and social reactionary that many scholars have taken him to be.
book discussion: challenging the kantian frame
35. The Owl of Minerva: Volume > 45 > Issue: 1/2
Challenging the Kantian Frame
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36. The Owl of Minerva: Volume > 45 > Issue: 1/2
Ardis Collins Reason and Its Absolute Opposite in Hegel's Critical Examination of Phenomenal Consciousness
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This paper begins with Hegel’s critique of Kant in the Encyclopaedia’s examination of three positions on objectivity. According to this critique, Kant’s philosophy is flawed because it reduces objectivity to a relation isolated within the subjectivity of the knower, does not integrate the contingent into its understanding of the rational, and does not acknowledge the reality status of contradiction. The second section of the paper examines Hegel’s analysis of dialectical proof procedure in the introductory essays of his major works. The rest of the paper examines the way the Phenomenology proves that rationality is a common ground governing both independent thought and the independence of the natural world, that the contradictory otherness of nature requires an irrational element, which neither observational nor practical thought can overcome, and that truth is an infinite spirit that both transcends and dwells within the finite reality of the human spirit.
37. The Owl of Minerva: Volume > 45 > Issue: 1/2
Brady Bowman Acosmism, Radical Finitude, and Divine Love in Mendelssohn, Schelling, and Hegel
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German philosophers of the classical period viewed Spinozism as posing a threefold challenge: fatalism, atheism, and acosmism. This paper focuses on acosmism as a vantage point for understanding the resulting “Pantheism Controversy.” Drawing on insights into the ineliminability of indexical thought, I argue that Mendelssohn’s refutation of acosmism entails rejecting traditional theism: The finite world cannot be the product of an omnipotent creator. Schelling and Hegel recognize this consequence, but each responds in a different way: Schelling with a conception of creative ethical individualism, Hegel with a conception of divine love and redemptive power to abolish the past and overcome fate. To understand these conceptions as a response to the Spinozist challenge is also to see how they themselves constitute a challenge to the Kantian Frame.
38. The Owl of Minerva: Volume > 45 > Issue: 1/2
Robert Williams Overcoming the Kantian Frame: Tragedy, Recognition, and the Death of God
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This paper has three sections. 1) For Hegel, the true infinite is the fundamental concept of philosophy. The true infinite challenges current non-metaphysical interpretations of Hegel, as it challenged Kant’s restriction of cognition to finitude and attack on metaphysics. The consciousness of limit (finitude) implies a transcendence of limit, and an infinite opposed to the finite shows itself to be finite. 2) Hegel accepts Kant’s approach to the God-question through practical reason, but rejects Kant’s postulates as incoherent. The content of the God-postulate contradicts the subject-relative form of the postulate. Kant’s moral God is a spurious infinite. The true infinite is a self-determining, self-realizing, inclusive whole which sublates the subjective ‘ought to be’ of the postulate. 3) For both Hegel and Nietzsche the moral god is dead; both pursue the question of theology after the death of God. I explore Hegel’s account of tragedy and his conception of tragic reconciliation. The latter is not a comic, but an “anguished reconciliation, a disquieted bliss in disaster.” The death of God and reconciliation include negation and suffering, and are closer to tragic reconciliation than to Dante’s Divine Comedy with its impassible absolute that lacks serious opposition.
39. The Owl of Minerva: Volume > 45 > Issue: 1/2
2014 Hegel Society of America Meeting Program
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book reviews
40. The Owl of Minerva: Volume > 45 > Issue: 1/2
Sebastian Rand Rebecca Comay. Mourning Sickness: Hegel and the French Revolution
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