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Displaying: 31-40 of 43 documents


31. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 113 > Issue: 4
Jared Warren Internal and External Questions Revisited
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Rudolf Carnap famously distinguished between the external meanings that existence questions have when asked by philosophers and the internal meanings they have when asked by non-philosophers. Carnap’s overall position involved various controversial commitments, but relatively uncontroversial interpretative principles also lead to a Carnap-style distinction between internal and external questions. In section 1 of this paper I offer arguments for such a distinction in several particular cases; in section 2 I defend my arguments from numerous objections and motivate them by using points drawn from the general theory of interpretation; and in section 3 I discuss the meanings of external questions, ultimately arguing that they are best understood as involving primitive metaphysical notions, and that when so understood, it is natural to adopt a general error theory about philosophical ontology.
32. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 113 > Issue: 4
Yael Loewenstein Why the Direct Argument Does Not Shift the Burden of Proof
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Peter van Inwagen's Direct Argument (DA) makes use of an inference rule he calls "Rule B." Michael McKenna has argued that van Inwagen's defense of this rule is dialectically inappropriate because it is based entirely on alleged “confirming” cases that are not of the right kind to justify the use of Rule B in DA. Here I argue that McKenna’s objection is on the right track but more must be said if we are to see why. To fill in the gaps I consider a recent attempt by Ira M. Schnall and David Widerker to defend DA against McKenna’s objection. I argue that neither prong of their attack is successful against a variation on McKenna’s basic argument. In the course of responding to Schnall and Widerker’s objections to McKenna, I identify what is, as I argue, the real reason DA fails in its purpose to shift the burden of proof.
review essays
33. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 113 > Issue: 4
James M. Joyce Arif Ahmed: Evidence, Decision and Causality
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34. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 113 > Issue: 3
Shieva Kleinschmidt Placement Permissivism and Logics of Location
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All of the current leading theories of location are parsimonious: they have at most one locative primitive, and the definitions of all of the other locative relations appeal to nothing beyond that primitive, mereological properties and relations, and basic logic. I argue that if we believe there can be extended, mereologically simple regions, we can construct cases that are incompatible with every possible parsimonious theory of location. In these cases, an object is contained within a simple region that is larger than the object; that is, there is some region, r, and some object, x, are such that every subregion of r fails to be completely free of x, yet x fails to fill r. I argue that we ought to respond to this incompatibility by rejecting the analytic possibility of extended, simple regions.
35. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 113 > Issue: 3
Bryan Pickel, Brian Rabern The Antinomy of the Variable: A Tarskian Resolution
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Kit Fine has reawakened a puzzle about variables with a long history in analytic philosophy, labeling it “the antinomy of the variable”. Fine suggests that the antinomy demands a reconceptualization of the role of variables in mathematics, natural language semantics, and first-order logic. The difficulty arises because: (i) the variables ‘x’ and ‘y’ cannot be synonymous, since they make different contributions when they jointly occur within a sentence, but (ii) there is a strong temptation to say that distinct variables ‘x’ and ‘y’ are synonymous, since sentences differing by the total, proper substitution of ‘x’ for ‘y’ always agree in meaning. We offer a precise interpretation of the challenge posed by (i) and (ii). We then develop some neglected passages of Tarski to show that his semantics for variables has the resources to resolve the antinomy without abandoning standard compositional semantics.
36. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 113 > Issue: 3
In Memoriam: Hilary Putnam
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37. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 113 > Issue: 3
New Books
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38. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 113 > Issue: 2
Sam Baron, Mark Colyvan Time Enough for Explanation
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The present paper advances an analogy between cases of extra-mathematical explanation (mathematical explanations of physical facts) and cases of what might be termed ‘extra-logical explanation’: the explanation of a physical fact by a logical fact. A particular case of extra-logical explanation is identified that arises in the philosophical literature on time travel. This instance of extra-logical explanation is subsequently shown to be of a piece with cases of extra-mathematical explanation. Using this analogy, we argue extra-mathematical explanation is part of a broader class of non-causal explanation. This has important implications for extra-mathematical explanation, for time travel and for theories of explanation more generally.
39. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 113 > Issue: 2
Philip Welch, Leon Horsten Reflecting on Absolute Infinity
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This article is concerned with reflection principles in the context of Cantor’s conception of the set-theoretic universe. We argue that within such a conception reflection principles can be formulated that confer intrinsic plausibility to strong axioms of infinity.
book reviews
40. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 113 > Issue: 2
Anil Gomes Manifest Reality: Kant’s Idealism and his Realism
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