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Displaying: 31-40 of 1237 documents


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31. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 53
Juho Ritola Harmless Epistemic Circularity?
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Epistemic circularity is a problem of arguments purporting to establish the reliability of our different sources of belief‐acquisition. For example:(TRA)At t1, S formed the perceptual belief that p, and p.At t2, S formed the perceptual belief that q, and q.At t3, …Therefore, sense perception is reliable source of beliefs.The problem is that any arguer putting forth this argument is ompelled to rely on the thing to be proven in establishing the second conjuncts of each premise. But relying on the thing to be proven is begging the question; therefore, the argument is fallacious. This has been argued to have serious skeptical implications: if there is no other way to establish the conclusion, we have no way of showing the reliability of, e.g., sense perception. Different authors have tried to resist this result. Frederick F. Schmitt (2004) argues that sense perception skepticism only follows from epistemic circularity if certain questionable assumptions are granted. He also argues that epistemic circularity is a specific type of circularity that is not vicious in the way logically circular arguments are. I argue thatSchmitt’s dismissal of the discussed assumptions is questionable and that the argument (TRA) is viciously circular under very minimal assumptions about inferential justification. Therefore, Schmitt fails to dissolve the problematic nature of (TRA).
32. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 53
V.I. Selivanova On the Universal Principle of Scientific and Philosophical Cognition
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The purpose of the present report is to draw the philosophical community’s attention to the universal principle of cognition, the principle of extrapolation, capable of integrating the present and possibly, the future methods of man’s cognitive attitude to the world. Extrapolation is interpreted as a key logical-and-gnosiological procedure and, depending on subject/object relationships, is subdivided into “actual” and “real”. According to the actual extrapolation principle in any kind of cognition, it is important to take account of the fact of the ontological presence of the individual in the world. The real extrapolation method is based on the available gnosiological content of a cognizing subject and on the use of a totality of the logical, gnosiological, epistemological, methodological, content-related and even psychological wealth of accumulated knowledge with the aim of its augmentation. The all-important aim of new gnosiology (theory of knowledge) should consist in studying permissible bounds of extrapolation, and in identifying basic laws of extrapolation of knowledge in two forms of its being as a necessary condition of their possible synthesis.
33. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 53
Ken Shigeta Dissolving the Skeptical Paradox of Knowledge via Cartesian Skepticism Based on Wittgenstein
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There is an epistemological skepticism that I might be dreaming now, or I might be a brain in a vat (BIV). There is also a demonstration that derives the skeptical conclusion about knowledge of the external world from the premise C1, i.e., I do not know “I am not dreaming (not a BIV) now.” Pessimistic critics (e.g., F. Strawson, B. Stroud) consider that the refutation of C1 is impossible, whereas others have attempted the direct refutation of C1 (e.g., G. E. Moore, H. Putnam, C. Wright), and some (e.g., F. Dretske, R. Nozick) have attempted to refute the closure principle of knowledge used in the demonstration while permitting the validity of C1. Another scholar, M. Williams, maintains that the skeptical demonstration is true only if we presuppose the epistemological premise that we choose to accept or reject at will. It seems that most critics tend to adopt a strategy that allows them to effectively avoid the skeptical consequence, thereby conceding the validity of C1. However, it is difficult to say whether their attempts succeeded, and in my opinion, they are indeed unsuccessful. This is because their concession to Descartes’ argument is insufficient. Their lack of success could also stem from the incompletion of Descartes’ own methodological doubt. The somewhat paradoxical‐sounding aim of this thesis is to show that the skeptical paradox about knowledge can be dissolved only if the Cartesian skepticism is extended far beyond the endpoint of his attempt. The argument of this thesis is based on the important arguments of Wittgenstein's On Certainty (OC)
34. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 53
Victor Shreiber Philosophy, Kant and the Scheme of Decision-making
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Some options to single out the foremost function of philosophy in culture are discussed. As any functioning part has to possess definite level of the internal unity, I begin by tracing out the main views on the unanimity of philosophical knowledge and demonstrate that the opposed variants can be reduced to well‐known contraposition between subject matter (a strong variant) and method (a weak one). I show further that at least one strong version, which identifies philosophical subject matter with the concrete universal being, seizes on only one piece of metaphysics. As a result, the boundary line between strong and weak versions erodes and the strong version converges into the weak one. Finally, I argue that fundamental philosophical themes can be united on the base of three famous Kant’s questions: What can I know? What may I hope? What ought I to do? Difference across modalities testifies against the interpretation of these questions as synopsis. Moreover, these questions correlate well with the three core parts of the making‐decision situation. Such a situation includes a set of possible alternatives and a system or an aggregate of selection criteria for a choice of the variant desired. These two components are logically prior to goal setting. Clearly, to achieve desired object one is to determine what steps are necessary for success. It is no less clear that in the structure of an action, they represent something one ought to do. Thus, specific cultural mission of philosophizing lies in the design and justification of Weltanschauung.
35. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 53
Mohammad Hasan Soleimani The Limitation of Skepticism
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The human in continuous century envisage the skepticism. When the human envisage the deficiency of his knowledge, will be in trouble of skepticism, when the knowledge of human fundamentally is doubted, all internal or external impressions will be doubted, so the man envisage the unlimited skepticism. But is it possible and logical? The possibility of it is a psychological question too, but my effort is the epistemological surveying of it. We can survey this question in two ways. One way is justifier reasons of skepticism. Are there sufficient for unlimited skepticism? Every deduction is based on preludes and if they’re uncertain the result will be uncertain too. There any deduction can’t justify unlimited skepticism. The other way is the surveying results of this skepticism. We have beliefs thatnever can doubt them like our existence. This inability express that the unlimited skepticism doesn’t agree the logic of our subject. Moreover the unlimited skepticism brings the mixed continuums. If we doubt anything, doubt this doubting too and this involving haven’t extremity, the demoniac hang that can’t be accepted by our.
36. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 53
Emilia Anvarovna Taissina Philosophical Truth in Mathematical Terms and Literature Analogies
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The article is based upon the following starting position. In this post-modern time, it seems that no scholar in Europe supports what is called “Enlightenment Project” with its naïve objectivism and Correspondence Theory of Truth1, - though not being really hostile, just strongly skeptical about it. No old-fasioned “classical” academical texts; only His Majesty Discourse as chain of interpretations and reinterpretations. What was called objectivity “proved to be” intersubjectivity; what was called Object (in Latin and German and Russian tradition) now is related to as a phenomenon; what was called Subject either is looked upon as Cartesian “cogito” or disappeares at all; what was called Truth turned to be either method of demonstration (by positivists) or the author’s sincerity (by existentialists); what was called Essence is now merely a joke. Alternatively, we speak about Sense, Meaning, and Value.
37. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 53
Stella Villarmea So You Think You Can Tell Sense from Nonsense
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38. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 53
Ron Wilburl Doubt and Modality
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I argue herein for two claims. First, contextualist strategies to tame or localize epistemic skepticism are ineffectual if contextualist factors are construed internalistically. Second, since efforts to contextualize externalism via subjunctive conditional analysis threaten circularity, only internalistic interpretations of contextualism can even be motivated. These two contentions do not themselves give us a grounds for skepticism. However, they do give us reason to suspect that contextualism, as such, is unlikely likely to provide a cogent anti-skeptical strategy.
39. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 53
Kai-Yee Wong Testimony and Computer Proof
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This article aims to evaluate the purported empirical character of computer-assisted proof, as suggested by Thomas Tymoczko and others. Tymoczko famously argued that the proof of the Four-Color Theorem introduced a new, empirical method of proof, forcing us to modify the traditional conception of mathematical argument as a priori reasoning. Detlefsen and Luker contended that Tymoczko’s suggestion entailed that typically mathematical proofs were empirical. My chief interest is to raise some objections to a line of thought common to both of these arguments, with a view to outlining an account of the a priori which allows thepossibility of a priori knowledge obtained by appeal to computers or through testimony. Drawing on some recent discussions by Tyler Burge, this account gives a broad construal of the non-justificatory, ‘enabling’ role that experience is held to play in knowledge and cognition, allowing us to argue that the purported empirical character of the appeal to computers pertains only to the role experience plays in enabling our access to the a priori warrant provided by computer proof.
articles in spanish
40. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 53
Elena Nájera A propósito de la crítica antiepistemológica de la “verdad” y la “objetividad”
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Con el interés de reconocer lo particular y amparar el derecho a la diferencia, el programa de superación de la epistemología que comparten R. Rorty y Ch. Taylor pone en cuestión las nociones de “verdad” y “objetividad”, aunque en dos sentidos encontrados. Para el primero de estos autores, se trata de anularambos conceptos a favor de un ironismo liberal que concede la contingencia de nuestras prácticas interpretativas, mientras que para el segundo, el camino pasa por justificarlos éticamente, en clave comunitarista. Frente a ambas estrategias, se perfilan las posiciones de otros pensadores de vocación epistemológica —e ilustrada—, como S. Haack y I. Hacking, que, sin recaer en el fundamentalismo que aquejaba al proyecto moderno, pero sin apoyarse tampoco en el comunitarismo, defienden la necesidad de conservar no sólo por razones teóricas sino esencialmente prácticas —ligadas al modus vivendi occidental— el punto de vista normativo que encierran la verdad y la objetividad.