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Displaying: 31-40 of 5662 documents


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31. The Modern Schoolman: Volume > 88 > Issue: 1/2
Christopher Evan Franklin Masks, Abilities, and Opportunities: Why the New Dispositionalism Cannot Succeed
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Conditional analyses of ability have been nearly entirely abandoned by philosophers of action as woefully inadequate attempts of analyzing the concept of ability. Recently, however, Vihvelin (2004) and Fara (2008) have appealed to the similarity between dispositions and abilities, as well as recent advances in the metaphysics of dispositions, in order to construct putatively superior conditional analyses of ability. Vihvelin and Fara claim that their revised conditional analysesof ability enable them to show that Frankfurt-style cases fail to sever the connection between freedom and responsibility, and that compatibilism about free will and determinism is true. I argue, however, that even granting the truth of their dispositional analyses, they cannot achieve these aims. Vihvelin and Fara’s fundamental error lies in their failing to appreciate the complex nature of free will and moral responsibility—specifically that agents’ freedom and responsibility depend not only on their abilities, but also their opportunities.
32. The Modern Schoolman: Volume > 88 > Issue: 1/2
Andrei A. Buckareff How Does Agent-Causal Power Work?
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Agent-causalism or the agency theory is the thesis that agents qua objects/substances cause at least some of their decisions (or at least their coming to have an intention that is constitutive of a decision). In this paper, I examine the tenability of an attractive agent-causal account of the metaphysics of the springs of free action developed and defended in the recent work of Timothy O’Connor. Against the backdrop of recent work on causal powers in ontology, I argue that, however attractive the account, O’Connor’s agent-causal theory of free agency is ultimately untenable.
33. The Modern Schoolman: Volume > 88 > Issue: 1/2
Rebekah L. H. Rice What is a Causal Theorist to Do about Omissions?
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Most philosophers concede that one can properly be held morally responsible for intentionally omitting to do something. If one maintains that omissions are actions (negative actions, perhaps), then assuming the requisite conditions regarding voluntariness are met, one can tell a familiar story about how/why this is. In particular, causal theorists can explain the etiology of an intentionalal omission in causal terms. However, if one denies that omissions are actions of any kind,then the familiar story is no longer available. Some have suggested that this poses a special problem for causal theorists of action. I argue that it does not and, even more interestingly, that it renders a more nuanced understanding of voluntariness (since it no longer applies strictly to actions) and moral responsibility (since you might be to blame, but not for anything you’ve done).
34. The Modern Schoolman: Volume > 88 > Issue: 1/2
Alicia Finch Experimental Philosophy and the Concept of Moral Responsibility
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In recent years, so-called experimental philosophers have argued that participants in the moral responsibility debate ought to adopt a new methodology. In particular, they argue, the results of experimental surveys ought to be introduced into the debate. According to the experimental philosophers, these surveys are philosophically relevant because they provide information about the moral responsibility judgments that ordinary people make. Moreover, they argue, anaccount of moral responsibility is satisfactory only if it is tightly connected to ordinary judgments. The purpose of this paper is to undermine this argument. I will argue that experimental philosophers have not adequately acknowledged the distinction between metaphysics and conceptual analysis; they have not carefully distinguished what-it-is-to-be morally responsible from the concept of moral responsibility. I will draw this distinction, and then argue that metaphysicians quametaphysicians may both ignore experimental data and offer an account of moral responsibility that satisfies the tight connection desideratum.
discussion
35. The Modern Schoolman: Volume > 88 > Issue: 1/2
Randolph Clarke Responsibility, Mechanisms, and Capacities
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Frankfurt-style cases are supposed to show that an agent can be responsible for doing something even though the agent wasn’t able to do otherwise. Neil Levy has argued that the cases fail. Agents in such cases, he says, lack a capacity that they’d have to have in order to be responsible for doing what they do. Here it’s argued that Levy is mistaken. Although it may be that agents in Frankfurt-style cases lack some kind of capability, what they lack isn’t required for them to be responsible for doing what they do. Differences between actions and omissions, and between the requirements for responsibility for these two, are also discussed.
36. The Modern Schoolman: Volume > 87 > Issue: 3/4
Kent W. Staley Special Editor’s Introduction to Experimental and Theoretical Knowledge
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37. The Modern Schoolman: Volume > 87 > Issue: 3/4
Deborah Mayo Learning from Error: The Theoretical Significance of Experimental Knowledge
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38. The Modern Schoolman: Volume > 87 > Issue: 3/4
P. Kyle Stanford Getting Real: The Hypothesis of Organic Fossil Origins
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39. The Modern Schoolman: Volume > 87 > Issue: 3/4
Derek Turner Comments on P. Kyle Stanford’s “Getting Real” The Hypothesis of Organic Fossil Origins”
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40. The Modern Schoolman: Volume > 87 > Issue: 3/4
Michael Weisberg Target Directed Modeling
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