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Displaying: 31-40 of 2372 documents


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31. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 88 > Issue: 1
Stephen A. Butterfill, Corrado Sinigaglia Intention and Motor Representation in Purposive Action
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Are there distinct roles for intention and motor representation in explaining the purposiveness of actions? Standard accounts of achon assign a role to intention but are silent on motor representation. The temptation is to suppose that nothing need be said here because motor representation is either only an enabling condition for purposive action or else merely a variety of intention. This paper provides reasons for resisting that temptation. Some motor representations, like intentions, coordinate actions in virtue of representing outcomes; but, unlike intentions, motor representations cannot feature as premises or conclusions in practical reasoning. This implies that motor representation has a distinctive role in explaining the purposiveness of action. It also gives rise to a problem: were the roles of intention and motor representation entirely independent, this would impair effective action. It is therefore necessary to explain how intentions interlock with motor representations. The solution, we argue, is to recognise that the contents of intentions can be partially determined by the contents of motor representations. Understanding this content-determining relation enables better understanding how intentions relate to actions.
32. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 88 > Issue: 1
Sam Shpall Moral and Rational Commitment
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33. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 88 > Issue: 1
Michael Rescorla The Causal Relevance of Content to Computation
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Many philosophers worry that the classical computational theory of mind (CTM) engenders epiphenomenalism. Building on Block's (1990) discussion, I formulate a particularly troubling version of this worry. I then present a novel solution to CTM's epiphenomenalist conundrum. I develop my solution within an interventionist theory of causal relevance. My solution departs substantially from orthodox versions of CTM. In particular, I reject the widespread picture of digital computation as formal syntactic manipulation.'
book symposium
34. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 88 > Issue: 1
Douglas W. Portmore Précis: Commonsense Consequentialism
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35. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 88 > Issue: 1
Joshua Gert Moral Rationalism and Commonsense Consequentialism
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36. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 88 > Issue: 1
Paul Hurley Comments on Douglas Portmore's Commonsense Consequentialism
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37. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 88 > Issue: 1
Sergio Tenenbaum The Perils of Earnest Consequentializing
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38. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 88 > Issue: 1
Douglas W. Portmore Replies to Gert, Hurley, and Tenenbaum
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39. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 88 > Issue: 1
Recent Publications
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40. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 87 > Issue: 3
Robert Audi Testimony as a Social Foundation of Knowledge
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Testimony is the mainstay of human communication and essential for the spread of knowledge. But testimony may also spread error. Under what conditions does it yield knowledge in the person addressed? Must the recipient trust the attester? And does the attester have to know what is affirmed? A related question is what is required for the recipient to be justified in believing testimony. Is testimony-based justification acquired in the same way as testimony-based knowledge? This paper addresses these and other questions. It offers a theory of the role of testimony in producing knowledge and justification, a sketch of a conception of knowledge that supports this theory, a brief account of how trust of others can be squared with critical habits of mind, and an outline of some important standards for intellectual responsibility in giving and receiving testimony.