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Displaying: 21-34 of 34 documents


section: human rights
21. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 3
Donald V. Poochigain Human Nature and Human Rights
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Human rights are universally accepted duties to one another as persons which make possible all other human relations. In order to get along in the world beings are grouped and treated as equal, distinctions being made only when an individual is familiar. Treatment of beings according to their general characteristics constitutes natural or species rights of which human rights are an instance. Such rights are an abstraction, an average of the behavior of all group members, extreme deviation from which is disregarded as pathological. Encompassed in human rights are welfare considerations as well as freedoms, all together establishing a minimal condition of life which everyone owes every other.
22. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 3
Neval Oğan Balkiz Die Frage nach einer Reorganisation der Vereinten Nationen im Lichte der neuen Herausforderung für kulturelle Balance im Bereich Menschenrechte
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Die UNO soll die Menschenrechte schützen, aber kann sie das wirklich? Ist sie als Organisation dafür verantwortlich? Dürfen die Vereinten Nationen Menschenrechte mit Gewalt erzwingen? Ist Druck wichtiger als Dialog? Sind ihre Strukturen nicht überholt und müssten verändert werden, damit sie effektiver arbeiten kann?? Allen Mängeln zum Trotz waren die Vereinten Nationen seit ihrer Gründung als einziges universelles Forum der Völker immer wieder unentbehrlich. Stets zum Gespräch miteinander gezwungen zu sein, erwies sich zumal während der Höhepunkte des Kalten Krieges oft als entscheidende Hilfe. Immerhin gab es eine von der UNO betriebene innovative Fortentwicklung des internationalen Rechts. Solchen Verdiensten und Erfolgen stehen zweifellos Fehlleistungen und Rückschläge gegenüber, die keinesfalls unbeachtet bleiben dürfen. Ihre neben der Friedenssicherung wichtigste Aufgabe, nämlich den sozialen Fortschritt und einen besseren Lebensstandard in grö erer Freiheit zu fördern und natürlich die Menschenrechte zu schützen, konnte die UNO bisher nicht erfüllen. Der Unterschied zwischen Arm und Reich hat sich seit 1960 nicht etwa verringert, sondern ungefähr verdoppelt. Das reichste Fünftel der Menschheit verfügt heute über mehr als vier Fünftel des Weltsozialprodukts. Für das ärmste Fünftel bleiben gerade einmal 1,4%. Der ökologisch unhaltbare Lebensstil vor allem der groen Industriegesellschaften hat sich nur unwesentlich verändert. Noch immer fehlt in den reichen Ländern des Nordens die Einsicht , dass Armut und Umweltzerstörung im Süden kein fernes,sondern ein gemeinsames globales Problem darstellt. Die Gro en Mächte des Sicherheitsrates und die Mitglieder der G 8 lenken über die Weltbank, den internationalen Währungsfonds und die Welthandelsorganisation die Weltwirtschaft zu wenig im Dienste der Uberwindung der globalen Unterentwicklung, dagegen immer wieder zum eigenen Nutzen. Das Wichtigste ist und bleibt es, Sicherheit nicht mehr allein militärisch zu definieren. Auch die wirtschaftlichen, sozialen, kulturellen und ökologischen Ursachen von Konflikten müssen an der Wurzel behandelt werden. Am dringenden Reformbedarf der Vereinten Nationen kann nicht ernsthaft bezweifelt werden. Ziel der Reform ist , die menschliche Sicherheit in einem umfassenden, nicht nur militärischen Sinn zu begreifen. Aber ist die UNO überhaupt reformierbar? Diese Frage richtet sich zuallererst an die Regierungen der UN-Mitglieder. Die Frage ist nur, wie entwickelt sich eine solche Identität auf internationaler Ebene? Wie entsteht, wächst und gedeiht so etwas wie eine überstaatlichen Gemeinschaft, die auf der Universalität der Menschenrechte begründet ist? Wie lernen, uns nicht nur als Angehörige unseres Volks, unserer Familie, unserer Gemeinde, unserer Region, unseres Berufsverbands, unserer politischen Partei, unseres Staats, unserer überstaatlichen Gemeinschaft zu definieren , sondern vor allem als Angehörige der Menschheit, , als konkrete menschliche Wesen, deren individuelles Sein seinen primären natürlichen und zugleich universalen Ausdruck in seinem Status als Bürger findet. Kann dies, wie es Immanuel Kant bereits vor über 200 Jahren sah, mit Hilfe eines weltweiten "Weltbürgerrecht" verwirklicht werden? Muss dieses Weltbürgerrecht -wie Jürgen Habermas behauptet hat- die einzelnen Regierungen binden? Und muss diese überstaatliche Gemeinschaft ihre Mitglieder unter Androhung von Sanktionen zu rechtmä_igem Verhalten zumindest anhalten können?
23. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 3
Georgia Apostolopoulou Toward a Hermeneutic Anthropology of Human Rights
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The hermeneutic anthropology of human rights is a possible anthropology before human rights. It does not aim at a deductive demonstration of the validity of human rights, but it delivers a hermeneutic justification of them by taking into account the a priori link of self-understanding with living body. Three aspects are most relevant in this case: a) The human person not only exists, but also has a value which is recognized within the shared world of persons. The embodied presence of persons is affirmed beyond pure facticity through the meta-grammatical terms " I " , "you" and "we". This mutual affirmation as an act of freedom indicates the primordial value of dignity, b) The human person has to arrange its uncertainty as a living being. It has to prevail over nature, in order to create an order of life. This consciousness of being able to act is the source of power. Nevertheless, power is produced as a kind of surplus through social interaction. The tension between power and recognition is always renewed and remains an open question for society, c) Human rights introduce moral demands on power. They define the political order of the society in such a way that the citizens can carry out their plan of life. Furthermore, they preserve the awareness of the limits, since human dignity indicates that the embodied presence of the human person and its world-character should not be defined apart from freedom and recognition.
section: philosophy and gender
24. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 3
Heather D. Macquarrie Ethics and the Role of Women in Transforming Violent Conflict: Why Hegel Matters
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In October 2000, the UN Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1325 on "Women, Peace and Security", calling for women's full and equal participation in all aspects of conflict prevention, resolution and peacebuilding. The world is at last recognizing that gender issues and peace are inextricably connected, and that women's involvement in peace efforts is essential for the prevention of renewed conflict. Given the need for women's involvement in peace and security issues, we must address the reasons why women's influence is limited, why they still do not have access to power or leadership roles, while their level of participation in the armed forces is minimal to non-existent. Meanwhile, wars rage. This paper argues that to think through the deeper connections between gender issues and peace is to engage in an unsettling, necessarily philosophical inquiry about the nature of modern ethical life— as a dysfunctional system of separate and competing ethical imperatives: family and state, public and private, individual and state, masculine and feminine. My inquiry is conducted from the standpoint of Hegel's philosophy. In the Phenomenology of Mind. Hegel draws upon the tragedian Sophocles for his insight that once upon a time in the ancient world, universal ethical substance divided itself into distinct ethical spheres of human and divine law. Human relationships to these ethical worlds were shaped by gender. The division of ethical substance precipitated conflicts that eventually caused the ancient world to collapse. For Hegel, the project of modernity is all about the recovery, in self-conscious form, of a harmonious ethical life, through reconciliation of conflicting ethical worlds. Hegel's philosophy of modern life has its shortfalls, but is a powerful resource for the argument that gender justice is a condition for long-lasting peace.
25. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 3
Kaija Rossi Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women?
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In my paper, I will argue that in the liberal tradition of thinking, illiberal practices of minority groups cannot be supported without interventions that already liberalize illiberal cultures. For example, positive group rights have to be evaluated in ways that demand democratization. Moreover, nonintervention with conditions, such as the right of exit, will fail to be noninterventive if taken seriously because illiberal treatment of individuals diminishes their ability to actualize their rights of exit. In addition, nonintervention as a basis of cultural preservation is based on a view of culture that is misleading in portraying minority cultures as entities where changes in the group could be differentiated into internal and external. I will claim that intervention is not as intrusive as often perceived, and, moreover, can be crucial for the wellbeing of women.
section: philosophy and environment
26. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 3
Helena Siipi Naturalness in Biodiversity Management
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Decline of biodiversity—richness, variety and variability of living beings—is an issue of concern world wide. Nevertheless, not all biological diversity is valued by conservation biologists. Most of them reject an idea of creation of so called A-areas—i.e. maximally rich and diverse biotic areas which have been produced by methods like genetic engineering and species introduction. Reasons for this are considered. A-areas are artefacts: their existence has been intentionally brought about by intentionally modifying their properties in order to produce an entity of their type. Nevertheless, since some restored ecosystems are equally artifacts and still valued over A-areas in biodiversity management, artifactuality cannot alone explain the low value of the A-areas. The essential difference between A-areas and restored ecosystems is in naturalness of their properties. By contrast with the properties of A-areas, the properties of any restored ecosystem are similar to the properties of some ecosystems that have originated through evolutionary processes. I conclude that biodiversity management decisions are based on multiple and different conceptions of natural, unnatural and artificial. The most desired alternatives are natural in all senses of the terms. Because of limits set by the real world, conservation biologists sometimes have to settle for second best alternatives that are unnatural in some sense of the term, but not in all or many of them.
27. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 3
Markku Oksanen Species Extinction and Collective Responsibility
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In this article I explore, from a philosophical perspective, what the responsibility for biodiversity means. Biodiversity is a peculiar thing because it consists of the variety of life in its all manifestations, that is, in all its forms, levels and combinations. Variation is a main characteristic of life on earth. Because of its vastness a collective has not only a right but also a duty to take responsibility for biodiversity conservation, and furthermore it has a prima facie duty to implement those measures the accomplishment of this requires. This includes the appropriate legislative and policy means. My argument for collective responsibility is mainly based on contrafactual reasoning, that is, if a collective takes no responsibility for the conservation of biodiversity, then no one takes responsibility. Providing that species extinction is something we definitely want to avoid, collective responsibility is well founded.
28. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 3
Robin Attfield Sustainable Development Revisited
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My aim is to defend the concept of sustainable development both against economists' interpretations that make it involve perpetual gains to human well-being, and against sceptical accounts that make its meaning vary from speaker to speaker, serving as a cloak for the status quo and the suggestion that it be discarded. The assumptions of the economists' interpretation are questioned, and the centrality among early advocates of sustainable development of sustainable practices and of sustainability being social and ecological as well as economic is used to support a different interpretation. On this interpretation, sustainable development involves the satisfaction of basic needs and comprises the precondition of economically, socially and ecologically sustainable practices. What is to be sustained is overtly practices and more basically intrinsic value. This account is shown to assist with solving conflicts between nature preservation and alleviation of poverty, solutions to which are argued to embody sustainable development even in the absence of prospects of ever-increasing quality of life for humanity. While this interpretation already counts against sceptical accounts, these are also shown to arise from the adoption of the radical concept of sustainable development by governments, international agencies and multinational business at the Rio Summit of 1992, and consequent re-interpretations. But the rational response is not discarding the concept but rediscovering the radical core and potential to which these various bodies are in theory committed.
29. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 3
Ömer Naci Soykan Looking at the World from Istanbul as a Metaphor
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The problem of environment is the leading common problem of people living on Earth, the sky and soil of which have been polluted. I believe that pollution in a broad sense is the basis for all other important problems of this world. Man has polluted himself and Earth. In the former, which is called cultural pollution, man becomes alienated from other members of his own species and in the latter, which is called physical pollution, man becomes alienated from nature of which he is a child. Both problems, which are based on alienation, show the deficiency in the implementation of the idea of the unity of man and nature, of the unity of mankind. The unity of humanity presupposes the consciousness of living in a common world and of the fact that man is a child of Earth. The possibility of and the necessity for such a consciousness to come into being in a physical-geographical space, which is metaphorically represented by Istanbul, in which different cultures managed to exist side by side throughout history, shows itself more clearly in the present day. Istanbul might be seen as the city which is probably most suitable for being seen as a metaphor for a world in which the idea of the unity of humanity may be realized in the future, because it is an entrance to Asia with its eastern side and to Europe with its western side and as such the point of intersection of the eastern and western cultures. It was a cosmopolitan city and still is. Having a look at the world from Istanbul as a metaphor is in a sense the same as having a look at Istanbul itself.
30. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 3
René von Schomberg The Erosion of our Value Spheres: The Ways in which Society Copes with Scientific, Moral and Ethical Uncertainty
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In the following, I will discuss the current social reaction to the ecological crisis and the ways in which society reacts to technological risks, which can be understood primarily as a reaction to scientific and moral or ethical uncertainty. In the first section, I will clarify what is meant by scientific and moral or ethical uncertainty. In the second section, I will contrast Max Weber's differentiation of science, law [Recht) and morality in the modern world with the process of de-differentiation of these value spheres, a trend which can be observed in the present-day context of the ecological crisis and technological risks. We shall see that social contradictions emerge in the functional relationships between these value spheres, and that such contradictions go hand in hand with these value spheres or contexts of discourse either losing their original function or becoming transformed. Science forfeits its role as a functional authority and becomes a strategic resource for politics. Law becomes a basic constituent of an amoral form of negotiation, which can no longer be properly grasped in terms of legal categories. Morality is transformed into fear, and economics yields unprofitable practices. In the third section, I will in attempt to open up the moral and ethical dimension of how to deal with uncertainty with the help of discourse theory (Apel, 1988; Habermas, 1996), as well as outline a possible solution.
31. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 3
Elisa Aaltola The Moral Value of Animals: Three Altruistic Versions
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Altruism has often been thought to be the reason we treat animals with a certain moral respect. Animals are not moral agents who could reciprocally honour our well being, and because of this duties toward them are considered to be based on other-directed motivations. Altruism is a vague notion, and in the context of animals can be divided into at least three different alternatives. The first one equates altruism with benevolence or "kindness"; the second one argues altruism is based on recognising inherent value in others; and the third one emphasises identification. Out of these three the first one seems the poorest, for it ultimately falls into egoism: we treat animals with respect out of a need to cultivate our "humanity". The second option is well justified and has been defended thoroughly in the field of animal ethics. Still, it has been criticised recently for being too theory-dependent and even abstract. The third alternative seems tempting in its willingness to give room to practice instead of emphasising abstract moral notions. However, this willingness also comes with a price, for it seems unclear what the mere concentration on contexts and practice can tell us about duties and norms. The main problem is fitting together identification as a practical grounds for moral sentiment with the need for "codified" and even abstract moral principles. One way to do this, the paper suggests, is to use a three-level approach that seeks to take both sides into account.
32. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 3
Alicia Irene Bugallo Ecología Profunda y conservacíon de la naturaleza: nuevos desafíos
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Norwegian ecosopher Arne Naess distinguished 'deep' from 'shallow' or merely technical approaches to ecological issues. The first proposal of the Deep Ecology movement (1973) was rooted in a monistic gestalt ontology. Deep Ecology is a tool for enabling systematic discussion of total views, of how norms and consequences interact. We need a deep spiritual change of attitude. Responsible ways of living are more conducive to truly human goals than the present destructive lifestyles. The movement has an inseparable ecopolitical aspect. The later proposals of the Platform movement (subsequent to the Naess-Sessions platform of 1984) stressed a pragmatic intention as can be found in James, Schiller or even Protagoras. The eight principles of the platform constitute a methodological path from ultimate premises to the level of decisions in concrete situations. Supporters of Deep Ecology have an obligation to work to implement changes through political, economic, technological and ideological activism, emphasizing improvements in environmental quality, aesthetics, culture and religion rather than higher levels of material consumption. In order to deal with shallow politicians and decision makers, more supporters incorporate the materialistic, naturalistic concepts of ecological sciences, and the points of view of new schools of conservation philosophy, with complementary approaches from conservation biology and ecosystem ecology.
contributors
33. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 3
Contributors
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index
34. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 3
Name Index
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