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presidential plenary session: kant’s aesthetics
21. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 35 > Issue: 1
Wiebke Deimling Kant’s Theory of Tragedy
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22. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 35 > Issue: 1
Sarah H. Woolwine Knowing Disability Transactionally: A Pragmatist Response to Epistemic Injustice Presidential Address
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23. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 35 > Issue: 1
Luis H. Favela Emergence By Way of Dynamic Interactions
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I defend the claim that emergence is always a kind of interaction dominance. I utilize Francescotti’s (2007) definition of emergence, which captures five features typically thought crucial for emergence: downward causal influence, novelty, relationality, supervenience, and unpredictability. I then explicate interaction dominance, a concept from complexity science. In short, a system is interaction dominant when the interactions of the parts give rise to features that override the features of the parts in isolation or linked via additive and linear dynamics. Locust swarms are presented as an illustrative case of a natural phenomenon that meets the definition for emergent properties. Moreover, locust swarms provide a case of an emergent property arising via interaction-dominant dynamics. I conclude by discussing the relationship of emergence and interaction dominance, with emphasis on the claim that all emergent properties occur due to interaction dominance, but not all systems that exhibit interaction-dominant dynamics have emergent properties.
24. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 35 > Issue: 1
Mark Bauer Semantic Essentialism and Populations
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25. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 35 > Issue: 1
Gabriel Zamosc Democracy and the Nietzschean Pathos of Distance
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In this paper I discuss the Nietzschean notion of a pathos of distance, which some democratic theorists would like to recruit in the service of a democratic ethos. Recently their efforts have been criticized on the basis that the Nietzschean pathos of distance involves an aristocratic attitude of essentializing contempt towards the common man that is incompatible with the democratic demand to accord everyone equal respect and dignity. I argue that this criticism is misguided and that the pathos in question involves encouraging the fl ourishing of higher types that give meaning and justification to the social order. For Nietzsche, the experience of living under a society that is thus organized leads to the psychological demand to search for spiritual states within a person that can make life worth living. I conclude by considering whether, so conceived, the pathos of distance is compatible with democracy.
26. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 35 > Issue: 1
Thomas Carnes Historic Injustice, Collective Agency, and Compensatory Duties
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27. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 35 > Issue: 1
James Cain Free Will, Resiliency and Flip-flopping
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Many philosophers accept with certainty that we are morally responsible but take it to be an open question whether determinism holds. They treat determinism as epistemically compatible with responsibility. Should one who accepts this form of epistemic compatibilism also hold that determinism is metaphysically compatible with responsibility—that it is metaphysically possible for determinism and responsibility to coexist? John Martin Fischer gives two arguments that appear to favor an affirmative answer to this question. He argues that accounts of responsibility, such as his, that are neutral with respect to whether responsible actions are determined have a “resiliency” that counts in their favor. Furthermore, he criticizes libertarians who argue on a priori grounds that determinism cannot coexist with responsibility and who admit that they would retract their argument if determinism were shown to hold; this “metaphysical fl ip-flopping” is said to render their positions implausible. I assess the merits of these arguments.
28. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 35 > Issue: 1
Daniel Douglas Carr Counterfeit Indeterminacy and Kane’s Self-Forming Actions
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Kane provides Self-Forming Actions (SFAs) as a rebuttal to allegations that indeterministic choices are determined by luck and are therefore not free. This paper explicates Kane’s proposal and provides a conceptual complication for Kane’s SFAs. The quantum events in an indeterministic world can be recreated in a deterministic world by pseudorandom number generation. This deterministic world is indistinguishable from the indeterministic world it simulates at the quantum, neurological, and phenomenological levels. Thus, indeterministic quantum behavior cannot secure free will in Kane’s SFAs in any way which is not reproducible in a deterministic world. The paper addresses the objections that the proposed problem is merely an epistemic rather than metaphysical one and that a deterministic agent does not have plural voluntary control. I conjecture that a dualistic account of libertarian free will may dodge the problems I raise regarding Kane’s SFAs.
29. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 35 > Issue: 1
Patrick Bondy Revisiting Anti-Luck Epistemology
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According to anti-luck approaches to the analysis of knowledge, knowledge is analyzed as unlucky true belief, or unlucky justified true belief. According to virtue epistemology, on the other hand, knowledge is true belief which a subject has acquired or maintained because of the exercise of a relevant cognitive ability. ALE and VE both appear to have difficulty handling some intuitive cases where subjects have or lack knowledge, so Pritchard (2012) proposed that we should take an anti-luck condition and a success-from-ability condition as independent necessary conditions on knowledge. Recently, Carter and Peterson (2017) have argued that Pritchard’s modal notion of luck needs to be broadened. My aim in this paper is to show that, with the modal conception of luck appropriately broadened, it is no longer clear that ALE needs to be supplemented with an independent ability condition in order to handle the problematic Gettier cases.
30. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 35 > Issue: 1
Jerry Green Metacognition as an Epistemic Virtue
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