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Displaying: 21-30 of 124 documents


21. Stance: An International Undergraduate Philosophy Journal: Volume > 10
Russ Shafer-Landau The Philosopher’s Role: An Interview with Dr. Russ Shafer-Landau
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22. Stance: An International Undergraduate Philosophy Journal: Volume > 10
Juli K. Thorson, Sarah E. Vitale Learning From Experience: Letter from the Managing Editors of Stance X
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23. Stance: An International Undergraduate Philosophy Journal: Volume > 10
David Concepción An Uncommon Decade: Letter from the Managing Editor
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24. Stance: An International Undergraduate Philosophy Journal: Volume > 9
Caroline Carr Does the Dao Support Individual Autonomy and Human Rights?
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The Universal Declaration of Human Rights lists what have come to be called “first” and “second” generation rights. First generation rights are civil and political; second generation rights are social, economic, and cultural. Western and Asian nations are in disagreement about whether each of these rights is universal. While Western nations strongly believe that first generation rights should be universal, many “Confucian” nations insist that second generation rights precede first generation rights. After analyzing the Confucian values in detail, I conclude that Confucianism supports both generations of rights.
25. Stance: An International Undergraduate Philosophy Journal: Volume > 9
Raquel Robles Just Visiting: A Working Concept of “Wilderness” for Environmental Ethics and Ordinary Language
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This paper argues for retaining the concept of “wilderness” as a significant ethical category and considers arguments by J. Baird Callicott and William Cronon for abandoning it. Counters by Paul M. Keeling and Scott Friskics are evaluated and defended. Lastly, the paper recommends thinking of the term “wilderness” as belonging to a certain range of meanings on a spectrum of naturalness.
26. Stance: An International Undergraduate Philosophy Journal: Volume > 9
Charlie Melman If “Everyone Does It,” Then You Can Too
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I argue that the “But Everyone Does That” (BEDT) defense can have significant exculpatory force in a legal sense, but not a moral sense. I consider whether legal realism is a better theory of the law than the more orthodox view of respecting the law as it is written. I next examine what the purpose of the law is, especially attending to how widespread disobedience is treated. Finally, I attempt to fit BEDT within Paul Robinson’s framework for categorizing defenses. I conclude that, first, BEDT can have significant exculpatory force; second, a BEDT plea does not comport with either Robinson’s definition of an excuse or other commonly held conceptions and so needs its own classification; and finally, BEDT does not exonerate the offender in a moral sense—only in a legal context.
27. Stance: An International Undergraduate Philosophy Journal: Volume > 9
Steven Dykstra Scientific Minimalism and the Division of Moral Labor in Regulating Dual-Use Research
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In this paper I examine the merits of a “division of moral labor” regulatory system for dual-use research. I borrow an argument from Thomas Douglas against scientific isolationism to show that researchers must be morally responsible for resolving at least some dual-use problems. I then argue that there are key benefits of scientific isolationism that are preserved in a position I call scientific minimalism. I then demonstrate that scientific minimalism, in a division of moral labor system, succeeds in maximizing both scientific freedom and moral efficiency, which I hold to be an essential aim for any proposed alternative regulatory model.
28. Stance: An International Undergraduate Philosophy Journal: Volume > 9
Richard Spradlin “Hood Politics”: Racial Transformation in Hip-Hop
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This paper explores the possibility of music to transform the way we understand each other. In particular, it looks at the genre of hip-hop and the ways in which it can serve as a vehicle for understanding black experience. I argue that hip-hop’s structural elements allow artists to convey their living narrative in a way that recognizes, challenges, and changes our conceptual understanding of the black body. Using the works of Darby English and Harry Nethery, I examine hip-hop and apply their arguments to two specific rappers in order to illustrate my argument.
29. Stance: An International Undergraduate Philosophy Journal: Volume > 9
Dane Shade Hannum Criminal Justice Without Moral Responsibility: Addressing Problems with Consequentialism
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This paper grants the hard determinist position that moral responsibility is not coherent with a deterministic world view and examines hard determinist alternatives to traditional punishment. I claim that hard determinist accounts necessarily involve consequentialist reasoning and discuss problems stemming from them. I also argue that a revised model of traditional consequentialism called complex consequentialism, a view in which multiple values may be considered as ends, provides the best moral framework for a hard determinist account. Ultimately, I examine a criminal justice model that draws heavily on public health ideals and argue that it should considered a complex consequentialist account.
30. Stance: An International Undergraduate Philosophy Journal: Volume > 9
Miguel D. Guerrero The Academic Animal is Just an Analogy: Against the Restrictive Account of Hegel’s “Spiritual Animal Kingdom”
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The “Spiritual Animal Kingdom” is an often-misunderstood section of G.F.W. Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit. Many scholars interpret the ‘Spiritual Animal Kingdom’ as being analogous to intellectual life. While the intellectual life analogy is useful, the restrictive account takes it to be the sole content of this section. In this essay, I argue that the restrictive account misidentifies what Hegel means by die Sache selbst (in English, “the matter in hand”). Such a mistake will affect the ability of consciousness to progress to absolute knowing, the ultimate project for Hegel’s Phenomenology.