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Displaying: 21-30 of 52 documents


book reviews
21. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 57 > Issue: 3
Joseph A. Bracken, S.J. German Idealism’s Trinitarian Legacy. By Dale M. Schlitt
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22. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 57 > Issue: 3
Victor Salas The Cambridge Companion to Medieval Logic. Edited by Catarina Dutilh Novaes and Stephen Read
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23. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 57 > Issue: 3
Sam Zeno Conedera, S.J. Conserving America? Essays on Present Discontents. By Patrick J. Deneen
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24. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 57 > Issue: 3
Joseph W. Koterski, S.J. The Concept of Woman. Volume 3: The Search for Communion of Persons, 1500–2015. By Sister Prudence Allen, R.S.M.
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25. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 57 > Issue: 3
Books Received
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26. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 57 > Issue: 2
About Our Contributors
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articles
27. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 57 > Issue: 2
Mark K. Spencer The Flexibility of Divine Simplicity: Aquinas, Scotus, Palamas
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Contrary to many interpreters, I argue that Thomas Aquinas’s account of divine simplicity is compatible with the accounts of divine simplicity given by John Duns Scotus and Gregory Palamas. I synthesize their accounts of divine simplicity in a way that can answer the standard objections to the doctrine of divine simplicity more effectively than any of their individual accounts can. The three objections that I consider here are these: the doctrine of divine simplicity is inconsistent with distinguishing divine attributes, with the doctrine of the Trinity, and with the doctrine of divine freedom.
28. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 57 > Issue: 2
Ezequiel L. Posesorski Maimon’s Late Ethical Skepticism and the Rejection of Kant’s Notion of the Moral Law
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This paper discusses a set of arguments launched in Salomon Maimon’s 1800 Der moralische Skeptiker against Kant’s notion of the moral law. Apart from being an almost overlooked chapter in the history of post-Kantian ethics, this work is one in which Maimon takes issue with four related aspects of the ethical thesis and methodology presented in Kant’s second Kritik. At the core of the discussion is Maimon’s emphasis on a major incongruity in the correlation of Kant’s notions of theoretical and practical reason: objectively valid statements in ethics should not qualitatively diverge from those in theoretical science. It is in this context that the paper discusses the late Maimonian thesis that Kant’s factual notion of the moral law cannot be reconciled with his notion of theoretical rigor. It also shows why, for Maimon, the highest principle of Kantian ethics should reveal itself to be theoretically untenable and dogmatic, and hence lead to skepticism.
29. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 57 > Issue: 2
Steven G. Smith Meaningful Moral Freedom: An Improved Kantian View
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Kant’s central notion of a “causality of freedom” seems inconsistent with his theoretical analysis of causation. Because of its detachment from any reference to time, it is also seriously in tension with ordinary moral ideals of individuality, efficacy, responsiveness, and personal growth in the exercise of freedom. I suggest a way of conceiving moral freedom that avoids the absurdity of practical timelessness while preserving the main strengths of Kant’s theories of theoretical and practical meaning, including his refusal to specify the content of human fulfillment. Much as Kant’s ideal of the highest good combines the supreme good of moral virtue with its necessarily desired complement of worthy happiness, a Kantian ideal of the fullest freedom can combine the transcendental freedom of the moral disposition with individual exercises of freedom in the dramatic interaction of actual moral community.
30. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 57 > Issue: 2
Luca Forgione Kant and the Simple Representation “I”
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The aim of this paper is to focus on certain characterizations of “I think” and the “transcendental subject” in an attempt to verify a connection with certain metaphysical characterizations of the thinking subject that Kant introduced in the critical period. Most importantly, two distinct meanings of “I think” need be distinguished: (1) in the Transcendental Deduction “I think” is the act of apperception; (2) in the Transcendental Deduction and in the section of Paralogisms “I think” is taken in its representational nature. It proves helpful to interpret the “transcendental subject” in formal terms as a concept that, mutatis mutandis, has the same function of the concept of the “transcendental object.”