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Displaying: 21-30 of 50 documents


book reviews
21. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 58 > Issue: 3
Sophie Berman The A Priori in the Thought of Descartes: Cognition, Method and Science. By Jan Palkoska
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22. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 58 > Issue: 3
Justin M. Anderson Aquinas on Virtue: A Causal Reading. By Nicholas Austin, S.J.
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23. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 58 > Issue: 3
Aaron Segal David Shatz: Torah, Philosophy, and Culture. Edited by Hava Tirosh-Samuelson and Aaron W. Hughes
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24. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 58 > Issue: 3
Joseph W. Koterski, S.J. Plato’s Persona: Marsilio Ficio, Renaissance Humanism, and Platonic Traditions. By Denis J.-J. Robichaud
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25. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 58 > Issue: 3
Books Received
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26. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 58 > Issue: 2
About Our Contributors
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articles
27. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 58 > Issue: 2
Lorraine Yeung The Nature of Horror Reconsidered
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There is a growing interest in the role of non-cognitive affective responses in the philosophical literature on fiction and emotion. This flurry of scholarly interest is partly a reaction to cognitivist accounts of fiction and emotion that have been found to be inadequate. The inadequacy is particularly salient when this approach is employed to account for narrative horror. Cognitivist conceptions of the emotion engendered by narrative horror prove to be too restrictive. Cognitivist accounts also fail to give the formal devices and stylistic elements deployed in narrative horror a proper place within the spectator’s emotional engagement with it. In this paper I propose an alternative conception of the emotion “horror” that incorporates non-cognitive affective responses. I argue that this conception of “horror” is more fine-grained than the one characterized as a cognitivist approach. It captures more literary examples of the horror experience and it accommodates better the fear of the unknown. It also makes possible an aesthetics of horror in which formal devices and stylistic elements are given their proper place.
28. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 58 > Issue: 2
Michael Barker The Argumentative Significance of Relative Purposiveness
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In the Critique of the Teleological Power of Judgment Kant argues that organisms have inner purposiveness. He introduces inner purposiveness in contrast to relative purposiveness. I examine Kant’s discussion of relative purposiveness in §63. I then argue that Kant establishes three theses in §63 that he subsequently modifies in §64 and further refines in §65. In my view, his discussion of relative purposiveness serves a broader purpose than just to present a contrast from which to consider inner purposiveness. The discussion of relative purposiveness establishes a framework for a sustained thread of argument from §63 through §65, culminating in Kant’s often discussed claim that we must judge organisms to be natural ends. My interpretation exposes a more significant argumentative role for relative purposiveness than is typically recognized.
29. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 58 > Issue: 2
Joseph Gamache Aquinas and Contemporary Epistemology: The Case of the Truth-Norm
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Whether and how truth is a norm of belief is a contentious issue in contemporary epistemology. In this paper I retrieve Aquinas’s conception of truth in order to advance a new answer to the question of what grounds the truth-norm. I begin by contrasting the two dominant contemporary accounts of this grounding, showing ways in which each succeeds and fails. Unlike the currently dominant accounts, my account seeks to ground the truth-norm in the nature of truth, as opposed to the nature of belief. Ultimately I argue that Aquinas’s conception of truth furnishes us with an account of the grounding of the truth-norm that satisfies three conditions of adequacy. Such an account (1) grounds the truth-norm in the nature of truth, (2) captures the breadth of epistemic evaluation, and (3) makes sense of the fact that truth is a norm specifically for the human person.
30. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 58 > Issue: 2
Gaven Kerr The Immediate Realism of Léon Noël
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After the emergence of the neo-Thomist movement in the early twentieth century, the question of how best to present Aquinas’s latent epistemological realism came to the fore. Léon Noël was an important contributor to this area of neo-Thomism, but his work has unfortunately been eclipsed by that of other more recognizable authors such as Etienne Gilson and Jacques Maritain. Noël argued that Aquinas’s realism is a form of immediate realism that recognizes the challenge of modern representationalist epistemologies but does not succumb to non-realist ways of thinking. Hence Noël presented immediate realism as an epistemological position that is inspired by Aquinas but also capable of addressing philosophical concerns that emerged after his death. In this article I present Noël’s view as interesting in its own right and capable of engaging with contemporary non-Thomist trends in epistemology.