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book review
21. Hume Studies: Volume > 41 > Issue: 2
Karl Schafer Jacqueline Taylor. Reflecting Subjects: Passion, Sympathy, and Society in Hume’s Philosophy
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22. Hume Studies: Volume > 41 > Issue: 2
Index to Volume 41
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23. Hume Studies: Volume > 41 > Issue: 2
Hume Studies Referees, 2015–2016
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articles
24. Hume Studies: Volume > 41 > Issue: 1
Lisa Ievers The Method in Hume’s “Madness”
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Hume’s response to his dramatic encounter with skepticism in the Treatise is well known: his skepticism dissipates when he socializes with others in the comparatively amusing sphere of common life. As many commentators have noted, however, this “response” to skepticism is really no response at all. In this paper, I show that the charge that Hume provides a non-response to skepticism at T 1.4.7.9 (SBN 269) is misplaced, for what is standardly interpreted as Hume’s skepticism in the preceding paragraph is not skepticism. Instead, I argue, it is the condition of “madness,” a disordered mental state in which “every loose fiction” enjoys the same status as a “serious conviction” (T 1.3.10.9; SBN 123). Hume’s alleged response to skepticism at T 1.4.7.9 (SBN 269) would indeed be unsatisfying, if he were responding to skepticism. As a response to madness, it is perfectly adequate.
25. Hume Studies: Volume > 41 > Issue: 1
Jennifer Welchman Self-Love and Personal Identity in Hume’s Treatise
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Do the first two books of Hume’s Treatise form a “compleat chain of reasoning” on the subject of personal identity? Not if a complete chain of reasoning is one that explains the origin of the fictitious beliefs that we remain identical through time, “as it regards our thought or imagination, and as it regards our passions or the concern we take in ourselves.” Book 1 explains how we come to believe that we are persisting subjects of conscious experience of an external world. Book 2 explains our belief that we are persisting subjects of passions and powers of practical agency. But neither explains the origin of the mistaken belief that we are also persisting objects of our own practical agency or the equally mistaken belief that we are naturally and powerfully disposed to “concern” for ourselves. If we are not the enduring objects of our practical agency and if, as Hume explicitly states in Book 2, we do not love our “selves,” how do we come to make these mistakes? And what actually plays the causal role in moral and social life vulgarly attributed to self-love? Were Hume to leave these phenomena unexplained, his chain of reasoning regarding personal identity would be incomplete. Hume supplies this account in Book 3. Thus the first two Books do not form a complete chain of reasoning as regards personal identity.
book symposium: andrew sabl’s hume’s politics: coordination and crisis in the history of england
26. Hume Studies: Volume > 41 > Issue: 1
Willem Lemmens “Sweden Is Still a Kingdom”: Convention and Political Authority in Hume’s History of England
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27. Hume Studies: Volume > 41 > Issue: 1
Mark G. Spencer “Distant and Commonly Faint and Disfigured Originals”: Hume’s Magna Charta and Sabl’s Fundamental Constitutional Conventions
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28. Hume Studies: Volume > 41 > Issue: 1
Ryu Susato “Politics May Be Reduced To a Science”? Between Politics and Economics in Hume’s Concepts of Convention
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29. Hume Studies: Volume > 41 > Issue: 1
Andrew Sabl Reply to My Critics
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articles
30. Hume Studies: Volume > 40 > Issue: 2
Alison McIntyre Fruitless Remorses: Hume’s Critique of the Penitential Project of The Whole Duty of Man
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Familiarity with the doctrines presented in Richard Allestree’s devotional work The Whole Duty of Man (1658), which Hume reported having read as a boy, can illuminate the strategy of argument Hume employs in Treatise 2.1.6–2.1.8 to undermine views he attributes to “the vulgar systems of ethicks.” Hume’s explicit critique of the view that pride is a sin and humility a virtue in Treatise 2.1.7 relies on assumptions that are already present in Allestree’s account of pride and humility and are described using similar language. Sections 6–8 of Treatise 2.1 also provide an implicit critique of Allestree’s attempts to induce a general stance of humility based on mortifying considerations about human nature and to inspire episodes of penitential humility for the sins of the day. I argue that the “limitations to this account” gathered together in 2.1.6 are placed there to set up this critique. Together, the limitations imply that defects in our personal character are sufficiently close to us, peculiar to us, discernible to others, of appropriate duration, and supported by general rules to generate the passion of humility when we reflect on them, while reflection on human nature in general and particular episodes of sin are not.