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Displaying: 21-40 of 1700 documents


articles
21. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 36 > Issue: 3
Jon W. Thompson Divine Idealism as Physicalism? Reflections on the Structural Definition of Physicalism
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Hempel’s Dilemma remains at the center of the problem of defining physicalism. In brief, the dilemma asks whether physicalism should be defined by appeal to current or future physics. If defined by current physics, physicalism is almost certainly false. If defined by an ideal future physics, then physicalism has little determinable content. Montero and Papineau have innovatively suggested that the dilemma may be avoided by defining physicalism structurally. While their definition is one among many definitions, it is significant in that—if successful—it would break the impasse for defining physicalism. I argue, however, that the structural definition fails because it counts metaphysical frameworks (crucially, versions of divine idealism) as “physicalist”—an unwelcome result for physicalists. This paper thus furthers the debate on the definition of physicalism and sheds light on the relationship between physicalism and idealism.
22. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 36 > Issue: 3
Robert C. Roberts Is Kierkegaard a “Virtue Ethicist”?
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Several readers of Kierkegaard have proposed that his works are a good source for contemporary investigations of virtues, especially theistic and Christian ones. Sylvia Walsh has recently offered several arguments to cast doubt on the thesis that Kierkegaard can be profitably read as a “virtue ethicist.” Examination of her arguments helps to clarify what virtues, as excellent traits of human character, can be in a moral outlook that ascribes deep sin and moral helplessness to human beings and their existence and salvation entirely to God’s grace. The examination also clarifies the relationship between virtues and character and between the practices of virtue ethics and character ethics. Such clarification also may provide a bridge of communication between Kierkegaard scholarship and scholars of virtue ethics beyond the theistic communities. In particular, I’ll argue that a character ethics that is not a virtue ethics would be suboptimal as an aid to the formation of Christian wisdom and sanctification. Kierkegaard’s character ethics is a virtue ethics.
23. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 36 > Issue: 3
Hugh Burling The Reference of “God” Revisited
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I argue that the reference for “God” is determined by the definite description “the being that is worthy of our worship.” I describe two desiderata for rival theories of the reference of “God” to meet: accessibility and scope. I explain the deficiencies of a view where God is dubbed “God” and the name passed down by causal chains and a view where “God” picks out the unique satisfier of a traditional definite description. After articulating the “Worship-Worthiness” view, I show how it best satisfies the desiderata. I then respond to some putative counterexamples to the view.
24. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 36 > Issue: 3
Frederick Choo The Prior Obligations Objection to Theological Stateism
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Theological stateist theories, the most well-known of which is Divine Command Theory (DCT), ground our moral obligations directly in some state of God. The prior obligations objection poses a challenge to theological stateism. Is there a moral obligation to obey God’s commands? If no, it is hard to see how God’s commands can generate any moral obligations for us. If yes, then what grounds this prior obligation? To avoid circularity, the moral obligation must be grounded independent of God’s commands; and therefore DCT fails to ground all moral obligations in God’s commands. I argue that DCT proponents should embrace “metaethical DCT.” On this view, there is no moral obligation to obey God. God creates our moral obligations out of normative nothingness. I argue that this helps DCT proponents to escape the prior obligations objection. Other theological stateist theories can modify their theory similarly to meet this objection.
book reviews
25. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 36 > Issue: 3
Gregory E. Ganssle Philosophical Essays Against Open Theism, edited by Benjamin H. Arbour
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26. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 36 > Issue: 3
Kate Finley Petitionary Prayer: A Philosophical Investigation, by Scott Davison
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27. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 36 > Issue: 3
Dustin Crummett Does God Matter? Essays on the Axiological Consequences of Theism, edited by Klaas Kraay
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28. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 36 > Issue: 3
Chris Tweedt Faith and Humility, by Jonathan Kvanvig
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29. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 36 > Issue: 3
Michael Thune God, Science, and Religious Diversity: A Defense of Theism, by Robert T. Lehe
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30. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 36 > Issue: 3
Benjamin B. DeVan The Devil’s Redemption: A New History and Interpretation of Christian Universalism, Volumes 1 and 2, by Michael J. McClymond
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articles
31. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 36 > Issue: 2
Jc Beall, Jared Henderson A Neglected Qua Solution to the Fundamental Problem of Christology
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We advance a neglected QUA solution to the fundamental problem of Christology. Our chief aim is to put the view on the theological table, leaving future debate to tell its ultimate fate. After presenting the view we measure it against standard problems that confront extant QUA views and also against objections peculiar to the proposed view.
32. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 36 > Issue: 2
Joseph Jedwab, John A. Keller Paraphrase and the Doctrine of the Trinity
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The Doctrine of the Trinity says that there is one God, that there are three divine Persons, and that each divine Person is God. The Logical Problem of the Trinity is that these claims seem logically inconsistent. We argue that any coherent and orthodox solution to the Logical Problem must use the technique of paraphrase: a logically or metaphysically more perspicuous reformulation. If so, discussions of paraphrase deserve more prominence in the literature on the Doctrine of the Trinity. We also show that such explicit discussion has important implications for theorizing about the Trinity.
33. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 36 > Issue: 2
Robert C. Roberts Joys: A Brief Moral and Christian Geography
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This paper is an initial effort preparatory for a more thorough “theology of joys.” I distinguish joys from other kinds of pleasure and argue that joy can be seen as the form of all the so-called positive emotions (the ones that feel good). So joy is properly treated in the plural: joys come in a variety of kinds. I distinguish canonical (joys with single-term names) from non-canonical joys. The worthiness of joys is primarily a function of their objects—what the joys are about. I look at a few examples of joys that appear in the New Testament and sketch the relation of joys to happiness.
34. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 36 > Issue: 2
Jeroen de Ridder Against Quasi-Fideism
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Duncan Pritchard has recently ventured to carve out a novel position in the epistemology of religious belief called quasi-fideism. Its core is an application of ideas from Wittgensteinian hinge epistemology to religious belief. Among its many advertised benefits are that it can do justice to two seemingly conflicting ideas about religious belief, to wit: (a) that it is, at least at some level, a matter of ungrounded faith, but also (b) that it can be epistemically rationally grounded. In this paper, I argue that quasi-fideism fails. Its central tenets either have unattractive consequences or are implausible.
35. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 36 > Issue: 2
Jonathan Curtis Rutledge Perspectival Skeptical Theism
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Skeptical theists have paid insufficient attention to non-evidential components of epistemic rationality. I address this lacuna by constructing an alternative perspectivalist understanding of epistemic rationality and defeat that, when applied to skeptical theism, yields a more demanding standard for reasonably affirming the crucial premise of the evidential argument from suffering. The resulting perspectival skeptical theism entails that someone can be justified in believing that gratuitous suffering exists only if they are not subject to closure-of-inquiry defeat; that is, a type of defeat that prevents reasonable belief that p even if p is very probable on an agent’s evidence.
reviews
36. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 36 > Issue: 2
Craig Warmke Idealism: New Essays in Metaphysics, edited by Tyron Goldschmidt and Kenneth L. Pearce
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37. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 36 > Issue: 2
Matthew A. Benton A Grotesque in the Garden, by Hud Hudson
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38. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 36 > Issue: 2
Andrew M. Bailey Maximal God: A New Defence of Perfect Being Theism, by Yujin Nagasawa
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39. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 36 > Issue: 2
Michelle Panchuk The Hiddenness of God, by Michael C. Rea
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40. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 36 > Issue: 2
Jordan Wessling The Christian Idea of God: A Philosophical Foundation for Faith, by Keith Ward
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