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Displaying: 21-40 of 49 documents


discussion papers
21. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 6 > Issue: 3
Robert W. Loftin The Morality of Hunting
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In recent years, philosophers have begun to devote serious attention to animal rights issues. Most of the attention has focused on factory farming and animal experimentation. While many of the arguments used to justify sport hunting are shown to be spurious, the paper defends sport hunting on utilitarian grounds. The loss of sport hunting would also mean the loss of a major political pressure group working for the benefit of wildlife through the preservation of habitat. Peter Singer argues that “the shooting of a duck does not lead to its replacement by another.” I argue that, on the contrary, the shooting of a duck leads to the production of other ducks and other life forms that are not shot at.
22. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 6 > Issue: 3
Marvin Henberg Wilderness as Playground
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Play requires security from sober concems, and only recently have non-native North Americans feIt secure enough in wildemess lands to view them as potential playgrounds. Employing a pretend quality of play illusion, many kinds of play are derivatives from normally sober activities. I argue that the most genuine sorts of wildemess play derive from the activities of the original geographical explorers. It is thus possible to distinguish types of play for which wildemess is especially suited from types that merely happen in the wildemess-i.e., for which wildemess is an accidental playground. Play values are important enough to receive serious consideration in the administration of wildemess lands, and Iconclude that our public policy ought to favor wildemess activities that most closely imitate the activities of the original geographical explorers.
23. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 6 > Issue: 3
Arne Naess A Defence of the Deep Ecology Movement
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There is an international deep ecology social movement with key terms, slogans, and rhetorical use of language comparable to what we find in other activist “alternative” movements today. Some supporters of the movement partake in academic philosophy and have developed or at least suggested philosophies, “ecosophies,” inspired by the movement. R. A. Watson does not distinguish sufficiently between the movement and the philosophical expressions with academic pretensions. As a result, he falsely concludes that deep ecology implies setting man apart from nature-a kind of “anthropocentrism” in his terminology: humans and only humans have no right to interfere with natural processes. What the deep ecology movement insists on is rather that life on Earth has intrinsic value and that human behavior should and must change drastically-and soon.
book reviews
24. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 6 > Issue: 3
Evelyn B. Pluhar Regulation, Values and the Public Interest
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25. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 6 > Issue: 3
Donald Gustafson Animal Thought
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26. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 6 > Issue: 3
Karen J. Warren Ethics and the Environment
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comment
27. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 6 > Issue: 3
Henryk Skolimowski The Dogma of Anti-Anthropocentrism
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news and notes
28. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 6 > Issue: 2
NEWS AND NOTES (1)
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from the editor
29. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 6 > Issue: 2
On Studying Environmental Ethics
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features
30. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 6 > Issue: 2
Ernest Partridge Nature as a Moral Resource
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In this paper I attempt a moral justification of protecting wild species, ecosystems, and landscapes, a justification not directly grounded in appeals to human benefit. I begin with a description of anthropocentric and ecosystemic approaches to the valuing of nature and offer some empirical arguments in support of the ecosystemic view. I suggest that human beings have a genetic need for natural environments, and that the direct experience of wild nature is an intrinsic good. Theoretical coherence and scope is another advantage of the ecological perspective over the anthropocentric view. Turning to moral psychology, I argue that human beings have a fundamental need to care for things outside themselves and that this need is suitably met, and human life enriched, by a transcending concern for the well-being of natural species, habitats, and ecosystems . These considerations are joined with the ecological point of view to yield the conclusion that a self-transcending concern for the welfare of wild species and their habitats enriches the quality of moral life. Persons with genuine reverence and respect for wild creatures and their habitats will enjoy greater fulfilment in their own lives and be better neighbors toeach other.
31. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 6 > Issue: 2
Bryan G. Norton Environmental Ethics and Weak Anthropocentrism
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The assumption that environmental ethics must be nonanthropocentric in order to be adequate is mistaken. There are two forms of anthropocentrism, weak and strong, and weak anthropocentrism is adequate to support an environmental ethic. Environmental ethics is, however, distinctive vis-a-vis standard British and American ethical systems because, in order to be adequate, it must be nonindividualistic.Environmental ethics involves decisions on two levels, one kind of which differs from usual decisions affecting individual fairness while the other does not. The latter, called allocational decisions, are not reducible to the former and govern the use of resources across extended time. Weak anthropocentrism provides a basis for criticizing individual, consumptive needs and can provide the basis for adjudicatingbetween these levels, thereby providing an adequate basis for environmental ethics without the questionable ontological commitments made by nonanthropocentrists in attributing intrinsie value to nature.
discussion papers
32. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 6 > Issue: 2
Paul W. Taylor Are Humans Superior to Animals and Plants?
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Louis G. Lombardi’s arguments in support of the claim that humans have greater inherent worth than other living things provide a clear account of how it is possible to conceive of the relation between humans and nonhumans in this way. Upon examining his arguments, however, it seems that he does not succeed in establishing any reason to believe that humans actually do have greater inherent worth than animals and plants.
33. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 6 > Issue: 2
Daniel L. Dustin, Leo H. McAvoy Toward Environmental Eolithism
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We apply two contrasting principles of human workmanship, the principles of design and eolithism, to the issue of responsible environmental stewardship. Both principles are described and analyzed in an environmental context with an emphasis on the weaknesses of the more popular design principle and the strengths of the lesser known eolithic principle. We conclude with a discussion of the principles’complementary potential for environmental planning and management.
book reviews
34. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 6 > Issue: 2
Geroge Sessions Eco-Philosophy: Designing New Tactics for Living
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35. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 6 > Issue: 2
Karen J. Warren Environmental Ethics
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news and notes
36. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 6 > Issue: 2
NEWS AND NOTES (2)
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book reviews
37. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 6 > Issue: 2
Richard A. Watson The Fate of the Earth
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38. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 6 > Issue: 2
Iris Marion Young Marxism and Domination
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news and notes
39. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 6 > Issue: 1
NEWS AND NOTES (1)
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from the editor
40. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 6 > Issue: 1
Beyond Spaceship Earth
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