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21. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 53
Indoo Pandey Khanduri Competency: The only Criteria of Applied Knowledge
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The present research paper focuses its objective on clarifying the arguments for establishing the Competency to use the knowledge as the intensively required criteria of knowledge in the present global scenario. For a clear and precise understanding, the present paper has three objectives. The first objective of the present paper is set to deal with definition of the competency of knowledge in general and reflect upon the theories of Competency as given in Indian and Western Philosophy. The second aim of the research paper will be to examine how far the criteria of Competency includes all vital criterion of knowledge truth like universality, certainty and necessity leading towards the objectivity fulfilling the verification and falsification criteria in the process of competent performance and use of knowledge by the performer or user. And lastly the concluding part of present research paper, we shall make an attempt to exhibit how Competency is quintessential requirement in all the field-for example narrative form of knowledge, in the process achieving higher level experience and introspection based knowledge in Yoga and Meditation.
22. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 53
Jeong Il Kim Peirce's Unique System of Pragmatism
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In understanding Peirce's unique system of pragmatism following three theories are helpful: first, Herakleitos' saying that 'one can never step into a same river twice', second, Protagoras' saying that 'men are the measure of the world', and third, Darwin's theory of evolution. It is always the case that epistemology takes place on top the metaphysical and cosmological bases. Peirce's metaphysics and cosmology is considered to line up with above three theories. It is interesting fact that Peirce who started up his work in science ended up with such somehow unscientific cosmology. Peirce believes that the world is constantly changing. Inknowing the world Peirce says that the subject of knowing takes a part doing a certain role. Peirce says that 'to believe A', 'to think of A' and 'to think of A as true' are all same sort of mental act. Therefore, to Peirce, truth is only a kind of 'opinion'. This means that the subject of knowing has something to do with truthfulness. In this kind of knowing process 'knowing truth' can only be acquired when possibility of 'inaccuracy' and 'onesideness' are opened. Thus, Peirce's definition of knowing or truth is quite indefinite definition. According to Peirce, we only know the world partially, and moreover, even we get the total sum data about the world,the world will move on forward changing. On this ground, it might be helpful that we look in to current matters in philosophy of mind in different angle.
23. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 53
Jennifer Lackey A Justificationist View of Disagreement’s Epistemic Significance
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The question that will be the focus of this paper is this: what is the significance of disagreement between those who are epistemic peers? There are two answers to this question found in the recent literature. On the one hand, there are those who hold that one can continue to rationally believe that p despite the fact that one’s epistemic peer explicitly believes that not-p. I shall call those who hold this view nonconformists. In contrast, there are those who hold that one cannot continue to rationally believe that p when one is faced with an epistemic peer who explicitly believes that not-p. I shall call those who hold this view conformists. Inthis paper, I shall argue that neither nonconformism nor conformism provides a plausible account of the epistemic significance of peer disagreement. I shall then develop my justificationist account of peer disagreement’s epistemic significance. Whereas current views maintain that disagreement, by itself, either simply does or does not possess epistemic power, my account holds that its epistemic power, or lack thereof, is explainable in terms of its interaction with other features,particularly the degree of justified confidence with which the belief in question is held and the presence of information that one possesses about one’s own epistemic situation.
24. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 53
Eunjin Lee Pryor’s Dogmatism Against the Skeptic
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My aim in this paper is to show the difficulty James Pryor faces in attempting to overcome the skeptic’s challenge. According to the skeptic, we can never know anything about the external world, because of our cognitive limitation that cannot distinguish real perceptions from false ones in the skeptical scenarios. Thus, the skeptic requires us having antecedent justification to rule out all possible hypotheses. In opposition to the skeptic, Pryor argues that as long as we remain dogmatic about perception, we can have “prima facie justification” for perceptual beliefs, which does not rest on any antecedent justification. Furthermore, on thebasis of prima facie justification, Pryor goes on to justify the existence of the external world, which by itself excludes various skeptical hypotheses. However, I shall argue that since Pryor’s prima facie justification only considers perceptual justification, it cannot show whether skeptical hypotheses are true or false, and thus, fails to give a convincing solution to the skeptic. Nevertheless, I still believe that dogmatism is worthy of notice in that it offers a plausible explanation of our ordinary perceptual beliefs by the notion of “entitlement to rely.
25. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 53
Elena Leonteva Rationality in General and its Specific Type
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The concept of rationality in general suggested in given paper may be considered as the initial theoretical abstraction that could become the starting point of rationality analysis. The “abstract concept” that is free from any sort of rationality individual being, indifferent and formal towards any particular stage of its becomingness, permits to specify the key attributes and principles which determine its fundamental sense. The rationality attributes realization is going through the external characteristics acquisition that is the process of rationality actual being becoming. In this case external characteristics are axiological, praxiological,cultural‐historical, and existential attributes that “inbreathe” rationality the “vital force” which allows it to abandon the realm of total abstraction.
26. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 53
Joungbin Lim Naturalistic Epistemology, Normativity, and Self
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In this paper, I criticize naturalized epistemology. To this end, I critically examine several versions of naturalistic epistemology (Quine, Kornblith, and Plantinga). While Quine’s epistemology eschews any kind of normativity not invoked in science, Kornblith’s and Plantinga’s views attempt to explain normativity in the light of descriptivity. I provide an argument against them. The upshot of my argument is that since we are self-conscious beings, we have reflective ability to see what we ought to believe. In other words, the fact that we are self-conscious beings requires us to find reason for our belief. I argue that naturalistic epistemology cannot capture that idea, since it is only concerned with third-person, impersonal approach. It simply shifts our thinking about justification from a subjective or first-person perspective to an objective or third-person perspective. Therefore, naturalistic epistemology, even if it is a weak version, is untenable in that it simply ignores human consciousness and its role in justification of beliefs.
27. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 53
Hui-Min Lin Knowledge and Information
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Obviously, “To know” is different to “be informed”. For “to know”, we have a motivation to reach certain proposition we thought is meaningful to us; however, for “be informed”, we just passively receive propositions or we gain certain propositions without much deliberation in which these propositions may be useful to us. The proposition “Wang collected 19 wins in both MLB 2006 and 2007” seems information but not knowledge to us, in the sense that we just be given this proposition and we exploited it to entertain our friends around us. However, in the case of I am a sport agent; “Wang collected 19 wins in both MLB 2006 and 2007” is surely knowledge but not just information for me, in the sense that I have a motivation to reach this proposition to do my work best. I “know” thatWang collected 19 and “inform” the team to consider his contribution to the New York Yankee. The Yankee of course “knows” Wang’s performance, I the sport agent “inform” the Yankee the fact of 19 just push the Yankee to reconsider this information seriously or tell them the significance of this information. What I want to tell them or remind them is what we said knowledge, not just information. Knowledge then has more elements than information does in our daily usage. It is less direct that there exists a distinction between the proposition of knowledge and that of information. The content of the two may be totally the same, the difference of the two may be vague; but the distinction of the two is necessary, at least they have different meanings in our daily usage. I think the epistemic reliabilism or externalism is not capable to bring out that point. The result leads to reliabilism any proposition that is just the information be qualified as the knowledge. But we think intuitively that the value of knowledge is more than the value of information, therefore, we need a better account of the knowledge which we are favorable.
28. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 53
Chintamani Malviya Problem of Truth and Reality
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Problem of truth and reality is age old in the field of philosophy as well as in the field of science. People very often confuse between ‘Truth’ and ‘Reality’ Most people think them to be one and the same, but there are differences. Whatever exist is real, reality and existence are interchangeable words. We can say truth, which is unchangeable and reality, which exist but change. False, which is not exist at all. People have suggested various taste to decide the truth falsity of our description of reality. Some suggested Pragmatic theory and some other have suggested Coherence as a test of truth. Realism is also an ontological theory and has been probably the most ancient one. According to ancient man, real is that which perceived. Latter on, due to religious impact the knower became more important then the knowing object. Barkeley developed an extreme position that the objective material world does not exist at all. Dewey has developed the position called Instrumentalism. Halt, Perry, Marvin, Pitkin are the chief advocates of this position. Philosophers such as Darke, Lovejoy, Cellars, and Santayana held a position of Critical Realism. These people hold that mind does not see the object directly as they are but only through their representatives, as regards the object of knowledge is concerned, the Neo Realist are monist while Critical Realist are dualist. Indian rationalist philosopher Dr. D.D. Bandiste introduces a new concept of reality Radical Realism. He proved that knowledge change the knower not the object. to him every new knowledge make some change or other inthe knowing person. Epistemological position of john Dewey called instrumentalism. According to him knowledge is an instrument of action and a meaningful action is always of a problem-solving type. Every knowledge is an instrument to serve some need or other, neither is any knowledge final, nor is any truth final. Not only everything in the world is changing, their mutual relations also change. Knowledge is not a goal, but only a instrument to achieve this or that goal. In my paper I haves discussed various theories regarding whether knowledge change the object known. In this contest I have discussed varieties of realism, Idealismand so on, but importantly I have also discussed a new theory Radical Realism.
29. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 53
Andrey N. Pavlenko Scepticism against Scepticism: Husserl’s and Putnam’s Attempts to Overcome Scepticism
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To analyze some sсeptical arguments was build the epistemological model about only one perceiving subject “Enarch”: he is one (ἐνᾴϛ) and has beginning (ἀρχῄ) in itself. This model was applyed for critical analysis of Husserl’s and Putnam’s attempts to overcome scepticism (i) by using “the intersubjective program” in a first case and (ii) argument “brains in a vat” in a second one. To justify the equivalence of the “intersubjectiveness” and “objectiveness” Husserl suggested the existence of transcendental Community . The main goal of the paper is to show that intersubjective epistemology faces the difficulty: the equivalence of the“intersubjectiveness” and “objectiveness” is not feasible. Developing Putnam’s model “brains in a vat” about boundaries of scepticism has been formulated the argument about “back of the head”. It showed that skepticism is much more strictly doctrine than it was suggested by Putnam.
30. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 53
Baron Reed Fallibilism and the Lottery paradox
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Any theory of knowledge that is fallibilist—i.e., that allows for one to have knowledge that could have been false or accidentally true—faces the lottery paradox. The paradox arises from the combination of two plausible claims: first, no one can know that one’s lottery ticket will lose prior to learning that it in fact has lost, and, second, the justification one has for the belief that one’s ticket will lose is just as good as the justification one has for paradigmatic instances of knowledge. In thispaper, I offer a solution to the lottery paradox that is grounded in a thorough-going acceptance of fallibilism.
31. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 53
Juho Ritola Harmless Epistemic Circularity?
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Epistemic circularity is a problem of arguments purporting to establish the reliability of our different sources of belief‐acquisition. For example:(TRA)At t1, S formed the perceptual belief that p, and p.At t2, S formed the perceptual belief that q, and q.At t3, …Therefore, sense perception is reliable source of beliefs.The problem is that any arguer putting forth this argument is ompelled to rely on the thing to be proven in establishing the second conjuncts of each premise. But relying on the thing to be proven is begging the question; therefore, the argument is fallacious. This has been argued to have serious skeptical implications: if there is no other way to establish the conclusion, we have no way of showing the reliability of, e.g., sense perception. Different authors have tried to resist this result. Frederick F. Schmitt (2004) argues that sense perception skepticism only follows from epistemic circularity if certain questionable assumptions are granted. He also argues that epistemic circularity is a specific type of circularity that is not vicious in the way logically circular arguments are. I argue thatSchmitt’s dismissal of the discussed assumptions is questionable and that the argument (TRA) is viciously circular under very minimal assumptions about inferential justification. Therefore, Schmitt fails to dissolve the problematic nature of (TRA).
32. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 53
V.I. Selivanova On the Universal Principle of Scientific and Philosophical Cognition
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The purpose of the present report is to draw the philosophical community’s attention to the universal principle of cognition, the principle of extrapolation, capable of integrating the present and possibly, the future methods of man’s cognitive attitude to the world. Extrapolation is interpreted as a key logical-and-gnosiological procedure and, depending on subject/object relationships, is subdivided into “actual” and “real”. According to the actual extrapolation principle in any kind of cognition, it is important to take account of the fact of the ontological presence of the individual in the world. The real extrapolation method is based on the available gnosiological content of a cognizing subject and on the use of a totality of the logical, gnosiological, epistemological, methodological, content-related and even psychological wealth of accumulated knowledge with the aim of its augmentation. The all-important aim of new gnosiology (theory of knowledge) should consist in studying permissible bounds of extrapolation, and in identifying basic laws of extrapolation of knowledge in two forms of its being as a necessary condition of their possible synthesis.
33. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 53
Ken Shigeta Dissolving the Skeptical Paradox of Knowledge via Cartesian Skepticism Based on Wittgenstein
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There is an epistemological skepticism that I might be dreaming now, or I might be a brain in a vat (BIV). There is also a demonstration that derives the skeptical conclusion about knowledge of the external world from the premise C1, i.e., I do not know “I am not dreaming (not a BIV) now.” Pessimistic critics (e.g., F. Strawson, B. Stroud) consider that the refutation of C1 is impossible, whereas others have attempted the direct refutation of C1 (e.g., G. E. Moore, H. Putnam, C. Wright), and some (e.g., F. Dretske, R. Nozick) have attempted to refute the closure principle of knowledge used in the demonstration while permitting the validity of C1. Another scholar, M. Williams, maintains that the skeptical demonstration is true only if we presuppose the epistemological premise that we choose to accept or reject at will. It seems that most critics tend to adopt a strategy that allows them to effectively avoid the skeptical consequence, thereby conceding the validity of C1. However, it is difficult to say whether their attempts succeeded, and in my opinion, they are indeed unsuccessful. This is because their concession to Descartes’ argument is insufficient. Their lack of success could also stem from the incompletion of Descartes’ own methodological doubt. The somewhat paradoxical‐sounding aim of this thesis is to show that the skeptical paradox about knowledge can be dissolved only if the Cartesian skepticism is extended far beyond the endpoint of his attempt. The argument of this thesis is based on the important arguments of Wittgenstein's On Certainty (OC)
34. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 53
Victor Shreiber Philosophy, Kant and the Scheme of Decision-making
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Some options to single out the foremost function of philosophy in culture are discussed. As any functioning part has to possess definite level of the internal unity, I begin by tracing out the main views on the unanimity of philosophical knowledge and demonstrate that the opposed variants can be reduced to well‐known contraposition between subject matter (a strong variant) and method (a weak one). I show further that at least one strong version, which identifies philosophical subject matter with the concrete universal being, seizes on only one piece of metaphysics. As a result, the boundary line between strong and weak versions erodes and the strong version converges into the weak one. Finally, I argue that fundamental philosophical themes can be united on the base of three famous Kant’s questions: What can I know? What may I hope? What ought I to do? Difference across modalities testifies against the interpretation of these questions as synopsis. Moreover, these questions correlate well with the three core parts of the making‐decision situation. Such a situation includes a set of possible alternatives and a system or an aggregate of selection criteria for a choice of the variant desired. These two components are logically prior to goal setting. Clearly, to achieve desired object one is to determine what steps are necessary for success. It is no less clear that in the structure of an action, they represent something one ought to do. Thus, specific cultural mission of philosophizing lies in the design and justification of Weltanschauung.
35. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 53
Mohammad Hasan Soleimani The Limitation of Skepticism
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The human in continuous century envisage the skepticism. When the human envisage the deficiency of his knowledge, will be in trouble of skepticism, when the knowledge of human fundamentally is doubted, all internal or external impressions will be doubted, so the man envisage the unlimited skepticism. But is it possible and logical? The possibility of it is a psychological question too, but my effort is the epistemological surveying of it. We can survey this question in two ways. One way is justifier reasons of skepticism. Are there sufficient for unlimited skepticism? Every deduction is based on preludes and if they’re uncertain the result will be uncertain too. There any deduction can’t justify unlimited skepticism. The other way is the surveying results of this skepticism. We have beliefs thatnever can doubt them like our existence. This inability express that the unlimited skepticism doesn’t agree the logic of our subject. Moreover the unlimited skepticism brings the mixed continuums. If we doubt anything, doubt this doubting too and this involving haven’t extremity, the demoniac hang that can’t be accepted by our.
36. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 53
Emilia Anvarovna Taissina Philosophical Truth in Mathematical Terms and Literature Analogies
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The article is based upon the following starting position. In this post-modern time, it seems that no scholar in Europe supports what is called “Enlightenment Project” with its naïve objectivism and Correspondence Theory of Truth1, - though not being really hostile, just strongly skeptical about it. No old-fasioned “classical” academical texts; only His Majesty Discourse as chain of interpretations and reinterpretations. What was called objectivity “proved to be” intersubjectivity; what was called Object (in Latin and German and Russian tradition) now is related to as a phenomenon; what was called Subject either is looked upon as Cartesian “cogito” or disappeares at all; what was called Truth turned to be either method of demonstration (by positivists) or the author’s sincerity (by existentialists); what was called Essence is now merely a joke. Alternatively, we speak about Sense, Meaning, and Value.
37. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 53
Stella Villarmea So You Think You Can Tell Sense from Nonsense
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38. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 53
Ron Wilburl Doubt and Modality
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I argue herein for two claims. First, contextualist strategies to tame or localize epistemic skepticism are ineffectual if contextualist factors are construed internalistically. Second, since efforts to contextualize externalism via subjunctive conditional analysis threaten circularity, only internalistic interpretations of contextualism can even be motivated. These two contentions do not themselves give us a grounds for skepticism. However, they do give us reason to suspect that contextualism, as such, is unlikely likely to provide a cogent anti-skeptical strategy.
39. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 53
Kai-Yee Wong Testimony and Computer Proof
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This article aims to evaluate the purported empirical character of computer-assisted proof, as suggested by Thomas Tymoczko and others. Tymoczko famously argued that the proof of the Four-Color Theorem introduced a new, empirical method of proof, forcing us to modify the traditional conception of mathematical argument as a priori reasoning. Detlefsen and Luker contended that Tymoczko’s suggestion entailed that typically mathematical proofs were empirical. My chief interest is to raise some objections to a line of thought common to both of these arguments, with a view to outlining an account of the a priori which allows thepossibility of a priori knowledge obtained by appeal to computers or through testimony. Drawing on some recent discussions by Tyler Burge, this account gives a broad construal of the non-justificatory, ‘enabling’ role that experience is held to play in knowledge and cognition, allowing us to argue that the purported empirical character of the appeal to computers pertains only to the role experience plays in enabling our access to the a priori warrant provided by computer proof.
articles in spanish
40. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 53
Elena Nájera A propósito de la crítica antiepistemológica de la “verdad” y la “objetividad”
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Con el interés de reconocer lo particular y amparar el derecho a la diferencia, el programa de superación de la epistemología que comparten R. Rorty y Ch. Taylor pone en cuestión las nociones de “verdad” y “objetividad”, aunque en dos sentidos encontrados. Para el primero de estos autores, se trata de anularambos conceptos a favor de un ironismo liberal que concede la contingencia de nuestras prácticas interpretativas, mientras que para el segundo, el camino pasa por justificarlos éticamente, en clave comunitarista. Frente a ambas estrategias, se perfilan las posiciones de otros pensadores de vocación epistemológica —e ilustrada—, como S. Haack y I. Hacking, que, sin recaer en el fundamentalismo que aquejaba al proyecto moderno, pero sin apoyarse tampoco en el comunitarismo, defienden la necesidad de conservar no sólo por razones teóricas sino esencialmente prácticas —ligadas al modus vivendi occidental— el punto de vista normativo que encierran la verdad y la objetividad.