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Displaying: 21-30 of 1349 documents


21. Social Theory and Practice: Volume > 44 > Issue: 2
Joseph O. Chapa The Martial Virtues: A Role Morality for Soldiers?
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In this article, I ask whether the martial virtues can serve as a role morality for soldiers. In it I compare three role morality theories and ask, according to each, whether the role of ‘soldier’ is the kind of role that generates a role morality. I conclude that the cultivation of the martial virtues may be a necessary condition for martial morality, but it is not a sufficient one. Finally, I present a positive account of a role morality for soldiers that creates the space for crucial, if not traditionally martial, virtues such as respect for human life and human dignity.
22. Social Theory and Practice: Volume > 44 > Issue: 2
Piero Moraro Against Epistocracy
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Jason Brennan has argued that democracy is intrinsically unjust, for it grants voting power to politically incompetent individuals, thus exposing people to an undue risk of harm. He claims democracy should be replaced by epistocracy, i.e., the rule of the knowers. In this paper, I show that his argument fails. First, Brennan mistakes voters’ competence for voters’ trustworthiness. Second, despite Brennan's claim to the contrary, an epistocracy may not reduce people’s exposure to an undue risk of harm. Third, Brennan overlooks the fact that citizens are not equally affected by ‘bad voting.’ Fourth, far from being a defence of libertarian ideals, Brennan's argument supports paternalism.
23. Social Theory and Practice: Volume > 44 > Issue: 2
Jelle Versieren The Methodological Rationale of Thomas Sekine: Dialectical Escapes from Orthodoxies and the Marxian Political Economy
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The unique conceptual status of Thomas Sekine’s approach to Marx’s Capital and capitalism, heavily indebted to Kōzō Uno’s work, will be analyzed by setting against its own theoretical counterparts, orthodox dialectical materialism. It will also be shown that Sekine’s critique of dialectical materialism differs from other neo-Hegelian perspectives or Althusser’s anti-Hegelian structuralism. These comparisons unearth Sekine’s concealed epistemological preoccupations: totality, subsumption of labor, self-commodification, historical indeterminacy and the logico-historical error. Last, Sekine also considered neoclassical economics as another form of unfounded orthodoxy both in conceptual and empirical terms, which he emphasizes in his analysis of the current phenomenon of financialization.
book discussion: john doris, talking to our selves: reflection, ignorance, and agency
24. Social Theory and Practice: Volume > 44 > Issue: 2
John Martin Fischer On John Doris's Talking to Our Selves
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25. Social Theory and Practice: Volume > 44 > Issue: 2
Manuel R. Vargas Reflectivism, Skepticism, and Values
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26. Social Theory and Practice: Volume > 44 > Issue: 2
Dana Kay Nelkin Responsibility and Ignorance of the Self
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27. Social Theory and Practice: Volume > 44 > Issue: 2
John M. Doris Ironic Deliberations: A (Regrettably Incomplete) Response to Fischer, Nelkin, and Vargas
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28. Social Theory and Practice: Volume > 44 > Issue: 1
Lee-Ann Chae Pacific Resistance: A Moral Alternative to Defensive War
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It is widely believed that some wars are just, and that the paradigm case of a just war is a defensive war. A familiar strategy used to justify defensive war is to infer its permissibility from the case of self-defensive killing. I show, however, that the permission to defend oneself does not justify killing, but instead calls for nonviolent resistance. I conclude that on the account of self-defense I develop, the appropriate way to respond to a war of aggression is not by prosecuting a defensive war, but by engaging in a form of nonviolence I call pacific resistance.
29. Social Theory and Practice: Volume > 44 > Issue: 1
Alex Davies A Liberal Anti-Porn Feminism?
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In the 1980s and 1990s, attempts were made to create U.S. legislation that would make it possible to sue the makers and distributors of pornography for doing so. One defence of such legislation was and is the free speech argument against pornography. Philosophers Rae Langton, Jennifer Hornsby, and Caroline West have supposed that this argument can function as a liberal defence of the legislation: in particular, a defence based on the value of women’s liberty. I argue that the free speech argument cannot be so used. The legislation is, to some extent, self-defeating insofar as it is understood in terms acceptable to a fairly standard kind of liberal. This becomes apparent when we consider the value pornography can have for women, which we can see if we consider what female makers, distributors, and consumers of pornography have to say about why they make, distribute, and consume it.
30. Social Theory and Practice: Volume > 44 > Issue: 1
Dan Demetriou, Bob Fischer Dignitarian Hunting: A Rights-based Defense
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Faced with the choice between supporting industrial plant agriculture and hunting, Tom Regan’s rights view can be plausibly developed in a way that permits a form of hunting we call “dignitarian.” To motivate this claim, we begin by showing how the empirical literature on animal deaths in plant agriculture suggests that a non-trivial amount of hunting would not add to animal harm. We discuss how Tom Regan’s miniride principle appears to morally permit hunting in that case, and we address recent objections by Jason Hanna to environmentally-based culling that may be seen to speak against this conclusion. We then turn to dignity, which is especially salient in scenarios where harm is necessary or justifiable. We situate “dignitarian” hunting within a larger framework of adversarial ethics, and argue that dignitarian hunting gives animals a more dignified death than the alternatives endemic to large-scale plant agriculture, and so is permissible based on the kinds of principles that Regan endorses. Indeed, dignitarian hunting may actually fit better with Regan’s widely endorsed animal rights framework than the practice of many vegans, and should only be rejected if we’re just as willing to condemn supporting conventional plant agriculture.