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Displaying: 21-30 of 231 documents


book symposium
21. Res Philosophica: Volume > 95 > Issue: 4
Susanna Siegel Précis to The Rationality of Perception
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22. Res Philosophica: Volume > 95 > Issue: 4
Andy Clark Priors and Prejudices: Comments on Susanna Siegel’s The Rationality of Perception
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23. Res Philosophica: Volume > 95 > Issue: 4
Christopher Peacocke Are Perceptions Reached by Rational Inference?: Comments on Susanna Siegel, The Rationality of Perception
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24. Res Philosophica: Volume > 95 > Issue: 4
Susanna Siegel Perception as Guessing Versus Perception as Knowing: Replies to Clark and Peacocke
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critical review
25. Res Philosophica: Volume > 95 > Issue: 4
Ross P. Cameron Critical Study of Kris McDaniel's The Fragmentation of Being
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2017 res philosophica essay prize winner
26. Res Philosophica: Volume > 95 > Issue: 3
Lorraine Juliano Keller Divine Ineffability and Franciscan Knowledge
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There’s been a recent surge of interest among analytic philosophers of religion in divine ineffability. However, divine ineffability is part of a traditional conception of God that has been widely rejected among analytic philosophers of religion for the past few decades. One of the main reasons that the traditional conception of God has been rejected is because it allegedly makes God too remote, unknowable, and impersonal. In this paper, I present an account of divine ineffability that directly addresses this concern by arguing that the deepest knowledge of God’s nature that we can attain is personal, rather than propositional. On this view, it is precisely because knowledge of God’s nature is personal that it cannot be linguistically expressed and communicated.
2017 res philosophica essay prize runners up
27. Res Philosophica: Volume > 95 > Issue: 3
Katherine Dormandy Disagreement from the Religious Margins
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Religious communities often discourage disagreement with religious authorities, on the grounds that allowing it would be epistemically detrimental. I argue that this attitude is mistaken, because any social position in a community—including religious authority—comes with epistemic advantages as well as epistemic limitations. I argue that religious communities stand to benefit epistemically by engaging in disagreement with people occupying other social positions. I focus on those at the community’s margins and argue that religious marginalization is apt to yield religiously important insights; so their disagreement with religious authorities should be encouraged.
28. Res Philosophica: Volume > 95 > Issue: 3
Juan Garcia Leibniz, a Friend of Molinism
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Leibniz is commonly labeled a foe of Molinism. His rejection of robust libertarian freedom coupled with some explicit passages in which he distances himself from the doctrine of middle knowledge seem to justify this classification. In this paper, I argue that this standard view is not quite correct. I identify the two substantive tenets of Molinism. First, the connection between the conditions for free actions and these free actions is a contingent one: free actions follow contingently from their sufficient conditions. Second, God knows what creatures would freely do in different possible circumstances prevolitionally—that is, prior to God willing anything. I argue that Leibniz himself endorses a version of both tenets and utilizes them for theoretical purposes similar to those of Molinists. I conclude that Leibniz is much closer to Molinism than is typically acknowledged. Leibniz is best characterized as a friend—rather than a foe—of Molinism.
articles
29. Res Philosophica: Volume > 95 > Issue: 3
Matthew A. Benton God and Interpersonal Knowledge
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Recent epistemology offers an account of what it is to know other persons. Such an approach holds promise for illuminating several issues in philosophy of religion, and for advancing a distinctive approach to religious epistemology. This paper develops an account of interpersonal knowledge and clarifies its relation to propositional and qualitative knowledge (section 1). Section 2 considers the possibility of our knowledge of God and God’s knowledge of us, and compares the present account of interpersonal knowledge with important work by Eleonore Stump on “Franciscan” knowledge. Section 3 examines how interpersonal knowledge may figure in liturgical practice, in diffusing the problem of divine hiddenness, and in motivating a novel understanding of divine love. Finally, section 4 explores the possibility of epistemic injustice arising from dismissal or neglect of our religious testimony to one another, or of divine testimony to humanity, focusing specifically on the import of interpersonal knowledge.
30. Res Philosophica: Volume > 95 > Issue: 3
Joshua Cockayne Inclusive Worship and Group Liturgical Action
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In this article, I consider how recent work on the philosophy of group-agency and shared-agency can help us to understand what it is for a church to act in worship. I argue that to assess a model’s suitability for providing such an account, we must consider how well it handles cases of non-paradigm participants, such as those with autism spectrum disorder and young infants. I suggest that whilst a shared-agency model helps to clarify how individuals coordinate actions in cases of reading or singing liturgy, it does not handle non-paradigm cases well and so cannot be considered a suitable model of group liturgical action. Instead, I suggest that a model of groupagency, in which a plurality of action types can contribute to the actions of a group as a whole, is better suited to explaining a church’s actions in worship.