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Displaying: 21-30 of 2372 documents


21. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 88 > Issue: 2
Colin Johnston Conflicting Rules and Paradox
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22. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 88 > Issue: 2
Dylan Murray, Eddy Nahmias Explaining Away Incompatibilist Intuitions
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The debate between compadbilists and incompatibilists depends in large part on what ordinary people mean by 'free will', a matter on which previous experimental philosophy studies have yielded conflicting results. In Nahmias, Morris, Nadelhoffer, and Turner (2005, 2006), most participants judged that agents in deterministic scenarios could have free will and be morally responsible. Nichols and Knobe (2007), though, suggest that these apparent compatibilist responses are performance errors produced by using concrete scenarios, and that their abstract scenarios reveal the folk theory of free will for what it actually is—incompatibihst. Here, we argue that the results of two new studies suggest just the opposite. Most participants only give apparent incompatibilist judgments when they mistakenly interpret determinism to imply that agents' mental states are bypassed in the causal chains that lead to their behavior. Determinism does not entail bypassing, so these responses do not reflect genuine incompatibilist intuitions. When participants understand what determinism does mean, the vast majority take it to be compatible with free will. Further results indicate that most people's concepts of choice and the abihty to do otherwise do not commit them to incompatibiHsm, either, putting pressure on incompatibilist arguments that rely on transfer principles, such as the Consequence Argument. We discuss the implications of these findings for philosophical debates about free will, and suggest that incompatibiHsm appears to be either false, or else a thesis about something other than what most people mean by 'free will'.
23. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 88 > Issue: 2
Michael Rescorla Perceptual Constancies and Perceptual Modes of Presentation
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24. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 88 > Issue: 2
Christopher Peacocke Perception, Biology, Action, and Knowledge
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25. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 88 > Issue: 2
Tyler Burge Reply to Rescorla and Peacocke: Perceptual Content in Light of Perceptual Constancies and Biological Constraints
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26. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 88 > Issue: 2
Recent Publications
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27. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 88 > Issue: 1
Conor McHugh Exercising Doxastic Freedom
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This paper defends the possibility of doxastic freedom, arguing that doxastic freedom should be modelled not on freedom of action but on freedom of intention.Freedom of action is exercised by agents like us, I argue, through voluntary control. This involves two conditions, intentions-reactivity and reasons-reactivity, that are not met in the case of doxastic states. Freedom of intention is central to our agency and to our moral responsibility, but is not exercised through voluntarycontrol. I develop and defend an account of freedom of intention, arguing that constitutive features of intention ensure that freedom of intention cannot requirevoluntary control. Then I show that an analogous argument can be applied to doxastic states. I argue that if we had voluntary control of intentions or of doxasticstates, this would actually undermine our freedom.
28. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 88 > Issue: 1
Mohan Matthen How to Be Sure: Sensory Exploration and Empirical Certainty
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29. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 88 > Issue: 1
Derek Ball, Bryan Pickel One Dogma of Millianism
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30. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 88 > Issue: 1
Bradley Armour-Garb, James A. Woodbridge From Mathematical Fictionalism to Truth-Theoretic Fictionalism
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