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Displaying: 21-30 of 3836 documents


book reviews
21. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 59 > Issue: 1
Silvia Carli Perception in Aristotle’s Ethics. By Eve Rabinoff
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22. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 59 > Issue: 1
Joseph W. Koterski, S.J. Hippocrates’ Oath and Asclepius’ Snake: The Birth of the Medical Profession. By T. A. Cavanaugh
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23. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 59 > Issue: 1
Curtis Hancock Through a Glass Brightly: Using Science to See Our Species as We Really Are. By David P. Barash
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24. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 59 > Issue: 1
Peter N. Bwanali, S.J. Philosophical Introductions: Five Approaches to Communicative Reason. By Jürgen Habermas. Introduction by Jean-Marc Durand-Gasselin
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books received
25. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 59 > Issue: 1
Books Received
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26. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 58 > Issue: 4
About Our Contributors
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articles
27. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 58 > Issue: 4
Jane Duran Murdoch’s Morality: An Ontological Analysis
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This paper argues that Murdoch’s views possess a structured ontology. As some of her critics note, her philosophical stance is one that must be gleaned from close readings of both her novels and her more straightforward essays. Given the complexities of her novels, the addition of her other work makes for a challenging task, but one that the reader can use. Murdoch’s work is valuable for the range of moral options it displays.
28. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 58 > Issue: 4
Joshua R. Brotherton Post-Gödelian Ontological Argumentation for God’s Existence: A Phenomenological-Existential Perspective
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The so-called ontological argument has a complex and controverted history, rising to particular prominence in contemporary analytic philosophy. Against this backdrop I will present a non-analytic interpretation of ontological argumentation for God’s existence by attempting to fuse Anselmian and Gödelian perspectives. I defend ontological argumentation in a number of slightly variant forms as neither a priori nor a posteriori, but ab actu exercito. Kantian and especially Thomistic critiques are confronted in the course of explaining how ontological argumentation may be logically valid without depending on or yielding to subjectivist epistemologies. Hence, post-Gödelian ontological argumentation ought to be acceptable to realists.
29. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 58 > Issue: 4
Ignacio De Ribera-Martin External Figure (Schêma) and Homonymy in Aristotle
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According to Aristotle’s homonymy principle, when we use a common name to refer to wholes and parts that lack the capacity to carry out the function (ergon) signified by the name, we are using the name in a homonymous way. For example, pictures and statues of a man, or a dead eye, are called “man” and “eye” only homonymously because they cannot carry out their proper function, i.e., to live and to see. This principle serves well Aristotle’s purposes in natural philosophy, for it avoids a reduction of the essence of living bodies and their parts to their material composition and shape. This principle, however, leaves unexplained why we still use those names in common language, despite their homonymy. Using Aristotle’s own comments on homonymy, I will examine the role played by external figure (schêma), for it explains why such homonyms are not accidental. In fact, they are correct forms of linguistic usage in non-philosophical contexts.
30. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 58 > Issue: 4
Andrés Tutor Isaiah Berlin on Positive Freedom
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The aim of this article is to provide a critical examination of Berlin’s treatment of positive freedom by offering a review of his standard arguments against this concept. Throughout his essays and particularly in “Two Concepts of Liberty” Berlin connects the idea of positive freedom with such notions as monism, rationalism, and determinism. Each of these connections will be discussed separately. I will argue that most of Berlin’s arguments against positive liberty are somehow flawed. Although Berlin valued positive freedom as one of the ultimate ends of life, his critical view of the concept should be tempered and contextualized since it was mostly based not on logical or conceptual grounds but on historical and interpretative considerations.