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141.
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:
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Nathan L. King
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142.
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:
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Declan Smithies
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143.
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:
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Eric Swanson
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144.
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:
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Stephen Kearns,
Ofra Magidor
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145.
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:
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Andrew M. Bailey
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There is a new objecton to the Consequence Argument for incompatibilism. I argue that the objection is more wide-ranging than originally thought. In particular:if it tells against the Consequence Argument, it tells against other arguments for incompahbilism too. I survey a few ways of dealing with this objection and show the costs of each. I then present an argument for incompatibilism that is immune to the objection and that enjoys other advantages.
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146.
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:
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Bradford Skow
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147.
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:
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Ben Bradley
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148.
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:
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Ben Blumson
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It's often hypothesized that the structure of mental representation is map-like rather than language-like. The possibility arises as a counterexample to the argument from the best explanation of productivity and systematicity to the language of thought hypothesis—the hypothesis that mental structure is compositional and recursive. In this paper, I argue that the analogy with maps does not undermine the argument, because maps and language have the same kind of compositional and recursive structure.
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149.
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:
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Richard Gale
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150.
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:
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Jeremy Fantl,
Matthew McGrath
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151.
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:
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Stewart Cohen
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152.
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:
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Ram Neta
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153.
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:
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Baron Reed
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154.
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:
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Jeremy Fantl,
Matthew McGrath
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155.
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:
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156.
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:
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John Greco
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Section 1 articulates a genus-species claim: that knowledge is a kind of success from ability. Equivalently: In cases of knowledge, S's success in believing the truth is attributable to S's ability. That idea is then applied to questions about the nature and value of knowledge. Section 2 asks what it would take to turn the genus-species claim into a proper theory of knowledge; that is, into informative, necessary and sufficient conditions. That question is raised in the context of an important line of objection against even the genus-species claim; namely, that there is no way to understand the attribution relation so that it does all the work that it is supposed to do. Section 3 reviews several extant proposals for understanding the attribution relation, and argues that none of them are adequate for answering the objection. Section 4 proposes a different way of understanding the relation, and shows how the resulting view does resolve the objection. Section 5 completes the new account by proposing a way to understand intellectual abilities. Section 6 briefly addresses Barn Fafade cases and lottery propositions. Section 7 briefly addresses a question about the scope of knowledge; in particular, it shows how the new view allows a neo-Moorean response to skepticism.
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157.
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:
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Guy Kahane
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Much seems to be at stake in metaphysical questions about, for example, God, free will or morality. One thing that could be at stake is the value of the universewe inhabit—how good or bad it is. We can think of competing philosophical positions as describing possibilities, ways the world might turn out to be, and to whichvalue can be assigned. When, for example, people hope that God exists, or fear that we do not possess free will, they express attitudes towards these ossibilities,attitudes that presuppose answers to questions about their comparative value. My aim in this paper is to distinguish these evaluative questions from related questions with which they can be confused, to identify structural constraints on their proper pursuit, and to address objections to their very coherence. Answers to such evaluative questions offer one measure of the importance of philosophical disputes.
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158.
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:
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Jonathan Ichikawa,
Ishani Maitra,
Brian Weatherson
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159.
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:
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Michael Jacovides
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160.
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:
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Simon Prosser
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According to the B-theory, the passage of time is an illusion. The B-theory therefore requires an explanation of this illusion before it can be regarded as fullysatisfactory; yet very few B-theorists have taken up the challenge of trying to provide one. In this paper I take some first steps toward such an explanation by first making a methodological proposal, then a hypothesis about a key element in the phenomenology of temporal passage. The methodological proposal focuses onthe representational content of the element of experience by virtue of which time seems to pass. The hypothesis involves the claim that the experience of changeinvolves the representation of something enduring, rather than perduring, through any change.
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