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Displaying: 131-140 of 3933 documents


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131. The Monist: Volume > 94 > Issue: 2
C.S. Jenkins Is Metaphysical Dependence Irreflexive?
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132. The Monist: Volume > 94 > Issue: 2
Daniel Nolan Categories and Ontological Dependence
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133. The Monist: Volume > 94 > Issue: 1
Sydney Shoemaker Realization, Powers, and Property Identity
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This paper is about the relation between two metaphysical topics: the nature of properties, and way the instantiation of a property is sometimes “realized in” something more fundamental. It is partly an attempt to develop further, but also to correct, my earlier treatments of these topics. In my published work on realization, including my book Physical Realization, I was at pains to insist that acceptance of my view about this does not commit one to the causal theory of properties I have defended in several places. I held that it commits one to the claim that within any given world, properties with the same causal profile are identical, but not to the requirement that a property must have the same causal profile in any world in which it can be instantiated. I now think that this was a mistake. There is an argument from the account of realization I have offered to the conclusion that, if physicalism is true, properties of macroscopic objects have their causal profiles essentially. In what follows I will present that argument.Along the way I will correct what now seem to me mistakes in my earlier presentationsof the account of realization. And I will conclude with an additional argument for the causal theory of properties, one that does not tie it to the assumption that physicalism is true or to my account of realization.
134. The Monist: Volume > 94 > Issue: 1
E.J. Lowe How Not to Think of Powers: A Deconstruction of the ‘Dispositions and Conditionals’ Debate
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135. The Monist: Volume > 94 > Issue: 1
John Heil Powers and the Realization Relation
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136. The Monist: Volume > 94 > Issue: 1
Stephen Mumford, Rani Lill Anjum Spoils to the Vector: How to Model Causes If You Are a Realist About Powers
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137. The Monist: Volume > 94 > Issue: 1
Jonathan D. Jacobs Powerful Qualities, Not Pure Powers
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138. The Monist: Volume > 94 > Issue: 1
Sungho Choi Finkish Dispositions and Contextualism
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139. The Monist: Volume > 94 > Issue: 1
Jessica Wilson Non-reductive Realization and the Powers-based Subset Strategy
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140. The Monist: Volume > 93 > Issue: 4
Niccolò Guicciardini Introduction
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