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Displaying: 121-140 of 434 documents


section: modern philosophy
121. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 10
Timothy M. Costelloe "So forward to imagine": Locke and Hume on Primary and Secondary Qualities
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This paper argues that an important feature of Locke's doctrine concerning primary and secondary qualities is also central to Hume's thinking. Section one considers Locke's distinction, presenting it in terms of an "error theory." Locke argues that we attribute secondary qualities to objects and that in so doing give those qualities an ontological status they do not otherwise possess. Locke completes his theory by drawing on the concept of "resemblance" to explain why such mistakes occur in the first place. Section two turns to Hume's philosophy, arguing that, despite his ambiguous comments on Locke and "the modern philosophy," he employs an error theory of the sort developed by Locke. This contention is supported by way of Hume's treatment of beauty as a secondary quality or sentiment which arises in an individual who judges an object beautiful. The paper concludes by emphasizing that, for Hume, this philosophical explanation of beauty stands in contrast to the error committed in common life where, as in Locke's account, people make the mistake of taking beauty to be in the object itself.
122. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 10
Anton Stengl La Mettrie und der falsche Traum der Aufklaerung
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Eine zu einheitliche Vorstellung der historischen Aufklaerung wird in diesem Text kritisiert. Um die gegensaetzlichen Strömungen dieser Epoche aufzuzeigen, wird der weitgehend unbekannte Philosoph La Mettrie vorgestellt und die negative Reaktion der bekannten Aufklaerer auf ihn. La Mettrie ging weit über die 'offizielle' Aufklaerung hinaus. Seine Analyse des Schuldgefühls und seine Ethik scheinen parallell zu zu sein. Alle Probleme der aktuellen > aufgeworfen worden.
123. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 10
Danilo Marcondes From the Light of the Soul to the Conventional Sign: Mind and Language in Early Modern Philosophy
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The objective of this paper is to analyze the appeal to the notion of the light of the soul as a commonplace in theories of knowledge from the Renaissance to early 18th century philosophy, showing that language will only become a central subject for philosophy with the progressive criticism of the powers of the intellect, especially intuitive thought.
124. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 10
Miran Bozovic Diderot and the Despotism of the Body
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The paper considers the multiplication of speech organs in Diderot's first novel Les Bijoux indiscrets. The main plot device of the novel—the talking "jewels" or female sex organs— enables Diderot to confront two different conceptions of the soul, the spiritual and material, in one and the same body. The voice coming from the head, traditionally held to be the seat of the soul, is contradicted by a voice that comes from that part of the body which is traditionally considered as to be the least submissive to the head or mind. When the body rebels against the women who believe themselves to be spiritual substances in command of the body to which they are united, it is in fact the soul which is identical with the body or with its organization that really rebels against them, and objects to the false portrayal of its seat—and function— in the body. Strictly speaking, by unmasking the testimony of the women as a lie, the jewels expose the very spiritualist position itself as a lie. The paper then argues that, unlike the spiritualism propounded by the head, the spontaneous philosophy of the "indiscreet jewels" is one of forthright materialism.
125. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 10
Marina Bykova The Philosophy of Subjectivity from Descartes to Hegel
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In the modern Continental tradition the word "subjectivity" is used to denote all that refers to a subject, its psychological-physical integrity represented by its mind, all that determines the unique mentality, mental state, and reactions of this subject. Subjectivity in this perspective has become on the Continent the central principle of philosophy.Modern Continental philosophy not only maintains the value of the subject and awakens an interest in genuine subjectivity. It evolves from the subject and subjective self-consciousness as Jundamento inconcusso. Thus modern Continental philosophy should be understood and discussed as a philosophy of subjectivity. This paper deals, on the one hand, with the philosophical-historical reconstruction of modern philosophy of subjectivity from Descartes to Hegel, and, on the other hand, with an analysis and evaluation of Hegel's systematic approach to subjectivity in terms of philosophical tradition, especially from the viewpoint of the realization of the idealistic program of selfconsciousness represented by German idealists.Focusing on the major lines of development of the theory of subjectivity in Continental philosophy from Descartes to Hegel, 1(1) discuss the quandaries of early modern philosophers concerning subject and subjectivity and their attempts to resolve these quandaries by developing the fundamentally new (in contrast to previous tradition) understanding of subjectivity; (2) show that the issue of subjectivity was the basic topic of transcendental idealism; and (3) introduce Hegel's approach to subjectivity and briefly define its novel character.
126. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 10
Gustavo Sarmiento El método de la metafísica en la Dissertatio de Kant
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En este trabajo examinamos el metodo de la metafisica segün la Disertaciön Inaugural de Kant. Para resolver los problemas de este saber, Kant distingue entre dos componentes del conocimiento humano, una intelectual, que aprehende los objetos como son en si mismos, y otra sensible, que conoce el objeto tal como se nos aparece subjetivamente, cada una con su propio ämbito de validez. Para la metafisica, sostiene Kant, es fundamental mantenerse como conocimiento intelectual puro, lo cual requiere que no sea contaminada por principios y leyes del conocimiento sensible, porque los conocimientos intelectuales no contaminados por el conocimiento sensitivo son verdaderos. Ahora bien, es preciso estar alerta para descubrir los trucos que emplea el conocimiento sensitivo para hacerse pasar por conocimiento intelectual. A fin de poner de relieve estas fuentes de error en la metafisica, Kant emprende la clasificaciön de las falacias de subrepciön por medio de las cuales diversas condiciones sensitivas del conocimiento de los objetos en la experiencia son tomadas como condiciones intelectuales de la posibilidad de los objetos en si mismos. De manera general, Kant piensa que no se debe predicar de los conceptos intelectuales nada que pertenezca a las relaciones de espacio y tiempo. Cuando ello ocurre se trata del conocimiento sensible de un objeto que se subsume bajo el concepto intelectual, pero esto no nos autoriza a pensar que el objeto tal cual es en si mismo este sometido a espacio y tiempo. El anälisis kantiano de las falacias de subrepciön revela asimismo un papel de los conceptos intelectuales en la experiencia, que anticipa -hasta cierto punto- la funciön de la inteligencia en la organizaciön de la experiencia, a traves de ciertos conceptos intelectuales, que en la Critica de la Razön Pura constituirän las categorias del entendimiento, aunque Kant todavia no descubre la division de la facultad superior en entendimiento y razön.
127. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 10
Maria Borges Emotions and Practical Reason in Kant
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In this paper, I shall discuss the relation between practical reason and emotions in Kant. First, I begin by explaining why knowledge of emotions is important for the transcendental project in the moral domain, understood as the claim that reason can determine our actions, in spite of our inclinations. Second, I explain the definition of affects and passions in Kant's philosophy and relate the two to feelings and the faculty of desire. I then question the possibility of controlling emotions, showing that it is, if not an altogether impossible task, at least a difficult one. I show that while affects present a momentary loss of control, they can still coexist with practical reason. Passions, however, may ground principles for actions, and represent a serious danger for rational mastery over inclinations.
128. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 10
Edgard José Jorge Filho Concerning Moral Faith in Kant
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According to Kant, all finite rational beings are unconditionally bound to obey the moral law, expressed in the formula of the categorical imperative. The assent (the taking to be true) to this law is a practical knowledge, since its ground is objectively and subjectively sufficient. However, the immortality of the soul and the existence of God are not objects of practical knowledge but just objects of practical faith, of moral faith more precisely, for the assent to them has a barely subjectively sufficient ground and is not a necessary consequence of this knowledge of the moral law. According to our interpretation of the Kantian philosophy, the ground of moral faith in God's existence and in the immortality of the soul will be found only in the finite rational being with a disposition (Gesinnung) for the actual fulfilment of the moral law. We will defend this interpretation and maintain that the radical evil of human nature, diagnosed by Kant, prevents all men from having a moral faith, which does not mean that this obstacle is unsurmountable, since the conversion of men into Good is possible. In our view, what makes this conversion feasible is the possibility (implicit in Kant's thought) of an irregular act of the free-will, that of adopting a good fundamental maxim.
129. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 10
Sophie Grapotte La Guerre au Service de la Paix
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Dans cette communication, je me propose de mettre en avant que si la guerre est, il est vrai, le moyen licite qu'utilise les Etats pour acquerir et conserver leur droit ä l'etat de nature, eile est egalement et fondamentalement le ressort du passage de l'etat de nature ä l'etat civique, condition d'une pacification possible. De meme que la propension ä philosopher, ä batailler en faveur de sa philosophie et finalement en se rassemblant dans des camps qui s'opposent ä mener une guerre ouverte, doit etre consideree comme "une des dispositions bienfaisantes et sages de la Nature, par laquelle eile cherche ä ecarter des hommes le grand malheur d'un corps vivant voue ä se corrompre" (AK VIII 414), la guerre est, nous allons le voir, l'un des arrangements preparatoires que prend la Nature pour rendre la paix necessaire et l'un des moyens auquel eile recourt pour contraindre les Etats ä se donner une constitution et ä nouer des relations exterieures legales propres ä conduire ä la paix permanente, bref, une ruse de Tingenieuse et grande ouvriere" pour realiser son but: "faire naitre parmi les hommes, contre leur intention, l'harmonie du sein meme de leurs discordes." (AK VIII 360-361)
130. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 10
Richard Fincham Hölderlin and Novalis: Reappropriating the Reflection Model of Self-Consciousness
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This paper draws upon my research into the posthumously published fragmentary remains of Hölderlin and Novalis's philosophical reflections to describe how their explanations of the possibility of self-consciousness are far more convincing than those provided by their philosophical contemporaries, and still have much to contribute to contemporary debates concerning the nature of 'consciousness' and 'selfhood.' The paper begins by sketching the background to their accounts of self-consciousness, that is, Fichte's critique of Kant's 'reflection model' of self-consciousness and the subsequent critique of Fichte's 'solution' to this problem by more orthodox Kantians (such as F. I . Niethammer). I shall then present an account of how Hölderlin and Novalis may be said to enact a 'synthesis' of the opposed Kantian and Fichtean positions, to formulate an account of self-consciousness that on one hand acknowledges the power of—in Henrich's words—Fichtes ursprüngliche Einsicht into the inadequacy of the Kantian 'reflection model,' whilst, on the other hand, re-appropriating such a 'reflection model.' They thus argue that I am only aware of myself as T by means of a reflective act (in which I in some sense become my own intentional object), whilst at the same time arguing that such awareness nevertheless involves a non-reflective 'dimension.' For Hölderlin and Novalis, therefore, consciousness is always intentionally directed, and yet in being intentionally directed, it is also non-reflectively related to itself or "self-luminous" sea conception of consciousness which has similarities with Sartre's conception of the 'pre-reflective cogito.'
131. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 10
Simon Lumsden Realism and Idealism in Fichte's theory of Subjectivity
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Kant's account of subjectivity is ambiguous: there is an implicit critique of Descartes in Kaaat, but this is in conflict with more Cartesian aspects of his approach to subjectivity. Fichte develops the critical elements of Kant and turns them against Kant's residual Cartesianism. Fichte, in the various versions of the Wissenschaftslehre, is the first to be aware of the limitations of the reflective model of consciousness. In those texts he presents his alternative model for subjectivity by trying to conceive of selfconsciousness such that the self-relation makes no separation between thinker and thought. While Fichte's insight into the limitations of the reflective model of consciousness is generally accepted, his own account of the character of the immediate self-relation, which he presents as the alternative to the reflective model, was never satisfactorily resolved. The exposition of Fichte will examine his theory of subjectivity in relation to the central notion of striving; it will be argued that the notion of a striving subject tries to reconcile the dichotomy of idealism and realism.
132. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 10
Lassaad Elouaer Histoire réelle et spéculation théorique dans la philosophie de Hegel
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Nous proposons dans cette communication d'etudier le rapport entre «le reel empirique» et «la raison theorique» dans le Systeme hegelien. L'objectif est de detacher Tun de l'autre ces deux concepts afin de voir la structure interne de l'esprit qui ne depend pas de la necessite objective du processus empirique dudeveloppement de l'histoire. Dans ce detachement possible, il convient d'interroger la conception hegelienne de la liberte de l'homme dans le monde.
133. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 10
Andrew Payne Emerson on Socrates and the Tyranny of the Majority
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Emerson's Representative Men reveals his awareness of the dangers of the tyranny of the majority and his admiration for figures of great genius. These trends of thought, which led Emerson's contemporaries Carlyle and Nietzsche to reject democracy, are combined in Emerson with support for democracy. To understand and justify Emerson's combination of fear of the tyranny of the majority, admiration for genius, and support for democracy, it is helpful to examine his portrait of Socrates in Representative Men. Emerson's Socrates is a figure of genius who, by his ironic profession of ignorance and demonstration of moral truths, is capable of freeing the citizen of a democracy from the tyranny of the majority.
134. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 10
Michael Rahnfeld Carnaps Kontinuum der induktiven Methoden als präzises Beispiel für Nietzsches Doktrin der unbegrenzten Zahl möglicher Interpretationen der Welt
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Der Beitrag zeigt, dass sich Nietzsches erkenntnistheoretische Position als konventionalistisch, pluralistisch, pragmatisch und evolutionär charakterisieren lässt. In diesen wesentlichen Punkten antizipiert sie moderne Ansätze, wie am Beispiel Carnaps Induktiver Logik gezeigt wird. In der sog. CLFunktion beruhen die Behauptungen über L auf s y n t h e t i s c h - a p r i o r i s c h e n Annahmen, die den Uniformitätsgrad des Gegenstandbereiches betreffen. Diese Annahmen lassen sich als konventionelle Festsetzungen deuten, die sich nach den erzielten pragmatischen Erfolgen richten. Es ist naheliegend anzunehmen, dass sich ein adäquates L in der Praxis nach evolutionären Mechanismen herauskristallisiert. Dennoch bleibt stets ein ganzes Kontinuum möglicher konventioneller Bestimmungen von L als rationale Alternative bestehen.
contributors
135. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 10
Contributors
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index
136. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 10
Name Index
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series introduction
137. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 7
Ioanna Kuçuradi Series Introduction
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volume introduction
138. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 7
Venant Cauchy Volume Introduction
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section: approaches to culture, religion, science and philosophy
139. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 7
William Sweet Philosophy, Culture, and Pluralism
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In this paper I outline some ways in which philosophy can contribute to the study of culture and pluralism, and how such a study may lead to a better understanding of philosophical enquiry. Building on earlier work (Sweet, 2002), I focus on four areas in which these contributions might be made. The first concerns the methodological, ideological, and historical presuppositions of culture and multiculturalism. The second area considers how philosophical discourse affects a culture's "self-understanding". The third area focuses on how (and how far) philosophy may enable a culture to allow diversity and pluralism within the larger community. The fourth area deals with philosophy's dialectical relation with culture -how far philosophy is a product of culture, and whether that affects philosophy's participation in culture. An exploration of these areas will show both what role philosophy has to play in the analysis of culture, and why it is important for philosophers -especially in the English-speaking world- to engage in the "philosophy of culture".
140. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 7
Marco Jean Le relativisme comme base inadequate pour penser les relations interculturelles
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L'article cherche ä demontrer que le relativisme ne constitue pas une base viable pour les reflexions sur les relations interculturelles. Contrairement ä ce que beaucoup d'intellectuels croient actuellement, le relativisme ne s'avere pas plus difficile ä defaire qu'une pensee recherchant une assise universelle pour penser les relations entre cultures. Trois points de vue importants sont abordes pour etayer la these de l'article. II y a d'abord le concept de matrice interculturelle developpee par le sociologue quebecois Jean-Jacques Simard. Selon cet auteur, les valeurs de la modernite, comme la liberte et l'egalite des personnes, sont des valeurs universelles et non propres ä la culture occidentals La modernite est en effet une matrice culturelle qui ne se cantonne pas ä une culture particuliere. Ensuite, une analyse du relativisme present chez Levi-Strauss est faite afm de montrer l'incoherence de cette approche. Pour terminer, on aborde quelques points interessants sur le relativisme apportes par Raymond Boudon, dont le concept d'axiologie est rationaliste et non consequentialiste, et qui affaiblissent le relativisme des valeurs.