Already a subscriber? - Login here
Not yet a subscriber? - Subscribe here

Displaying: 121-130 of 2372 documents


book symposium
121. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 86 > Issue: 1
Jesse Prinz Attention, Atomism, and the Disunity of Consciousness
view |  rights & permissions | cited by
122. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 86 > Issue: 1
Tim Bayne Response to Commentators
view |  rights & permissions | cited by
123. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 86 > Issue: 1
Recent Publications
view |  rights & permissions | cited by
articles
124. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 85 > Issue: 3
Jennifer Nagel Intuitions and Experiments: A Defense of the Case Method in Epistemology
view |  rights & permissions | cited by
125. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 85 > Issue: 3
Jeff Speaks On Possibly Nonexistent Propositions
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
Alvin Plantinga gave a reductio of the conjunction of the following three theses: Existentialism (the view that, e.g., the proposition that Socrates exists can't existunless Socrates does), Serious Actualism (the view that nothing can have a property at a world without existing at that world) and Contingency (the view thatsome objects, like Socrates, exist only contingently). I sketch a view of truth at a world which enables the Existentialist to resist Plantinga's argument without givingup either Serious Actualism or Contingency.
126. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 85 > Issue: 3
Chandra Sekhar Sripada What Makes a Manipulated Agent Unfree?
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
Incompatibilists and compatibilists (mostly) agree that there is a strong intuition that a manipulated agent, i.e., an agent who is the victim of methods such asindoctrination or brainwashing, is unfree. They differ however on why exactly this intuition arises. Incompatibilists claim our intuitions in these cases are sensitive to the manipulated agent's lack of ultimate control over her actions, while many compatibilists argue that our intuitions respond to damage inflicted by manipulation on the agent's psychological and volitional capacities. Much hangs on this issue because manipulation-based arguments are among the most important for defending incompatibilist views of free will. In this paper, I investigate this issue from a experimental perspective, using a set of statistical methods well suited for identifying the features of hypothetical cases people's intuitions are responding to. Results strongly support the compatibilist view—subjects' tendency to judge that a manipulated agent is unfree was found to depend on their judgments that the agent suffers impairments to certain psychological/volitional capacities that compatibilists say are the basis for free will. I discuss the significance of these results for the use of manipulation cases in the philosophical debate about free will.
127. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 85 > Issue: 3
Thomas Sattig The Paradox of Fission and the Ontology of Ordinary Objects
view |  rights & permissions | cited by
128. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 85 > Issue: 3
Marilyn McCord Adams, Cecilia Trifogli Whose Thought Is It? The Soul and the Subject of Action in Some Thirteenth and Fourteenth Century Aristotelians
view |  rights & permissions | cited by
129. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 85 > Issue: 3
J. Robert, G. Williams Counterfactual Triviality: A Lewis-Impossibility Argument for Counterfactuals
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
I formulate a counterfactual version of the notorious 'Ramsey Test'. Whereas the Ramsey Test for indicative conditionals links credence in indicatives to conditional credences, the counterfactual version links credence in counterfactuals to expected conditional chance. I outline two forms: a Ramsey Identity on which the probability of the conditional should be identical to the corresponding conditional probabihty/expectation of chance; and a Ramsey Bound on which credence in the conditional should never exceed the latter.Even in the weaker, bound, form, the counterfactual Ramsey Test makes counterfactuals subject to the very argument that Lewis used to argue against the indicative version of the Ramsey Test. I compare the assumptions needed to run each, pointing to assumptions about the time-evolution of chances that can replace the appeal to Bayesian assumptions about credence update in motivating the assumptions of the argument.I finish by outlining two reactions to the discussion: to indicativize the debate on counterfactuals; or to counterfactualize the debate on indicatives.
130. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 85 > Issue: 3
Catharine Abell Art: What it Is and Why it Matters
view |  rights & permissions | cited by