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Displaying: 101-120 of 1430 documents


articles
101. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 34 > Issue: 1
Hilary Yancey Disability and First-Person Testimony: A Case of Defeat?
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It is widely agreed that first-person testimony is a good source of evidence, including testimony about the contents of mental states unobservable to others. Thus we generally think that an individual’s testimony is a good source of evidence about her wellbeing—after all, she experiences her quality of life and we don’t. However, some have argued that the first-person testimony of disabled individuals regarding their wellbeing is defeated: regardless of someone’s claim about how disability affects her overall wellbeing, other evidence about disability undermines the force of her testimony with respect to our justified beliefs. In this paper, I argue that at least some cases of first-person testimony about disability is not defeated. Particularly, neither the existence of conflicting testimony nor evidence about disabilities’ associated harms or challenges successfully undermine either the content of the testimony or the reliability of the testifiers. While I do not claim that first-person testimony is the only evidence relevant to characterizing disability, I argue that it is not always blocked by other evidence about disability. At least some first-person testimony from disabled individuals is, therefore, undefeated evidence relevant to evaluating disability and overall wellbeing.
102. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 34 > Issue: 1
Peter Westmoreland Act Like a Right-Hander: Right Hand Bias in Norms of Proximate Space Inhabitation
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90% of human beings are right-handed. Naturally, the human world is dexterocentric, or designed for encounter with the right hand. Moments of this right hand bias are widely recognized, and, through devices such as left-handed scissors, coffee mugs, and wooden spoons, non-right-handers fi nd accommodation. From the perspective of one-off accommodations, however, the extent of right hand bias is unclear. This paper offers a unifying framework for understanding right hand bias. It focuses not on which hand is used, but on how the hands are used in space. This is a novel approach to laterality studies. I first argue that differences in how left and right-handers inhabit space entail dissimilar left and right-handed body comportments. I next argue that the norms governing spatiality conform to the right-handed comportment, yet apply to all. I conclude that right hand biased norms are pervasive. We can next ask if they are oppressive.
103. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 34 > Issue: 1
Justin Remhof A World Without a Past: New Challenges to Kant’s Refutation of Idealism
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104. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 34 > Issue: 1
Peter R. Nennig Mechanical Memory and the Speculative Sentence: The Importance of Language for Hegel in the Phenomenology and Encyclopedia
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In this paper examine the relation between the account of mechanical memory in Hegel’s Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences and the speculative sentence in his Phenomenology of Spirit. Both accounts involve a transition to speculative thinking, a kind of thinking that is free from given images and representations. By discussing them together I hope to illuminate how speculative thinking functions for Hegel and why it is important. Specifically, I try to show how what Hegel calls mechanical memory can shed light on Hegel’s more familiar notion of the speculative sentence. I also draw out implications of language and mechanical memory for what Hegel calls speculative thinking. First, I examine Hegel’s account of language acquisition in the Encyclopedia, which involves an account of mechanical memory, to show how Hegel thinks the mind can produce a vehicle for thinking that it has produced both in form and content. Second, I show how this vehicle of language works in the speculative sentence in the Phenomenology.
105. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 34 > Issue: 1
Thomas Dabay On the Inconsistency of Naturalism and Global Expressivism
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Price defends a form of global expressivism that aspires to be both naturalistic and thoroughly anti-representational. I argue that although Price achieves the latter aspiration, his minimalist treatment of semantic notions prevents his global expressivism from being genuinely naturalistic. To do this, I propose two demands that any view must meet in order to be considered naturalistic—a Deflationary Demand and an Objectivity Demand—and show how the indexical nature of Price’s use of disquotational schemata prevents him from meeting the Objectivity Demand. I conclude by extrapolating from my critique of Price’s global expressivism to the claim that similar points might apply to other forms of semantic minimalism.
106. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 34 > Issue: 1
Mark Bauer Nonfunctional Semantics in Plant Signaling
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107. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 34 > Issue: 1
Kenneth L. Brewer There Will be Monsters: A Defense of Noël Carroll’s Definition of the Horror Genre
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108. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 34 > Issue: 1
Joe Swenson Dewey’s Institutions of Aesthetic Experience
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109. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 34 > Issue: 1
Andrew D. Rose Kierkegaard, Charles Taylor, and Narrative Sources of Identity
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This essay is an attempt to demonstrate that Charles Taylor’s “social imaginaries” should not be viewed as sources of identity. For Taylor, making sense of society’s practices allows an individual to develop a conception of the self – an idea Taylor borrows from Hegel. I therefore suggest that Kierkegaard’s critiques against Hegel may similarly be used against Taylor’s conception of identity. Kierkegaard’s critiques of Hegel are applicable to Taylor’s social imaginaries for two reasons. First, Hegel’s system only provides approximations—mediation in the ethical nullifies the individual’s subjective relation to Kierkegaard’s “Absolute” by objectivizing the relation. Thus, despair ensues. Second, if knowledge of the Absolute is mediated through social imaginaries, the individual’s responsibility to perpetually renew faith in her constituting power is diminished. Taylor’s “system” is therefore insufficient for achieving a positive view of existence (actuality) because selfhood is properly understood through the inward subjectivity of one’s relation to her constituting power (God).
110. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 34 > Issue: 1
G. M. Trujillo, Jr. What Race Terms Do: Du Bois, Biology, and Psychology on the Meanings of “Race”
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This paper does two things. First, it interprets the work of W. E. B. Du Bois to reveal that the meanings of race terms are grounded by both a historical and an aspirational component. Race terms refer to a backward-looking component that traces the history of the group to its present time, as well as a forward-looking component that sets out values and goals for the group. Race terms thus refer to a complex cluster of concepts that involve biological, sociological, historical, moral, and political properties. Second, the paper defends W. E. B. Du Bois’s conservationist thesis about races, which holds that we should maintain race talk and racial distinctions. But instead of offering philosophical evidence, this paper defends the plausibility of the conservationist thesis with evidence from contemporary biology and psychology. It argues that, instead of eliminating race terms or concepts, we should conserve and revise them.
commentaries
111. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 33 > Issue: 2
Klaus Ladstaetter Response to Christopher Tomaszewski’s “Intentionality as Partial Identity”
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112. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 33 > Issue: 2
Robyn Gaier Commentary on Christopher Bobier’s “Deflating Moods”
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113. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 33 > Issue: 2
Justin Bell Comments on Samuel Arnold’s “Social Equality and the Duty to Participate in Personal and Political Relationships”
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114. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 33 > Issue: 2
Todd M. Stewart Comments on Wilson’s “Is Epistemic Permissivism a Consistent Position to Argue from?”
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115. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 33 > Issue: 2
Rachel A. Johnson Comments on “On Being Reasonably Different”
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116. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 33 > Issue: 2
Randall Auxier Commentary on Torsten Menge’s “Making it Uncanny: The Critical Effect of Telling a Genealogy”
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117. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 33 > Issue: 2
Scott Aikin Comic Phthonos and Protreptic Premises: Comments on Rebecca Bensen Cain
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118. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 33 > Issue: 2
E.M. Dadlez Comment on “Solving the Puzzle of Aesthetic Assertion” by Andrew Morgan
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119. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 33 > Issue: 2
Ashley Scheu The Instability of Bad Faith: A Response to Larry Busk
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120. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 33 > Issue: 2
Dave Beisecker Ask A Sellarsian!: Commentary for Robert Farley’s “The Sellarsian Dilemma: Not What it Seems"
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