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Displaying: 101-120 of 887 documents


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101. Grazer Philosophische Studien: Volume > 52
Ota Weinberger Intuition as a Philosophical Argument
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We experience evidence, but experienced evidence does not entail objective validity of the evident content. There are different kinds of intuitive evidence: logical and analytical evidence, the presuppositions of realism etc.; there is intuitive evidence in the cognitive field as well as in the practical realm. Intuitive evidence is linked with the basic framework of the respective field. Intuition may be replaced by deeper intuition on the basis of new views that evoke a reconstruction of the framework. Value intuition is characterized as an established opinion which seems undubitable. All persons, all groups and all institutions have actually some practical convictions on which they found their practical evaluation.
102. Grazer Philosophische Studien: Volume > 52
Andreas Roser Gibt es autonome Bilder?: Bemerkungen zum grafischen Werk Otto Neuraths und Ludwig Wittgensteins
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Neuraths bildtheoretische Überlegungen und Wittgensteins philosophisch orientierte Verwendung von Bildern werden miteinander konfrontiert, um zu zeigen, daß beider Interpretationen der Verwendung grafischer Darstellungen geeignet sind, das Problem einer lebensformübergreifenden Sprache am Beispiel einer internationalen Bildersprache neu zu diskutieren. Wittgenstein spricht zwar nicht von „autonomen Bildern", verwendet Bilder aber auf ganz pragmatische Weise in seiner Philosophie, und eben die pragmatische Rolle des Bildes als visuellen Aufklärungsmittels bei Neurath verbindet Neuraths und Wittgensteins Bildbegriff. Die normierende Funktion von Bildern als paradigmatischen Illustrationen legt eine gemeinsame Konzeption visueller Argumente bei Wittgenstein und Neurath nahe.
103. Grazer Philosophische Studien: Volume > 52
J. C. Nyíri Wittgenstein as a Philosopher of Secondary Orality
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It is known that Wittgenstein enjoyed reading Plato; but the significance the philosopher had for him is quite underrated, and has never been properly understood. Utilizing insights by Ortega and E. Havelock, the paper argues that while the background of Plato's philosophy was the emergence of literacy, the genesis and the direction of Wittgenstein's later philosophy, by contrast, is not independent of the emergence of post-literacy (or "secondery orality", to use Walter J. Ong's term). A post-literal phenomenon clearly having specifc impact on Wittgenstein was the film: it is striking that he regularly used the film metaphor to illustrate philosophical points. Analyzing these metaphors the paper reaches the conclusion that according to Wittgenstein the carrier of uncorrupted meaning is, actually, spoken language; if we leave the rein to written language, philosophical problems will arise.
104. Grazer Philosophische Studien: Volume > 52
Katalin Neumer How To Do Things With Letters?: Sprechen und Schreiben in Wittgensteins Philosophie
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Der Aufsatz geht von J.C. Nyiris Wittgenstein-Interpretation aus, der zufolge die vom späten Wittgenstein vertretene handlungsorientierte Theorie der Sprache nur dann wirklich einleuchtend ist, wenn man hauptsächlich die mündlichen und nicht die schriftlichen Varianten der Kommunikation im Auge hat. Im Aufsatz wird untersucht, (1) inwiefern Nyiris Wittgenstein-Interpretation akzeptabel und (2) inwieweit seine Beschreibung der schriftlichen Kommunikation haltbar ist.
105. Grazer Philosophische Studien: Volume > 52
Gerd Grasshoff, Timm Lampert Paul Engelmanns Psychologie graphisch dargestellt
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Paul Engelmann hat über zwanzig Jahre seines Lebens an einer systematischen Darstellung der Psychologie mittels einer von ihm entwickelten graphischen Methode gearbeitet. Das Resultat dieser Arbeit bildet seine Psychologie graphisch dargestellt, die sich in seinem Nachlaß befindet. In diesem Werk will Engelmann die Klärung geistiger Aufgabengebiete, wie sie seine Lehrer Karl Kraus, Adolf Loos und Ludwig Wittgenstein betrieben haben, in der Psychologie fortsetzen. Hierbei fiihrt er Freuds Methode weiter, psychische Erscheinungen räumlich darzustellen, und wendet die Bildtheorie Wittgensteins auf seine Theorie psychischer Vorgänge an.
106. Grazer Philosophische Studien: Volume > 52
John Peterson True Belief and Knowledge Revisited
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Distinguishing sense and referent in true belief that is not knowledge and true belief that is knowledge implies scepticism as regards facts. That is because it falsely reduces knowledge to mere true belief To remove the scepticism, it might be held that sense and referent are the same in both. But this over-correction makes the opposite mistake of reducing mere true belief to knowledge. It also implies either assimilating false belief to true belief or saying, counterintuitively, that the sense of a belief varies with the truth-value of the belief The way out is to take the middle path of distinguishing sense and referent in true belief that is not knowledge and identifying sense and referent in true belief that is knowledge.
107. Grazer Philosophische Studien: Volume > 52
Peter Baumann Davidson on Sharing a Language and Correct Language-Use
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Donald Davidson has argued against a thesis that is widely shared in the philosophy of language, e.g., by Wittgenstein, Dummett and Kripke: the thesis that successful communication requires that speaker and hearer share a common language. Davidson's arguments, however, are not convincing. Moreover, Davidson's own positive account of communication poses a serious problem: it cannot offer criteria for the correct use of a language, especially in the case of a language that only one speaker speaks. Even though Davidson's own position is not convincing he shows us that the opposite position is weaker than one might assume (compare, e.g., the wittgensteinian idea that a common social praxis of rule-following can supply us with criteria of correctness). Furthermore, the whole discussion shows us that the issue is not settled yet.
108. Grazer Philosophische Studien: Volume > 52
Erwin Tegtmeier Meinong on Measurement
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Meinong's realist theory of measurement is brought up against the presently dominating positivist and operationalist view. His criticism of 19th century positivist analysis of measurement (J. v. Kries) turns out to be pertinent to modern model-theoretic analysis (Suppes and Zinnes). Meinong's ontology of quantities as well as his view of associative and derived measurement is confronted with the operational analysis. The positivist cannot make sense of measurement error and tries to push it aside. In Meinong's view it is pivotal. This view harmonises with the practice of measurement where error is used as a means of gaining knowledge. Starting from Meinong and his pupil Mally a more adequate theory of measurement could be developed.
109. Grazer Philosophische Studien: Volume > 52
Juha Räikkä Are there Alternative Methods in Ethics?
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Do all methods of moral justification resemble the method of reflective equilibrium in presupposing that moral judgment's being justified depends at least in part on its being appropriately related to our actual substantial moral views? Can a moral judgment be justified without such a presupposition? I shall distinguish three versions of the no-option argument According to any version of the no-option argument, there is certain fact which characterizes moral theories, and that fact implies that there is no option other than to justify moral judgments by presupposing that their justification depends at least in part on their being appropriately related to our actual substantial moral views. Versions of the no-option argument differ in their specification of the characterizing fact that proves that in ethics there is only one option. I shall argue that the most common versions of the no-option argument are indefensible, while the defensibility of a more sophisticated version depends on the meaning of a notion of moral argument in philosophical ethics.
review articles
110. Grazer Philosophische Studien: Volume > 52
Sonja Austrian Philosophy. The Legacy of Brentano
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111. Grazer Philosophische Studien: Volume > 52
Rudolf Haller Husserls Briefwechsel
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112. Grazer Philosophische Studien: Volume > 52
Hans-Johann Glock Frege
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critical notes
113. Grazer Philosophische Studien: Volume > 52
Roman Murawski Mathematical Objects and Mathematical Knowledge
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review articles
114. Grazer Philosophische Studien: Volume > 52
Roger Behrens Vor der Interpretation: Sprache und Erfahrung in Hermeneutik, Dekonstruktion und Pragmatismus
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articles
115. Grazer Philosophische Studien: Volume > 51
Andreas Kemmerling Frege über den Sinn des Wortes „Ich”
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Frege hat an seiner metaphysischen und semantischen Lehre der frühen 90er Jahre Veränderungen vorgenommen, um Besonderheiten des Sinns von „ich” Rechnung zu tragen. Diese Veränderungen betreffen zum einen den Status von Gedanken als objektiven Entitäten, zum andern betreffen sie die sprachlogische Behandlung von Ausdrücken, deren Sinn erst im Zusammenspiel mit dem Verwendungskontext einen selbständigen Gedankenteil ergibt. Diese Veränderungen lassen die alte Lehre in ihrem Kern unberührt. Doch obgleich Freges Auffassungen über den Sinn von „ich” eine kohärente Weiterentwicklung seiner Lehre darstellen, sind sie in ihren Einzelheiten nicht immer plausibel. Das gilt insbesondere für die These, das Wort „ich” habe im Denken und im Sprechen ein und derselben Person unterschiedlichen Sinn.
116. Grazer Philosophische Studien: Volume > 51
Han Linke Philosophy as Experience, as Elucidation and as Profession: A n Attempt to Reconstruct Early Wittgenstein's Philosophy
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Wittgenstein uses the word "philosophy" in the Tractatus in three different senses: philosophy as experience (Erlebnis) aiming at solving the problem of the meaning of life and world, philosophy as elucidation (Erläuterung) aiming at determining the nature o f philosophy, clearly demarcating what can be said from what cannot, and philosophy as profession. The latter only consists in the work of analyzing the propositions brought about by philosophy as experience - which cannot be pursued professionally as well as philosophy as elucidation - and in pointing out the nonsensicalness of these propositions.
117. Grazer Philosophische Studien: Volume > 51
Richard Raatzsch Philosophical Investigations, § 1 - Setting the Stage
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How much can and should be said about the beginning of Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations (PI) on the basis of its very first section alone? Is the only thing worth mentioning that it is designed to introduce the topic for the rest of the book - may this be a "pre-philosophical", "pre-theoretical", "Augustinian" picture of Ianguage (Baker/Hacker, Kenny, Katz, Canfield et al.) or a mentalistic picture of the use of language (Savigny)? These ways of interpreting leave too many aspects of the text untouched. Some of these are: Why does Wittgenstein quote just from the Confessions if his only interest was to get a picture of language? How about Wittgenstein's different ways of dealing with the quotation from Augustine? Trying to answer these questions means to develop a new, more complicated picture o f the beginning of the PI.
118. Grazer Philosophische Studien: Volume > 51
Richard Gaskin „Kein Etwas, aber auch nicht ein Nichts!”: Kann die Grammatik tatsächlich täuschen?
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Es werden zwei von Wittgenstein entworfene Modelle der Semantik eines Wortes dargelegt und miteinander verglichen: das sog. Muster von ,Gegenstand und Bezeichnung' und das Gebrauchsmodell. Im Gegensatz zu der formalistischen Position wird gezeigt, daß das Modell von ,Gegenstand und Bezeichnung' für die Semantik unentbehrlich ist. Selbst das Gebrauchsmodell, so unumstritten dieses auch sein mag, vermag das Modell von ,Gegenstand und Bezeichunung' nicht abzulösen. Das dargestellte metaphysische Bild wird veranschaulicht, indem einige Bemerkungen Wittgensteins zur Semantik der Empfindungswörter widerlegt werden.
119. Grazer Philosophische Studien: Volume > 51
Charlotte Katzoff When Is Knowledge a Matter of Luck?
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It is quite common that a claim to knowledge is dismissed as a matter of luck. It is demonstrated that when one cites as the reason for rejecting a true belief that it is merely lucky, this is typically because the belief has not satisfied the requirements of one's theory. So disputes on luck in fact turn out to be disputes on deep epistemological issues. Criterea for epistemological luck suggested by Thomas Nagel, Nicolas Rescher, Alvin Goldman, Mylan Engel and Richard Foley are analyzed and reconstructed and compared with accounts on luck in the moral sphere.
120. Grazer Philosophische Studien: Volume > 51
Jose L. Zalabardo Predicates, Properties and the Goal of a Theory of Reference
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An account of predicate reference is presented which attempts to steer a middle course between reductionism, which construes the notion in terms of speakers' inclinations, and {transcendent) realism, which construes the notion in terms of properties. It is first introduced in the context of a discussion of the accounts of length (distance) advanced by Hans Reichenbach, Adolf Grünbaum and Hilary Putnam. A general account of predicate reference is then developed that explains the notion in terms of speakers' inclinations, while rejecting the idea that this explanation should take the form of a reduction. The view is presented as a vindication of extreme nominalism, as it explains predicate reference solely in terms of the notion of qualia introduced by C.I. Lewis and developed by Nelson Goodman, which, it is argued, is definable in terms of speakers' classificatory propensities. Some connections are explored between the position that is presented and the views of Michael Dummett, John McDowell, Mark Johnston and Hilary Putnam, among others.