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Displaying: 101-120 of 2010 documents


artículos
101. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 41 > Issue: Supplement II
Catherine Larrère “Una Vida Digna de Ser Llamada Humana”: La Actualidad de la Máxima de Hans Jonas
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“Actúa de manera tal que los efectos de tu acción sean compatibles con la permanencia de la vida humana genuina en la Tierra”. ¿Cómo podemos entender esta máxima de Jonas? ¿Es demasiado antropocéntrica como para ser interesante para la ética ambiental? ¿Está demasiado limitada a la supervivencia como para tener un significado moral en una ética verdaderamente humana? En primer lugar, podríamos argumentar que no es tan anti-kantiana como para desafiar el “presentismo” actual imperante y nos obliga a tener en cuenta no solo las generaciones futuras, sino también el contexto en el que anticipamos que estas futuras generaciones vivirán. Por lo tanto, deberíamos distinguir dos interpretaciones diferentes de la máxima de Jonas. En una primera etapa, la del desarrollo sostenible, se entendió que considera no solo las necesidades sino también los derechos de las generaciones futuras. En una segunda etapa, la de un Antropoceno y una transición ecológica, significa que dar sentido a la humanidad implica conectar a los seres humanos con la Tierra y otros seres vivos en lugar de oponerse a ellos.
102. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 41 > Issue: Supplement II
Daniel Loewe Justicia Ambiental Intergeneracional y el Problema de la No-Identidad: Un Enfoque Kantiano
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El presente artículo sostiene que, sobre la base de un enfoque moral kantiano, podemos abordar el problema de la no-identidad –al menos en los casos de agotamiento de recursos o políticas riesgosas. Ahora bien, al ser una teoría moral orientada a los deberes, permite tanto que las personas que llegan a existir en una situación de no-identidad puedan estar contentas de existir como que, simultáneamente, consideren que el agotamiento de recursos o la política arriesgada (con la que su existencia está relacionada causalmente) es moralmente errónea debido a la violación de deberes morales.
103. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 41 > Issue: Supplement II
Hernán Neira Clímax: Biología y Ética en la Restauración Ambiental
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Las justificaciones para la restauración ambiental del Parque Nacional Pumalín, originalmente conocido como Santuario Natural de Pumalín, en Chile, se analizan desde un punto de vista filosófico y ético. La etapa ambiental a la que se debe restaurar el parque se define como una opción moral, más que ecológica, que se basa en el “clímax” como un valor a priori que respalda y guía las principales acciones de restauración llevadas a cabo en el parque. Definido filosóficamente, el clímax es tanto un valor ético como político. Para estas acciones, la salud del ecosistema se trata de la misma manera que la de un ser humano: cada sociedad define los criterios y el punto máximo de la salud, así como los esfuerzos válidos para restaurarla.
104. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 41 > Issue: Supplement II
Andrea Nye Aimé Bonpland: Una Ética de la Tierra en la Cuenca del Río La Plata
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Algunos libros recientes promueven a Alexander von Humboldt como un héroe ambiental desestimando el papel de su compañero de exploración, el botánico Aimé Bonpland, refiriéndose a él con unas pocas frases imprecisas: dejó Europa, se estableció en algún lugar de América del Sur, hizo algo de agricultura. Sostengo que los escritos de Bonpland y sus cuarenta años de desarrollo regional, que su investigación botánica, etno-farmacológica y en conservación ambiental en Argentina y Brasil, presentan un mejor modelo para una ética ambiental que el ascenso a la fama de Humboldt en Europa.
revisión de libro
105. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 41 > Issue: Supplement II
Claudio Venegas Ricardo Rozzi y colaboradores, Guía Multiétnica de Aves de los Bosques Templados de Sudamérica Austral
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106. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 40 > Issue: 4
News and Notes
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107. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 40 > Issue: 4
Trish Glazebrook, Anthony Kola-Olusanya From the Guest Editors
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features
108. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 40 > Issue: 4
Workineh Kelbessa Environmental Philosophy in African Traditions of Thought
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Besides normative areas, African environmental philosophy should pay attention to the epistemological and metaphysical dimensions of the worldviews of the African people in order to understand the environmental attitudes and values in African traditions of thought. Unlike mainstream Western ethics, African environmental philosophy has renounced anthropomorphism, anthropocentrism, and ethnocentrism and recognizes the interconnectedness of human beings with the natural environment and its component parts. In African worldviews, the physical and the metaphysical, the sacred and the secular, the natural and the supernatural are interrelated. Human beings are part of the natural environment. African philosophers should continue to explore the potential for a strong African environmental philosophy in African traditions of thought that can contribute to the solution of current environmental crises.
109. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 40 > Issue: 4
Boyowa Anthony Chokor Cultural Ethics and Social Mediation of Environmental Action and Use of Space in Nigeria
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Space provides the major context for environmental interactions, both social or physical. In Africa the use of space is mediated by sociocultural values, beliefs, and norms. Segments of space from the room to the village square and surrounding natural environment have domains of cultural rules, symbols, and meanings assigned to them with import for environmental behavior and action among elders, children, and women. They illuminate aspects of the social enforcement of three forms of environment-related rules: “prescriptive,” mediating, and community-assigned environmental codes/taboos, some of which may require purification rites for violations. Several transgenerational eco-thoughts and eco-fantasies embedded in social practices have significant bearing on sustainable environmental conservation. Five major contexts are in deep interplay between community environmental ethics and environmental action: (1) the adoption and evocation of spiritualized rules in regulating the use of space; (2) the declaration of sacred grounds and territories to bound people; (3) the evolution of time-and place-related rules; (4) the use of physical designs to secure behavioral expectations; and (5) the role of “regulatory social institutions” in the enforcement of environmental codes. They point to the fact that cultural and social meanings assigned to the ordinary physical environment are important in deconstructing peoples’ use of space. While traditional communal environmental norms can be given preeminence, their correlates in cosmopolitan societies are exemplified in the complex formal rules sometimes employed in regulating the use of space, creating a juridical order in the drive for efficiency and profit in capitalistic societies.
110. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 40 > Issue: 4
Michael Adetunji Ahove Paradigm Shifts of the African Worldview: Climate Adaptation and Mitigation Education
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Africa is the most vulnerable region of the world due to anthropogenic climate change challenges on account of dependence on nature for the sustenance of agriculture as her main source of income, high level of poverty, and low level of literacy. Climate change adaptation involves strategies of adjusting to the negative effects of climate change, while climate change mitigation involves techniques that help to reduce production of greenhouse gases through burning fossil fuels. The African worldview from the frontier of Nigerian epistemological and ontological perspectives as it finds expression in climate change adaptation and mitigation is built on the foundations of its relationship with nature, traditional religion and belief systems, agricultural practices, and some other day-to-day practices. Worldview analysis of the contemporary Nigerian has been conducted and classified into Original African, Westernized African, and Little Here-and-There African, a paradigm existing in Nigerians irrespective of level of Western education. What will be the fate of the younger Nigerian climate scientist in a globalized and technologically competitive world? This question gives rise to further discussion on the principles and application of the theory of Culturo-Techno-Contextual Approach as postulated by Peter A. Okebukola and applied to creating an environment for meaningful learning on climate change adaptation and mitigation for the future generations of Nigerians.
111. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 40 > Issue: 4
Edward Uzoma Ezedike Ratiocentrism, Intrinsic Value, and the Moral Status of the Nonhuman Natural World: A Reflection on Kant’s Categorial Imperative
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Kant’s doctrine of the “categorical imperative” with respect to ratiocentrism needs to be examined for its implications for environmental ethics. Kant’s argument is that moral actions must be categorical or unqualified imperatives that reflect the sovereignty of moral obligations that all rational moral agents could figure out by virtue of their rationality. For Kant, humans have no direct moral obligations to non-rational, nonhuman nature: only rational beings, i.e., humans, are worthy of moral consideration. I argue that this position is excessively anthropocentric and ratiocentric in excluding the nonhuman natural world from moral consideration. While conceding that nonhuman nature is instrumentally valuable owing to some inevitable existential, ontological considerations, moral obligation should be extended to the natural world in order to achieve environmental wholeness.
112. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 40 > Issue: 4
Emmanuela Opoku, Trish Glazebrook Gender, Agriculture, and Climate Policy in Ghana
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Ghana is aware of women farmers’ climate adaptation challenges in meeting the country’s food security needs and has strong intentions to support these women, but is stymied by economic limitations, poor organization in governance, persistent social gender biases, and either little or counter-productive support from international policy makers and advisory bodies. Focal issues are the global impacts of climate change on agriculture, Africa’s growing hunger crisis, and women’s contribution to food production in Ghana. Of special importance are the issues of gender-inclusiveness and gender-sensitivity of Ghana’s climate and climate-related policies, including its integration of United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change policy, as well as the influence of international economic policy on Ghana’s gender development. Because women farmers provide the majority of the country’s national food-basket, Ghana (as well as other African counries) should focus on building women subsistence farmers’ adaptation needs to avert mass starvation. People should understand that starvation in Africa is not a future event but is already underway.
113. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 40 > Issue: 4
Yvette Abrahams How Must I Explain to the Dolphins?: An Intersectional Approach to Theorizing the Epistemology of Climate Uncertainty
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The story of change and growth, i.e., evolution, in the traditional manner, involves an epistemology of indigenous knowledge systems that admits both evolution and the divine—and therefore the human capacity for free choice—that tells us that fossil fuels are a bad choice. Steven Biko’s message of “Black Consciousness” responds to the dilemma of how we belong to the species that is damaging the planetary ecosystem, amd yet how we can deny complicity by saying that reclaiming our culture enables us to see what we have done, so we can refuse complicity with the system that has divided us and take responsibility for giving birth to new life. The uncertainties of climate change can be thought through using race, class, gender, sexual orientation, indigeneity, and disability as categories of analysis. The result is an understanding that through both climate science and lived experience, we can know enough to know we ought to act on climate change. We do not need more research; we need instead an acceptance of our ignorance amid a sense of ethical responsibility. This story speaks of liberation from oppression and of climate action as deeply entangled in
book reviews
114. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 40 > Issue: 4
Piers H. G. Stephens Svetozar Y. Minkov and Bernhardt L. Trout, eds.: Mastery of Nature: Promises and Prospects
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115. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 40 > Issue: 4
Tony Vogt David Naguib Pellow: What is Critical Environmental Justice?
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116. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 40 > Issue: 4
Referees 2018
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117. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 40 > Issue: 4
Index for 2018
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118. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 40 > Issue: 3
News and Notes
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features
119. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 40 > Issue: 3
Lisa Kretz The Oppression of Nonhuman Life: An Analysis Using the Lens of Karen Warren’s Work
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Karen Warren’s work has helped to transform the landscape of environmental philosophy, contributing theoretical grounding for Western ecofeminism and opening the range of theoretical perspectives one can adopt when doing Western environmental ethics. Although her work is laudable, there are substantive worries about how potential subjects of oppression are characterized in her later work. Warren’s work and relevant secondary literature can be used as a foil to illuminate inadequate justification for the failure to include all living entities as potential subjects of the harm of oppression. The failure to provide conceptual room to include all entities that can rightfully be the potential subjects of oppression limits our understanding of oppression and the multiple ways in which it functions. Additionally, failure to attend to all potential subjects of oppression limits practical opportunities for anti-oppressive solidarity in political action. If oppression is correctly described as the harm of particular group members by others, and the class of living entities can be subjected to harm, then nonhuman living entities can potentially be subjects of oppression. The aim here is to provide conceptual support for the possibility that nonhuman life can be oppressed.
120. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 40 > Issue: 3
Tony Chackal Place, Community, and the Generation of Ecological Autonomy
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Autonomy is traditionally considered to be an epistemic capacity of individuals to think for themselves, and the community is held to be its central obstruction. Autonomy is the internal capacity to freely use reason to form beliefs and preferences that are one’s own. It is premised on the atomistic individual conceived as a decontextualized rational mind. Accordingly, natural, physical, and social externalities have not been included in discourse on autonomy. But if individuals are seen as embodied dwellers within social and natural environments and are reconceived as ecological, that is, partly constituted by their environments, then autonomy must likewise be reconceived. Ecological autonomy is an internal epistemic capacity to think and an external actional capacity to act for oneself in relation to other individuals and environments. Whereas traditional and even relational autonomy require that competency and authenticity conditions must be met for internal thinking, ecological autonomy requires two sets of competency and authenticity conditions, one for internal thought and one for external action. An ecological treatment holds that while community can obstruct autonomy, it also generates and sustains it to reveal how community and place are co-defined as mutually constitutive companion concepts with alternate emphases. Place emphasizes physical and social, and natural and artificial environments, but includes people and social practices. Community emphasizes people, social practices, knowledge, and values, but includes the environing world.