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Displaying: 101-110 of 2350 documents


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101. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 85 > Issue: 3
Thomas Sattig, The Paradox of Fission and the Ontology of Ordinary Objects
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102. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 85 > Issue: 3
Marilyn McCord Adams, Cecilia Trifogli, Whose Thought Is It? The Soul and the Subject of Action in Some Thirteenth and Fourteenth Century Aristotelians
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103. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 85 > Issue: 3
J. Robert, G. Williams, Counterfactual Triviality: A Lewis-Impossibility Argument for Counterfactuals
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I formulate a counterfactual version of the notorious 'Ramsey Test'. Whereas the Ramsey Test for indicative conditionals links credence in indicatives to conditional credences, the counterfactual version links credence in counterfactuals to expected conditional chance. I outline two forms: a Ramsey Identity on which the probability of the conditional should be identical to the corresponding conditional probabihty/expectation of chance; and a Ramsey Bound on which credence in the conditional should never exceed the latter.Even in the weaker, bound, form, the counterfactual Ramsey Test makes counterfactuals subject to the very argument that Lewis used to argue against the indicative version of the Ramsey Test. I compare the assumptions needed to run each, pointing to assumptions about the time-evolution of chances that can replace the appeal to Bayesian assumptions about credence update in motivating the assumptions of the argument.I finish by outlining two reactions to the discussion: to indicativize the debate on counterfactuals; or to counterfactualize the debate on indicatives.
104. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 85 > Issue: 3
Catharine Abell, Art: What it Is and Why it Matters
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105. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 85 > Issue: 3
Sven Rosenkranz, Radical Scepticism Without Epistemic Closure
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This paper contributes to the current debate about radical scepticism and the structure of warrant. After a presentation of the standard version of the radicalsceptic's challenge, both in its barest and its more rehned form, three anti-sceptical responses, and their respective commitments, are being identified: the Dogmatist response, the Conservativist response and the Dretskean response. It is then argued that both the Dretskean and the Conservativist are right that the anti-sceptical hypothesis cannot inherit any perceptual warrants from ordinary propositions about the environment—and so the Dogmatist response founders. However, i f this is so Epistemic Closure lacks any clear rationale. There is therefore good reason to agree with both the Dretskean and the Dogmatist that perceptual warrants for ordinary propositions about the environment are enough in order for those propositions to enjoy a positive epistemic status—and so the Conservativist response founders. However, the Conservativist is nonetheless right that a warrant for the anü-scepücal hypothesis is needed. For contrary to what much of the recent literature suggests, the radical sceptic need not appeal to Epistemic Closure in order to cast doubt on the legitimacy of our beliefs in ordinary propositions about the environment: there is a Pyrrhonian version of scepticism that, though equally radical, is consistent with failure of Epistemic Closure. For this reason, the Dretskean response is insufficient to answer scepticism.
106. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 85 > Issue: 3
Susan Schneider, Non-Reductive Physicalism Cannot Appeal to Token Identity
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review
107. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 85 > Issue: 3
Daniel M. Haybron, Nicholas White, A Brief History of Happiness
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book symposium
108. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 85 > Issue: 3
Jason Stanley, Precis of Know How
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109. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 85 > Issue: 3
Imogen Dickie, Skill Before Knowledge
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110. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 85 > Issue: 3
Mark Schroeder, Showing How to Derive Knowing How
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