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Displaying: 101-120 of 1692 documents


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101. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 34 > Issue: 1
Kenneth L. Pearce Counterpossible Dependence and the Efficacy of the Divine Will
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The will of an omnipotent being would be perfectly efficacious. Alexander Pruss and I have provided an analysis of perfect efficacy that relies on non-trivial counterpossible conditionals. Scott Hill has objected that not all of the required counterpossibles are true of God. Sarah Adams has objected that perfect efficacy of will (on any analysis) would be an extrinsic property and so is not suitable as a divine attribute. I argue that both of these objections can be answered if the divine will is taken to be the ground, rather than the cause, of its fulfillment.
102. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 34 > Issue: 1
Jonathan Curtis Rutledge Commonsense, Skeptical Theism, and Different Sorts of Closure of Inquiry Defeat
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Trent Dougherty argues (contra Jonathan Matheson) that when taking into consideration the probabilities involving skeptical theism (ST) and gratuitous evils, an agent may reasonably affirm both ST and that gratuitous evils exist. In other words, Dougherty thinks that assigning a greater than .5 probability to ST is insufficient to defeat the commonsense problem of evil. I argue that Dougherty’s response assumes, incorrectly, that ST functions solely as an evidential defeater, and that, when understood as a closure of inquiry defeater, ST may still defeat reasonable belief in gratuitous evils, even in the face of strong evidence that gratuitous evils exist.
103. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 34 > Issue: 1
Joshua Lee Harris Analogy in Aquinas: The Alston-Wolterstorff Debate Revisited
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In the last decade there arose a debate between William P. Alston and Nicholas Wolterstorff on the subject of Thomas Aquinas’s doctrine of analogia—that is, the position that perfection terms, when properly predicated of God and of creatures, are distinct, yet related in meaning. Whereas Alston interprets Aquinas to hold this well-known position before criticizing it, Wolterstorff argues that Aquinas actually did not hold the position as it is usually presented. In this paper, I show why Alston’s “orthodox” interpretation is more faithful to the letter of Aquinas’s text than is Wolterstorff’s “heterodoxy” and attempt to defuse Alston’s criticisms.
104. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 34 > Issue: 1
Alonso Villarán Kant’s Highest Good: The “Beck-Silber Controversy” in the Spanish-Speaking World
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In the 1960s Lewis White Beck criticized Kant’s highest good as a moral concept. In 1963 John Silber responded. Thus, the “Beck-Silber controversy.” This paper explores such controversy in the Spanish literature. It begins identifying four criticisms: the problems of heteronomy, derivation, impossibility, and irrelevance. It then identifies a new problem rescued from the Spanish literature: dualism. After categorizing, following Matthew Caswell, the Spanish defenses into revisionists, secularizers, and maximalists, this paper assesses these defenses. The paper also translates sections of such literature into English and leaves us closer to a complete defense of the highest good by salvaging what it can of the Spanish literature’s unique points.
105. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 34 > Issue: 1
Jerome Gellman A Surviving Version of the Common Sense Problem of Evil: A Reply to Tweedt
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Chris Tweedt has offered a solution to the “common sense problem of evil,” on which that there is gratuitous evil is justified non-inferentially as a trivial inference from non-inferentially justified premises by invoking versions of CORNEA. Tweedt claims his solution applies not only to the versions of the common sense problem of evil offered by Paul Draper and Trent Dougherty, but also to that offered by me in this journal in 1992. Here I argue that Tweedt fails to defeat this version of the problem. So even if Tweedt’s response to Draper and Dougherty is successful, a version of the common sense problem of evil survives.
106. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 34 > Issue: 1
William Hasker Molinism’s Freedom Problem: A Reply to Cunningham
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Arthur Cunningham has asserted that my argument targeting the “freedom problem” for Molinism is unsuccessful. I show that while he has correctly identified two minor (and correctible) problems with the argument, Cunningham’s main criticisms are ineffective. This is mainly because he has failed to appreciate the complex dialectical situation created by the use of a reductio ad absurdum argument. The result is to underscore the difficulty for Molinism of the freedom problem.
book reviews
107. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 34 > Issue: 1
W. Jay Wood Vainglory: The Forgotten Vice, by Rebecca Konyndyk DeYoung
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108. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 34 > Issue: 1
Glen Pettigrove Anger and Forgiveness: Resentment, Generosity, Justice, by Martha Nussbaum
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109. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 34 > Issue: 1
Andrew Ter Ern Loke In Defense of Conciliar Christology: A Philosophical Essay, by Timothy Pawl
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articles
110. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 33 > Issue: 4
Richard Cross Duns Scotus on Divine Immensity
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In a recent article, Hud Hudson analyses divine omnipresence in terms of a spatial property, ubiquitous entension, neither reducible to nor derivative from any other divine attribute. Hudson’s view is an alternative to the predominant view in recent philosophical theology, in which omnipresence is reduced to omnipotence. I show that Duns Scotus adopts a view that conforms very closely to Hudson’s account, and show how he argues against the derivative view, which he finds in Aquinas. Hudson claims that ubiquitous entension helps dissolve the mystery of causal interactions between God and creatures. Scotus argues against this claim. He also argues against the view taken by Hudson that entension entails materiality. While fundamentally agreeing with Hudson’s basic position, then, Scotus nevertheless provides challenges both for Hudson and his opponents.
111. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 33 > Issue: 4
Martin Pickup The Trinity and Extended Simples
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In this paper, I will offer an analogy between the Trinity and extended simples that supports a Latin approach to the Trinity. The theoretical tools developed to discuss and debate extended simples in the literature of contemporary analytic metaphysics, I argue, can help us make useful conceptual distinctions in attempts to understand what it could be for God to be Triune. Furthermore, the analogy between extended simples and the Trinity might surprise some who find one of these at least plausibly possible and the other incoherent.
112. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 33 > Issue: 4
Joshua Mugg The Quietest Challenge to the Axiology of God: A Cognitive Approach to Counterpossibles
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Guy Kahane asks an axiological question: what value would (or does) God’s existence bestow on the world? Supposing God’s existence is a matter of necessity, this axiological question faces a problem because answering it will require assessing the truth-value of counterpossibles. I argue that Kahane, Paul Moser, and Richard Davis and Paul Franks fail in their attempts to render the axiological question substantive. I then offer my own solution by bringing work in cognitive psychology and philosophy of mind to bear on the possibility of assessing counterpossibles. I argue that humans can engage in counterpossible reasoning by “accepting” or “supposing” that the antecedent is true and “screening out” those beliefs that would result in contradictions when combined in inferences with the acceptance or supposition. These screened out propositions are not treated as false, but are ignored. I offer a three-valued logic for counterpossible reasoning. I conclude by outlining some implications for the axiological question.
113. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 33 > Issue: 4
Alexander R. Pruss An Open Infinite Future is Impossible
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According to the Open Futurist there are no true undetermined contingent propositions about the future. I shall argue on probabilistic grounds that there are some statements about infinite futures that Open Futurism cannot handle. The Open Futurist’s best bet is to reject an infinite future, but a Christian philosopher cannot take that bet, and hence should reject Open Futurism.
114. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 33 > Issue: 4
Jeff Speaks Perfect Being Theology and Modal Truth
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In “The Method of Perfect Being Theology,” I argued that the attempt to derive the divine attributes from the principle that God is the greatest possible being faces substantial challenges. Here I clarify and defend the argument of that paper in response to the objections of Brian Leftow in “Perfection and Possibility,” and consider the question of whether we might use perfect being reasoning to establish the possibility of certain hypotheses about God.
115. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 33 > Issue: 4
James Cain On the Geachian Theory of the Trinity And Incarnation: A Reply to Jedwab
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Contemporary accounts of the Trinity and Incarnation sometimes employ aspects of Peter Geach’s theory of relative identity. Geach’s theory provides an account not merely of identity predicates, but also proper names and restricted quantification. In a previous work I developed an account of the doctrines of the Trinity and Incarnation incorporating these three aspects of Geach’s theory and tried to show how each might contribute to our understanding of the doctrines. Joseph Jedwab has recently argued that my account—or any that employs Geach’s treatment of restricted quantifiers—leads to serious doctrinal errors. I reply to his criticisms.
book reviews
116. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 33 > Issue: 4
Ryan W. Davis Reasons, Rights, and Values, by Robert Audi
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117. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 33 > Issue: 4
James M. Arcadi An Invitation to Analytic Christian Theology, by Thomas H. McCall
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118. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 33 > Issue: 4
Katherin Rogers The End of the Timeless God, by R. T. Mullins
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119. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 33 > Issue: 4
Chris Tucker The Hiddenness Argument: Philosophy’s New Challenge to Belief in God, by J. L. Schellenberg
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articles
120. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 33 > Issue: 3
Shieva Kleinschmidt Simple Trinitarianism and Feature-Placing Sentences
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Some Trinitarians, such as Thomas Aquinas, wish to claim that God is mereologically simple; that is, God has no parts distinct from Himself. In this paper, I present Simple Trinitarianism, a view that takes God to be simple but, diverging from Aquinas, does not identify the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit with anything in our ontology. Nonetheless, Simple Trinitarians would like Trinitarian sentences to be true; thus, they must give a non-standard semantics for those sentences. I will focus on one possible semantics a Simple Trinitarian may give: taking Trinitarian claims to be translatable into feature-placing sentences, which posit property instantiation without requiring commitment to any objects that instantiate those properties.