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1. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 26 > Issue: 1
Kenneth Henley Hume’s Deflationary Theory of Allegiance
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2. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 26 > Issue: 1
Iain Morrisson Nietzsche, Economy and Morality
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3. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 26 > Issue: 1
C.D. Meyers Nature, Virtue, and the Nature of Virtue: An Outline for an Environmental Virtue Ethics
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Most of the philosophical work written on environmental issues focuses on notions such as rights, consequences, duties, etc. And most of the theoretical philosophy done in environmental ethics focuses on questions of whether animals, plants, or ecosystems have inherent value or moral standing independently of their usefulness to humans. A character-based approach has been largely neglected (despite a few important works). In this paper, I consider what a plausible environmental virtue ethics would look like. Specifically, I argue (pace Sandler) that it would not require any distinct eco-virtue but would involve merely widening the scope of traditional virtues to include the non-human world. I further argue that a successful environmental virtue ethics would have to be pluralistic (involving more than one virtue) and would require the formulation of prima facie (rather than absolute) v-rules. Finally, borrowing from Naess, I suggest a way that eco-friendly character could be acquired.
4. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 26 > Issue: 1
William Grove-Fanning Biodiversity Loss, the Motivational Gap, and the Failure of Conservation Education
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While the precipitous decline of biodiversity threatens life-sustaining processes and vast segments of the human population, concern about its loss remains extremely shallow. Nearly all motivational campaigns falsely assume that upon appreciating the relevant information, people will be sufficiently motivated to do something. But rational argumentation is doomed to fail, for there exists a motivational gap between a comprehension of the crisis and action taken based upon such knowledge. The origin of the gap lies neither in the quantity and quality of information on the crisis, nor in the putative confl ict between self-interest and morality. Instead, it lies in “remoteness conditions” which dissociate decision-makers from ecological damage and enfeeble incentive to correct it. The centralremoteness conditions are spatial, temporal, and consequential. They can be eliminated by concretizing and particularizing earth others. While direct-experience, place-based educational programs satisfy the criteria, they are uncommon. There is also little opportunity for working adultsto engage in these sorts of activities. As such, the outlook for endangered species and humans in the developing world remains dire.
5. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 26 > Issue: 1
Hoke Robinson Kant on Empirical Concept- and Intuition-Formation: A Discussion with Hannah Ginsborg
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6. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 26 > Issue: 1
Scott Forschler Willing Universal Law vs. Universally Lawful Willing: What Kant’s Supreme Principle of Ethics Should Have Been
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7. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 26 > Issue: 1
Amanda Roth Ethical Progress and the Goldilocks Problem: Objectivity and the Radical Revision of Values
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I argue that a number of non-utopian accounts of ethical progress—specifically, those offered by Wiggins, Moody-Adams, and Rorty—face a trade-off between objectivity and the radical revision of values. I suggest that each of these views is unsatisfactory because they face the Goldilocks problem—none of the views is able to get the trade-off between objectivity and radical revision of values “just right.” Moody-Adams and Wiggins offer accounts which are too conservative with regard to ethical progress in not allowing radical revision of values, while Rorty’s account is too liberal in not maintaining enough objectivity. Despite thisdifficulty, however, I conclude on an optimistic note about the potential of non-utopian accounts of progress. I sketch out a Dewey-inspired view of progress which I believe can overcome the Goldilocks problem.
8. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 26 > Issue: 1
Mary Stewart Butterfield Moral Considerations in Epistemic Conceptions of Democracy
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9. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 26 > Issue: 1
Jenn Neilson Freedom of Expression, Obscenity and the Community Standards Test
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10. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 26 > Issue: 1
Samuel A. Stoner Critical Philosophy as Artistic Endeavor: On the Form of Kant’s “Critique of Aesthetic Judgment” and its Implications
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11. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 26 > Issue: 1
Todd R. Long Proper Function Justification and Epistemic Rationality
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12. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 26 > Issue: 1
Tim Mosteller Platonism and Recent Correspondence Theories of Truth
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13. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 26 > Issue: 1
Robyn R. Gaier Hey, You, What’s so Special about the Second-Person Perspective?
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14. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 26 > Issue: 1
J.K. Swindler Autonomy and Accountability
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15. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 26 > Issue: 1
Elizabeth J. Jelinek The Philosopher-Ruler: From Theory to Action
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16. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 26 > Issue: 1
Richard Cole Nature, Value, and Duty
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open submission articles
17. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 26 > Issue: 1
Maurice Hamington Hull House: Urban Epistemology and Social Action
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