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Southwest Philosophy Review

Volume 33, Issue 1, January 2017

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Displaying: 11-20 of 22 documents


11. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 33 > Issue: 1
Larry Alan Busk Two Women in Flight in Beauvoir’s Fiction
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This paper analyzes two forms of “fl ight from freedom” (or bad faith) embodied by characters in Beauvoir’s fi ction, connecting these portrayals to the situation of women as described in The Second Sex as well as the discussion of social freedom in The Ethics of Ambiguity. The characters under consideration are Monique from the story “The Woman Destroyed” and Françoise from the novel She Came to Stay, who represent fl ight from freedom in related but distinct ways. My claim is that considering these two characters in conjunction allows us to see the two decisive moments of Beauvoir’s theory of authentic freedom in negative manifestations. Monique attempts to make herself into an object by abdicating her freedom, while Françoise takes herself for a sovereign subject and is unable to recognize the freedom of others.
12. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 33 > Issue: 1
R.M. Farley The Sellarsian Dilemma: Not What It Seems
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13. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 33 > Issue: 1
Glenn Tiller Being Denied: Analytic Metaphysics and American Philosophy
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14. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 33 > Issue: 1
Julie Wulfemeyer Reference-Shifting on a Causal-Historical Account
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I take it as given that we manage to linguistically refer to objects we can neither perceive nor uniquely describe. Kripke accounts for this fact by appeal to causal-historical chains of communication. But Evans famously presented what has seemed to many a devastating counterexample to Kripke’s view: the phenomenon of reference-shifting. Here, I’ll agree with critics that Kripke’s view is insuffi cient to handle cases of reference shift, but I’ll argue for an alternative version of the causal-historical account that is immune to Evans’ counterexample. The key move will be at the foundations; it will require a change in what it is we’re giving a causal-historical account of. Critically, I’ll argue that we should reject two claims associated with the causal-historical picture. First, we should reject the claim that names are used to think of their referents. Second, we should reject the claim that later speakers defer to earlier ones.
15. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 33 > Issue: 1
Erik Krag A New Timing Objection to Frankfurt Cases
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16. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 33 > Issue: 1
Paul Carron Monkeys, Men, and Moral Responsibility: A Neo-Aristotelian Case for a Qualitative Distinction
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17. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 33 > Issue: 1
Robert P. Reed Must God Prevent Evil?
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18. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 33 > Issue: 1
Matthew Shea Thomistic Eudaimonism, Virtue, and Well-Being
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19. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 33 > Issue: 1
Sarah H. Woolwine Concealing Disability: Horkheimer and Adorno on Passing as Abled
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20. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 33 > Issue: 1
Erik W. Schmidt Troubled Trades: Normative Incomparability and the Challenge of Universal Markets
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One common set of arguments against universal markets contends that the special status of certain goods (e.g., organs, reproductive services, or native artifacts) makes it inappropriate or wrong to compare their worth to the value of a commodity or to some amount of money. These arguments rest on the fear that market valuations would distort the way we value the goods in question rather than the fear that their sale could exploit or directly harm the people involved in the exchange. In this paper I use behavioral economics to explain why these arguments persuade so many people despite the fact that we already engage in a wide range of economic valuations with respect to those contested domains. I conclude by identifying the implications this has for the broader debate over contested markets.