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11. Philosophia Christi: Volume > 20 > Issue: 2
Timothy Blank The Open Theistic Multiverse
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Recently, some analytic philosophers of religion have argued that if God exists, it is likely that He would create a multitude of universes. This view is called the Theistic Multiverse. More specifically, the view claims that each possible universe has an axiological status and all and only those universes above an objective axiological threshold are created by God and included in the Theistic Multiverse. I point out that in this model of divine creation there is the implicit assumption that Molinism is true. But Molinism is a controversial view, and so this project considers the compatibility of the Theistic Multiverse with a rival model of divine foreknowledge: Open Theism.
12. Philosophia Christi: Volume > 20 > Issue: 2
Christopher W. Love The Argument from Disagreement to Moral Skepticism: A “Worldview” Reply
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This essay begins with the assumption that many of our moral disputes have deeper roots in disagreement over worldview propositions. If this is true, and if there is a fact of the matter about worldview propositions, such that one could know the truth of at least some of them, then this makes it possible for one to maintain one’s moral beliefs, even despite the persistent, pervasive disagreements so common today. I argue that this holds true even when those debates include supposed peers and when the worldview propositions themselves are highly disputed.
13. Philosophia Christi: Volume > 20 > Issue: 2
Travis Dumsday Origen on Demonic Ignorance: And Why It Might Still Matter for the Theology of World Religions
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Historically it has been common for theologians to understand demons as basically on a par with angels in terms of intelligence and access to knowledge (excluding direct communications from God). Yet on this point Origen dissents, suggesting instead that demons might be qutie ignorant, at least with respect to spiritual truths. I explore some of the justifications available to him for entertaining this idea, and consider whether it could contribute to current discussions concerning the theology of world religions. Specifically, I argue that Origen's account of demonic ignorance provides the key ingredients for a plausible (at least for those already open to the reality of the demonic) explanatory model of one root cause of religious diversity: paranormal and “religious” experiences delivering incompatible propositional content.
14. Philosophia Christi: Volume > 20 > Issue: 2
Matthew J. Hart Christian Materialism and Demonic Temptation
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Demons have the power to cause temptations in us, and Christian materialism implies the supervenience of temptations on brain states. This in turn implies that demons bring about temptations by causally interfering with our brains. But if they have such an ability to affect the physical world, it is mysterious why they do not wreak more havoc than they do both to our brains and in the world more generally. Substance dualism provides an elegant solution: demonic temptation is not a species of soul-to-brain causation, but soul-to-soul, and we don’t need to suppose demons have the power to directly affect the physical world. Materialist solutions, in contrast, are ad hoc.
15. Philosophia Christi: Volume > 20 > Issue: 2
Dallas Willard, Brandon Rickabaugh Intentionality contra Physicalism: On the Mind’s Independence from the Body
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We argue for the mind’s independence from the body. We do so by making several moves. First, we analyze two popular kinds of reasons which have swayed many to adopt the independence of the mind from the body. Second, we advance an argument from the ontology of intentionality against the identity thesis, according to which the mind is identical to the brain. We try to show how intentionality is not reducible to or identical to the physical. Lastly, we argue that, contrary to what many materialists contend, the concept of a mind, understood as an immaterial substance, existing independently of the body is both coherent and empirically evidenced.
16. Philosophia Christi: Volume > 20 > Issue: 2
Victor Reppert Extending the Debate on the Argument from Reason: A Further Response to David K. Johnson
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In our exchange in the book, C. S. Lewis’s Christian Apologetics: Pro and Con, edited by Gregory Bassham, David Kyle Johnson argued that four naturalistic views, property dualism, the identity theory, epiphenomenalism, and eliminative materialism, can all meet the challenge posed by a C. S. Lewis–style argument from reason. I maintain that his response fails to take into account what a consistent naturalism is committed to, and that his defenses of these positions fail to put those positions in the clear.
17. Philosophia Christi: Volume > 20 > Issue: 2
David Kyle Johnson Retiring the Argument from Reason: Another Reply to Reppert
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In C. S. Lewis’s Christian Apologetics: Pro and Con, I took the con in a debate with Victor Reppert about the soundness of Lewis’s famous “argument from reason.” Reppert then extended his argument in an article for Philosophia Christi; this article is my reply. I show that Reppert’s argument fails for three reasons. (1) It “loads the die” by falsely assuming that naturalism, by definition, can't include mental causation "on the basic level." (I provide multiple examples of naturalist theories of mind that do exactly that). (2) Physical processes can reliably produce true beliefs. And (3) reasoning isn’t necessarily mental.
philosophical notes
18. Philosophia Christi: Volume > 20 > Issue: 2
Benjamin H. Arbour, Gregory E. Trickett Evil Does Not Pose Any Special Problem for Berkeleyan Idealism: An Idealist Response to John DePoe
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John DePoe takes issue with Christians who accept Berkeleyan idealism, essentially arguing that there is a special problem from evil for the Christian idealist. While DePoe’s treatment of idealism is commendable, his argument ultimately fails in one of two ways. It either (1) turns on common misunderstandings of idealism or (2) results in consequences unacceptable to Christians. In our article, we respond to DePoe’s argument by remotivating idealism, pointing out ways in which DePoe misunderstands idealists’ responses to the charge of a special problem of evil, and pointing out problems with DePoe’s proposals of materialist solutions to the problem of evil.
19. Philosophia Christi: Volume > 20 > Issue: 2
William Hasker What’s Wrong with Theistic Evolution?
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The volume, Theistic Evolution, brings together objections to an evolutionary account of life’s history, and especially to theistic evolution, developed by scientists, philosophers, and theologians who prefer the perspective afforded by Intelligent Design. I present the main themes of their critique, and also point out that the work done to date falls short of providing a genuine alternative to the prevalent evolutionary account.
book reviews
20. Philosophia Christi: Volume > 20 > Issue: 2
J. P. Moreland Metaphysical Perspectives
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