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論 著 / articles
11. NTU Philosophical Review: Year > 2017
陳斐婷 Fei-Ting Chen
空氣如何容受顏色?: 亞里斯多德論中介物、光、與視覺
How Does Air Receive Color?

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本文嘗試重建亞里斯多德如何看待中介物空氣容受顏色,給予《靈魂論》第二書第七章418a26-b20 這個段落一個新的詮釋。亞里斯多德分兩個方向進行這項探究。一方面,我論述亞里斯多德嘗試建立一個視覺事件的因果發生序列,顏色是整個視覺事件因果發生序列的動力因起點,使得中介物諸如空氣等透明事物產生變動。而這項變動是一項性質變化。另一方面,透過考察亞里斯多德透過對於光的探究,我指出,處於實現狀態的透明事物,應該理解為展現其與火或此類物體同一的透明本性,是透明事物歷經變動的必要條件。如果上述關於空氣如何容受顏色的解讀是正確的,或許可以為視覺感官如何接受視覺對象的形式(De anima 2.12,414a18-19)提供新的思考方向。
12. NTU Philosophical Review: Year > 2017
陳湘韻 Hsiang-Yun Chen
主教句型的真正問題
The Real Problem of Bishop Sentences

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描述性理論(或稱E-型理論)是對「驢子代詞」(donkey anaphora)的一種分析(如:伊凡斯(Evans,1977),韓牧(Heim,1990),尼爾(Neale,1990))。此徑路常為人詬病的一點是無法解釋「主教句型」(bishop sentences)。艾勃(Elbourne,2005)提出一套情境語義學(situation semantics)式的描述性理論,並宣稱該理論不僅能解決傳統描述性理論在說明主教句型時的困難,還能解釋另一種新的主教句型。本文旨在質疑艾勃的分析。我指出艾勃的解法不但使用了未受約束的指代詞(unbound anaphora),且其對新的主教句型的說明也並不適切。
書 評 / book reviews
13. NTU Philosophical Review: Year > 2017
楊德立 Tak-Lap Yeung
評After Hegel: German Philosophy, 1840-1900
A Review of After Hegel: German Philosophy, 1840-1900

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相比十九世紀後半葉的德國哲學,哲學學者與史家一般更注重前半葉的成就。Frederick Beiser 這本著作,正是針對這種情況而寫。他認為十九世紀後半葉被過度簡化和忽略,其實相對於前半葉,後半葉甚至「更重要和哲學上更有趣」,而通過新的敘事和理論重構,該能賦予其應得的重視。為此,作者鑄造了五條不同的歷史線索,包括新「康德主義的興起」、「物質主義的爭論」、「歷史主義的發展」、「現代邏輯的根源」、「悲觀主義的冒起」,讓讀者以不同角度,重新認識這段歷史。他以發掘失落的傳統為己任,對於志同道合的讀者而言,這書當然對味,然而,若要讓讀者公平、恰當地了解當時的思潮,從另一角度而言,書名引來的期望或未盡相符。作者的學術素養無容置疑,本書豐富的資料和清晰的整理,能讓無論是否熟悉該段哲學史的讀者皆耳目一新。若讀者能自行把當中的細節,放到更大的歷史脈絡看,相信會對此書有更正面的評價、獲益更多。
論 著 / articles
14. NTU Philosophical Review: Year > 2017 > Issue: 53
黃文宏 Wen-Hong Huang
論洪耀勳「真理論的絕對辯證法」的構想
On Hung Yao-Shun’s Conception of “Absolute Dialectics of Alethiology”

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15. NTU Philosophical Review: Year > 2017 > Issue: 53
Hsiu-Lin Ku 古秀鈴
On the Very Idea of a Minimal Proposition
論極小命題

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Can the idea of a minimal proposition be successfully held? I will first formulate what the minimal proposition is in the minimalist’s mind, taking Emma Borg as the representative. What a minimalist seeks for a minimal proposition is the abstract and skeletal core meaning of a sentence, and this faith is founded on the notion of minimal word meaning—an atomic, code-like, conceptual thing. I show that the problem of this notion of minimal proposition lies in the three features, intuitive read-off, invariantness, and truth-evaluability, that Borg ascribes to it. I shall argue, first, that positing a conceptual-like thing as the invariant minimal content of word cannot support the invariantness of the minimal proposition of a sentence, and second, that the skeletal content, as the minimal proposition of a sentence, is a grammatically analyzed product and thus is hardly truth evaluable. According to the analyses, the idea of a minimal proposition with these three features identified by minimalists cannot be maintained.
16. NTU Philosophical Review: Year > 2017 > Issue: 53
Wim De Reu 魏家豪
On Goblet Words: Coexistence and Writing in the Zhuangzi
論巵言─《莊子》之共存與寫作

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This article attempts to reframe the state of research on the notion of goblet words (zhiyan) in the Zhuangzi. Recent studies predominantly view the notion of zhiyan as referring to peculiar stylistic forms exhibited in the Zhuangzi—forms such as dilemmatic questions and paradoxes. In this article, I question the quick identification of these forms as zhiyan. I argue that zhiyan are essentially definite yet provisional simple-form utterances located on the level of everyday interaction and coexistence. On this level, the peculiar stylistic forms do not play their part. However, such stylistic forms do become indispensable in discussing and recommending zhiyan. It is on this meta-level—for the Zhuangzi, the level of writing—that we find these forms employed. Based on structural similarities, we may stretch the label ‘zhiyan’ to include such forms but should keep in mind that any such extension is secondary to the use of language in coexisting with others.
17. NTU Philosophical Review: Year > 2017 > Issue: 53
廖育正 Yu-Zheng Liao
朱子心性論可以回應道德責任歸屬嗎?
Can Zhu Xi’s Theory of Mind Respond to Moral Responsibility?

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在談論道德責任(moral responsibility)歸屬時,一種常被接受的看法是:某人對某事具有道德責任,若且唯若某人在自由意志下,促使了某事的發生。換句話說,若是人無從避免去做一件道德上應受譴責的事情,則不被歸屬道德責任。而朱熹(1130-1200)以心統性情的義理架構,作為其倫理思想的心性論基礎,這樣的系統究竟能否歸屬道德責任?當代學人對此有許多歧見。他們的意見為何產生衝突?朱子心性論可以回應道德責任歸屬嗎?這是本文意欲探究的重點。本文的結論是:當代學人各條研究進路之糾結,大致可以視為相容論與不相容論之爭的中國式展開;對此大哉問,形上學一日不得解,便一日沒有答案。然而在上述糾結之外,若還有回應問題的空間,或許在於以本體工夫論,兼及體驗論的視野,將心詮釋為性情的突現(emergence),去照應涵養省察、格物致知、克己主敬等思想─進而能將Peter van Inwagen 的話改寫為一種中國式的言說:心性情之間,別有一種神秘的工夫。
18. NTU Philosophical Review: Year > 2016 > Issue: 52
林宏星 Hong-Xin Lin
朱子論真知及其動機效力
Zhuxi on True Knowledge and It’s Motivational Efficacy

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本文試圖通過對朱子「真知」概念的內容和結構的分析,說明「真知」概念所包含的動機效力,並藉由T. Nagel 的理論,以回應休謨式問題的詰難。對於「知而不能行」之知,朱子認為這種知只是淺知,而真知則必能行。依朱子,一個人在特定情境下對何為最好的知道得越深,他就越可能依其判斷去行動,當一個人之知達到了最高的程度,他便完全會依知而行。這種知(真知)不僅是對所當然之則之知,也是對所以然之理之知,而這種所以然之理原在自家身心上,經由反省體驗而得,因而具有在道德行動中決定如此而不如彼的動機效力
19. NTU Philosophical Review: Year > 2016 > Issue: 52
陳榮華 Wing-Wah Chan
羅逖的脈絡重整與高達美的視域融合
Rorty’s Recontextualization and Gadamer’s Fusion of Horizons

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本文首先指出,無論羅逖(Rorty)的脈絡重整 (recontextualization) 和高達美(Gadamer)的視域融合 (Horizontverschmelzung, fusion of horizons) 都是思考的過程。雖然它們是兩種不同的理論,但都是獲得知識的方式。然後本文要證成,脈絡重整無法得到實有的知識,也無法完成羅逖的啟發哲學 (edifying philosophy) 的理想,這是說,脈絡重整無法突破已有的哲學典範,創立新的哲學典範,以提出創新的哲學知識。但高達美的視域融合卻可以避免脈絡重整的困難,讓人能理解實有,也可突破而得到創新的知識。因此相對而言,高達美的視域融合是較合理的思考理論。
20. NTU Philosophical Review: Year > 2016 > Issue: 52
林薰香 Shing-Shang Lin
瞬間的永恆─海德格《尼采》與《存有與時間》之研究
The Eternity of the Augenblick

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海德格於《尼采》(1961)以存有理解為基礎接續《存有與時間》對存有和時間的追問,論點則由《存有與時間》存有者的存有、向來屬我性(Jemeinigkeit)的個體性轉向存有者整體(das Seiende im Ganzen)、存有本身,因而出現與前期哲學有所延續卻又不同的關係。透過對尼采永恆輪迴學說與強力意志的詮釋,海德格於《尼采》提出「瞬間的永恆(Ewigkeit des Augenblicks)」。如此意義下的永恆與時間及自身性有關,而且和《存有與時間》的瞬間(Augenblick)概念及自主式的自由具有某種相似性,因此本文以《尼采》為主,並藉助《存有與時間》的相關論述,探討海德格有關瞬間和永恆的概念,以及瞬間、永恆與人的可能關係。