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Displaying: 11-20 of 43 documents


11. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 113 > Issue: 9
William MacAskill Smokers, Psychos, and Decision-Theoretic Uncertainty
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In this paper I propose an approach to decision theory that I call metanormativism, where the key idea is that decision theory should take into account decision-theoretic uncertainty. I don’t attempt to argue in favor of this view, though I briefly offer some motivation for it. Instead, I argue that if the view is correct, it has important implications for the causal versus evidential decision-theory debate. First, it allows us to make rational sense of our seemingly divergent intuitions across the Smoking Lesion and The Psychopath Button cases. Second, it generates strong new arguments for preferring the causal approach to decision-theory over the evidential approach.
12. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 113 > Issue: 9
Renaud-Philippe Garner A Tale of Two Moralities
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In this paper, I seek to close a gap in Michael Walzer’s argument for the moral equality of soldiers. Specifically, I seek to show that Walzer’s argument for the moral equality of soldiers depends upon an implicit analysis of the function of excuses. I provide this analysis of excuses: a triadic relationship between moral norms, a background of normality and excuses. I then use this analysis to show that Jeff McMahan’s argument for the moral inequality of soldiers rest upon an implausible view of excuses, namely that the conditions of war merely constitute excuses for failing to comply with ordinary, or peacetime, morality. I argue that the conditions of war are best understood as providing a new background of normality rather than a set of excuses. To show this, I identify five conditions that separate the normality of war from the normality of peace.
comments and criticism
13. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 113 > Issue: 9
Shao-Pu Kang Somatoparaphrenia, the Body Swap Illusion, and Immunity to Error through Misidentification
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Sydney Shoemaker argues that a certain class of self-ascriptions is immune to error through misidentification relative to the first-person pronouns. In their “Self-Consciousness and Immunity,” Timothy Lane and Caleb Liang question Shoemaker’s view. Lang and Liang present a clinical case (somatoparaphrenia) and an experiment (the Body Swap Illusion) and argue that they are counterexamples to Shoemaker’s view. This paper is a response to Lane and Liang’s challenge. I identify the desiderata that a counterexample to Shoemaker’s view must meet and show that somatoparaphrenia and the Body Swap Illusion fail to meet those desiderata. Thus, despite being puzzling phenomena, somatoparaphrenia and the Body Swap Illusion are not counterexamples to Shoemaker’s view.
book reviews
14. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 113 > Issue: 9
Daniel Deasy Ross Cameron: The Moving Spotlight: An Essay on Time and Ontology
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15. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 113 > Issue: 9
New Books: Translations
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16. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 113 > Issue: 8
Daniel Greco, Brian Hedden Uniqueness and Metaepistemology
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We defend Uniqueness, the claim that given a body of total evidence, there is a uniquely rational doxastic state that it is rational for one to be in. Epistemic rationality doesn't give you any leeway in forming your beliefs. To this end, we bring in two metaepistemological pictures about the roles played by rational evaluations. Rational evaluative terms serve to guide our practices of deference to the opinions of others, and also to help us formulate contingency plans about what to believe in various situations. We argue that Uniqueness vindicates these two roles for rational evaluations, while Permissivism clashes with them.
17. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 113 > Issue: 8
Fabrizio Cariani Consequence and Contrast in Deontic Semantics
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Contrastivists view ought-sentences as expressing comparisons among alternatives. Deontic actualists believe that the value of each alternative in such a comparison is determined by what would actually happen if that alternative were to be the case. One of the arguments that motivates actualism is a challenge to the principle of agglomeration over conjunction—the principle according to which if you ought to run and you ought to jump, then you ought to run and jump. I argue that there is no way of developing the actualist insight into a logic that invalidates the agglomeration principle without also invalidating other desirable patterns of inference. After doing this, I extend the analysis to other contrastive views that challenge agglomeration in the way that the actualist does. This motivates skepticism about the actualist’s way of challenging agglomeration.
book reviews
18. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 113 > Issue: 8
Neal A. Tognazzini Carolina Sartorio: Causation and Free Will
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19. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 113 > Issue: 8
New Books: Anthologies
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20. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 113 > Issue: 7
Roy T. Cook, Philip A. Ebert Frege's Recipe
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In this paper, we present a formal recipe that Frege followed in his magnum opus “Grundgesetze der Arithmetik” when formulating his definitions. This recipe is not explicitly mentioned as such by Frege, but we will offer strong reasons to believe that Frege applied it in developing the formal material of Grundgesetze. We then show that a version of Basic Law V plays a fundamental role in Frege’s recipe and, in what follows, we will explicate what exactly this role is and explain how it differs from the role played by extensions in his earlier book “Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik”. Lastly, we will demonstrate that this hitherto neglected yet foundational aspect of Frege’s use of Basic Law V helps to resolve a number of important interpretative challenges in recent Frege scholarship, while also shedding light on some important differences between Frege’s logicism and recent neo-logicist approaches to the foundations of mathematics.