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Displaying: 11-20 of 46 documents


11. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 114 > Issue: 10
New Books
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12. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 114 > Issue: 9
Jeffrey Sanford Russell Composition as Abstraction
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The existence of mereological sums can be derived from an abstraction principle in a way analogous to numbers. I draw lessons for the thesis that “composition is innocent” from neo-Fregeanism in the philosophy of mathematics.
13. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 114 > Issue: 9
Yannig Luthra Self-Trust and Knowledge of Action
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This paper argues that you have non-observational warrant for beliefs about the body in action. For example, if you mean to be drinking a cup of water, you can know independently of observation that you are moving your body in a way that is effective in enabling you to drink. The case I make centers on the claim that you have default warrant to trust your agency. You do well to trust your agency just in virtue of your status as an agent, and are not required to earn permission to trust your agency through making use of evidence about how well your agency works. You have non-observational warrant for beliefs about the functioning of your agency, including beliefs about your body in action, inasmuch as those beliefs reflect trust in your agency.
book reviews
14. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 114 > Issue: 9
Timothy Williamson Penelope Maddy: What Do Philosophers Do? Skepticism and the Practice of Philosophy
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15. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 114 > Issue: 9
Thomas Hofweber Amie L. Thomasson: Ontology Made Easy
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16. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 114 > Issue: 9
R. A. Briggs Richard Pettigrew: Accuracy and the Laws of Credence
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17. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 114 > Issue: 8
Sarah-Jane Leslie The Original Sin of Cognition: Fear, Prejudice, and Generalization
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Generic generalizations such as ‘mosquitoes carry the West Nile virus’ or ‘sharks attack bathers’ are often accepted by speakers despite the fact that very few members of the kinds in question have the predicated property. Previous work suggests that such low-prevalence generalizations may be accepted when the properties in question are dangerous, harmful, or appalling. This paper argues that the study of such generic generalizations sheds light on a particular class of prejudiced social beliefs, and points to new ways in which those beliefs might be undermined and combatted.
18. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 114 > Issue: 8
Joshua Shepherd The Experience of Acting and the Structure of Consciousness
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I offer an account of the experience of acting that demonstrates how agentive aspects of experience associated with the execution of intentions are richly integrated with perceptual aspects associated with parts of action taking place in the publicly observable world. On the view I elucidate, the experience of acting is often both an engagement with the world and a type of intimate acquaintance with it. In conscious action the agent consciously intervenes in the world and consciously experiences the world she is changing. In section one, I discuss extant accounts of the experience of acting, noting deficiencies. In sections two and three, I develop my own account, drawing on Casey O’Callaghan’s work on multi-modal perception. In the conclusion, I discuss ramifications for psychology and philosophy.
19. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 114 > Issue: 8
New Books
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20. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 114 > Issue: 7
Eddy Keming Chen Our Fundamental Physical Space: An Essay on the Metaphysics of the Wave Function
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The mathematical structure of realist quantum theories has given rise to a debate about how our ordinary 3-dimensional space is related to the 3N-dimensional configuration space on which the wave function is defined. Which of the two spaces is our (more) fundamental physical space? I review the debate between 3N-Fundamentalists and 3D-Fundamentalists and evaluate it based on three criteria. I argue that when we consider which view leads to a deeper understanding of the physical world, especially given the deeper topological explanation from the unordered configurations to the Symmetrization Postulate, we have strong reasons in favor of 3D-Fundamentalism. I conclude that our evidence favors the view that our fundamental physical space in a quantum world is 3-dimensional rather than 3N-dimensional. I outline lines of future research where the evidential balance can be restored or reversed. Finally, I draw lessons from this case study to the debate about theoretical equivalence.