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11. Idealistic Studies: Volume > 42 > Issue: 2/3
Volume 42 Index
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12. Idealistic Studies: Volume > 42 > Issue: 1
Alex Savory-Levine Man Is the Redeemer of Nature: An Interpretation of Schelling's "Of Human Freedom"
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In the era of Romanticism, certain authors sought to redefine man’s place in nature as a response to industrialism. The German Naturphilosoph Friedrich Schelling published his treatise Of Human Freedom in 1809 that reveals traces of romantic notions of nature with an existential undercurrent that predated and influenced the philosophical movement known as Existentialism. The existentialist philosopher Martin Heidegger delivered a series of lectures on the treatise at the University of Freiburg in 1936. In his works, Heidegger stresses the importance of being actively involved in the world. His interpretation of the treatise, with its emphasis on the way humans and other creatures are engaged with their environment, calls to mind contemporary thinking in ecology. Through Heidegger’s interpretation, I will show that Schelling’s treatise could be construed as a proto-ecological study, which is to say a study in ecology before the development of the concept or field of study.
13. Idealistic Studies: Volume > 42 > Issue: 1
Tyler Tritten Entsetzung as Affectivity: An Account of Passivity in the Late Schelling
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This article argues that Schelling, contrary to the traditional view which situates him as the mediator between Fichte and Hegel, the link from the absolute activity of the ego to the absolute activity constitutive of transcendental idealism, offered one of the first attempts to ground philosophy in a fundamental passivity. Schelling’s Erlangen lectures (1820-21) in particular provide a penetrating critique of idealistic modes of thought. I will show that these lectures, along with Schelling’s late philosophy as a whole, elaborate consciousness as what is most problematic instead of the firm foundation. Instead of beginning with transcendental consciousness as its terminus a quo he views it as the terminus ad quem, namely, that which is most in need of explanation and justification. Consciousness arises in passivity thought as a preconscious affection. I will first outline the idea of passivity through an exposition of Entsetzung. Next, I will analyze Schelling’s notion of the World Law or law of either/or as the impetus to freedom, that which sets freedom free. I will then show how this manner of thought circumvents traditional metaphysical thinking, i.e., the so-called philosophy of presence. Schelling offers not a will to power but freedom as the will to or not to power, as that which can or can also not be. Lastly, I will briefly outline some of the ramifications of this for Schelling’s philosophical anthropology.
14. Idealistic Studies: Volume > 42 > Issue: 1
Rocío Zambrana Kant's Hyperbolic Formalism
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Hegel famously argued that Kantian Moralität is an empty formalism. This article offers a defense of Kant’s formalism and suggests that it is crucial to Hegel’s own idealism. My defense, however, depends on reading Kantian morality non-morally, as a theory of normative authority. Through a reading of the Grundlegung and Religion, the article delineates Kant’s hyperbolic formalism—the insistence on giving an account of the form of rational agency by isolating willing from all content. The article accordingly assesses Kant’s understanding of autonomy as a matter of institution-subjection. It also critically engages Henry Allison’s groundbreaking work on Kant. Hegel follows Kant in arguing that determinacy is a matter of institution-subjection, and in the Logic provides a radically formalist justification of the role of normative authority in determinacy. Unlike Kant, who articulates institution-subjection as a matter of an isolated subject, Hegel shows that institution-subjection is a matter of social practices.
15. Idealistic Studies: Volume > 42 > Issue: 1
Andrew Alexander Davis Schema and Bild: The Act Bridging Potentiality and Actuality
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Immanuel Kant’s “Schema” and J. G. Fichte’s “Bild” are parallel figures of activity that serve as bridges. For both Kant and Fichte, it is not the image/schema taken as product that is primary, but the act of imaging. I show how Fichte leans on the Kantian argumentation of the schematism in order to attempt bridging the gulf critical philosophy leaves between theoretical and practical philosophy. My broader purpose is to indicate how two German Idealists emphasize activity as a way of solving philosophical problems.
16. Idealistic Studies: Volume > 42 > Issue: 1
William J. Mander T. H. Green, Kant, and Hegel on Free Will
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Scholars have remained undecided how much the British Idealists owe to Hegel, how much to Kant, and how much they may be credited with minting a new intellectual coinage of their own. By way of a detailed examination of T. H. Green’s metaphysics of free will and how it stands to both its Kantian and its Hegelian predecessors, this paper attempts to make some headway on that longstanding question of pedigree. It is argued that by translating previously naturalistic considerations about free will into Kantian or atemporalist terms, Green makes some useful and important advances. But he still remains subject to the tension between libertarian and autonomous approaches to the issue. It might be wondered whether any theory could ever reconcile these two approaches, but it is argued that by filtering his Kantianism through a more Hegelian lens, Green manages somewhat to reduce the friction between these two perspectives and to get closer to his ideal of a unified theory of human free will.
17. Idealistic Studies: Volume > 42 > Issue: 1
David A. Shikiar Hegel's Conception of Reconciliation in Objective Spirit
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In this essay I attempt to clarify Hegel’s conception of reconciliation in objective spirit. I advance the view that it involves adopting one’s institutional structure as an end of one’s will and then proceed to explain how the resulting structure is to be thought of as ‘the mutual interpenetration of particular and universal.’ The structure in question involves the mutual affirmation and fulfillment of both individual and institutional rights, as well as individual and institutional freedom. Focusing particularly on freedom, I explain how the individual receives an institutionally mediated Bildung resulting in an individual who can be free and know herself as such. I conclude by arguing that the fully free individual must indeed come to serve as a locus for the collective subjectivity of her community by fully identifying with the process of, and the values embedded in, necessarily public parliamentary deliberation.
18. Idealistic Studies: Volume > 42 > Issue: 1
Volume 41 Index
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