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Croatian Journal of Philosophy

Volume 18, Issue 1, 2018
On Thought Experiments

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Displaying: 11-18 of 18 documents


on thought experiments
11. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 18 > Issue: 1
Nenad Miščević Simulation and Thought Experiments: The Example of Contractualism
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The paper investigates some mechanisms of thought-experimenting, and explores the role of perspective taking, in particular of mental simulation, in political thought-experiments, focusing for the most part on contractualist ones. It thus brings together two blossoming traditions: the study of perspective taking and methodology of thought-experiments. How do contractualist thought-experiments work? Our moderately inflationist mental modelling proposal is that they mobilize our imaginative capacity for perspective taking, most probably perspective taking through simulation. The framework suggests the answers to questions that are often raised for other kinds of thought-experiments as well, concerning their source of data, heuristic superiority to deduction, experiential, qualitative character and ease in eliminating alternatives. In the case of contractualist political thought-experiments, the data come from perspective taking and the capacity to simulate. Mental simulation is way more accessible to subjects than abstract political reasoning from principles and facts. There is a new experience for the subject, the one of simulating. Simulation normally is quick and effortless; the simulator does not go through alternatives, but is constrained in an unconscious way. We distinguish two kinds of political thought-experiments and two manners of imagining political arrangements, building third-person mental models, and fi rst-person perspective taking. The two mechanisms, the fi rst of inductive model building, the second for simulation, and their combination(s), exhaust the range of cognitive mechanism underlying political thought-experimenting.
book discussions
12. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 18 > Issue: 1
Ana Butković The ‘Arguments Instead of Intuitions’ Account of Thought Experiments: Discussion of The Myth of the Intuitive by Max Deutsch
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After decades of receiving a lot of attention on the epistemological level, the so-called ‘problem of intuitions’ is now in the center of debates on the metaphilosophical level. One of the reasons for this lies in the unfruitfulness of the epistemological discussions that recently subsided without producing any significant or broadly accepted theory of intuitions. Consequently, the metaphilosophical level of discussion of the ‘problem of intuitions’ inherits the same difficulties of the epistemological level. The significance of Max Deutsch’s book The Myth of the Intuitive is his effort to resolve these problems in a clear and persuasive way. He is not only trying to debunk problems behind the vagueness of the ‘intuition-talk’ by drawing important distinctions that usually go under the radar in the contemporary literature, but also develops his own account of philosophical methodology. In this paper I will present some of his arguments against the traditional view of intuitional methodology, as well as his own solutions to the presented problems. Regardless of Deutsch’s insightful account of the ‘problem of intuitions’, I find that some difficulties in his own proposal are inherited from the unresolved issues of intuitions on the epistemological level.
13. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 18 > Issue: 1
Danilo Šuster “The Brain in Vat” at the Intersection
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Goldberg 2016 is a collection of papers dedicated to Putnam’s (1981) brain in a vat (‘BIV’) scenario. The collection divides into three parts, though the issues are inter-connected. Putnam uses conceptual tools from philosophy of language in order to establish theses in epistemology and metaphysics. Putnam’s BIV is considered a contemporary version of Descartes’s skeptical argument of the Evil Genius, but I argue that deception (the possibility of having massively false belief) is not essential, externalism does all the anti-skeptical work. The largest section in the collection covers Putnam’s model-theoretic argument (MTA) against metaphysical realism (MR) and its connections with the brain in vat argument (BVA). There are two camps—unifiers (there is a deep connection in Putnam’s thoughts on BVA, MTA and MR) and patchwork theorists and I try to provide some support for the second camp. All of the papers in the collection are discussed and the anti-skeptical potential of BVA is critically assessed.
book reviews
14. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 18 > Issue: 1
Mia Biturajac The Routledge Companion to Thought Experiments
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15. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 18 > Issue: 1
Tomislav Miletić The Myth of the Moral Brain. The Limits of Moral Enhancement
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16. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 18 > Issue: 1
Nenad Miščević Knowledge Through Imagination
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17. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 18 > Issue: 1
Davor Pećnjak Thought Experiments between Nature and Society: A Festschrift for Nenad Miščević
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18. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 18 > Issue: 1
Marko Delić Perspectives on the Self
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