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Displaying: 11-20 of 1778 documents

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11. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 75
Murray Clarke Dual-Process Theory and Epistemic Intuition
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In this paper, I seek an account of the nature of epistemic intuition. Given the resources of Dual-Process Theory in Psychology, I argue that the intuitions of elite epistemologists, such as Fred Dretske, are not a priori, pre-theoretic, insights. Instead, they are a posteriori insights into the phenomena of knowledge, not the concept of knowledge. Dretske intuitions are technical, modal intuitions about hypothetical counterfactual cases using System II reflections. Such intuitions depended on thinking about the implications of laws of nature in particular circumstances and were used to defend Dretske’s reliable indicator account of knowledge. That account suggested that one must have conclusive reasons when one has empirical knowledge that P.
12. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 75
A. Kadir Çüçen Hegel’s Critique of Kant’s Theory of Knowledge
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Kant and previous philosophers in the modern philosophy have inquired into the limit of human knowledge, so the limitation of knowledge is the result of a basic view of the Critical philosophy. According to most of the modern philosophers, before one wants to attempt to know God, the essence of being, etc., he or she must first investigate the capacity of knowledge itself in order to see whether it is able to accomplish such an attempt. Hegel criticizes this view in the Encyclopedia, section 10. He claims that the task to examine knowledge before using it is based on a false analogy with tools. If one does not want to fool oneself with words, it is easy to see that other instruments can be investigated and criticized without using them in the particular work for which they were designed. But the investigation of knowledge can only be performed by an act of knowledge.
13. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 75
Mustafa M. Dagli Virtual Reality and Its Relations with ‘Life’ and Human Knowledge
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Socrates, Plato and Aristotle are still important for thinking humans; but computers, TV, telephones or automobiles were not existing in their age. For the sake of elasticity in my tripartite subject, a pseudo-philosopher E.G. (“eye-glasser”) and his friends supplied presentation assistance. Mosaic of facts can transpire in their conversation, I think. In a nutshell, a search towards roots and nature of ‘virtual reality’ is conducted first. Then, the role of imagination on knowledge is discussed somehow. Connections and interactions among life, mind and artifacts are touched on thereafter. ‘Mirroring’ metaphor is mentioned as useful. A distinction between ‘knowledge’ and ‘human knowledge’ seemed hopeful, in this quasi-essay inquiry. Wisdom is distinguished from abundance/crowdedness of ‘knowledge’. Effects of ‘virtual reality’ on society is questioned. Some properties of ‘human knowledge’ are stated, then: Knowledge needs to be learnt, understood, and interiorized/internalized. In its circumstances, an aspect of human knowledge is relevance, in addition to “truth + belief + justification”. And also, ‘truth’ is important for human knowledge; it may come to light first or last (as in the Socrates-case).
14. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 75
John Economides Relations Internal and External
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Interaction and motion produce change. Change produces time (past–future) relation. Changes and interchanges develop differences (effects). Changes and differences unite and divide the two frames of time the past and the future, in the present. The relational effect of change in time is expressed in motion and in the information it produces. The time relation develops in patterns which are alternations (interchanges) and repetitions (replications). Alternations (interchanges) produce external conditions. Replications (reproductions) produce internal conditions. The alternating and recurring patterns of change, the respective external and internal conditions they develop and the information they produce configures evolution inorganic, organic, biological and human. Using this information the human mind converts sensory actions to motor reactions (kinetics) and so manages human interactions. Human interactions, kinetics and derivative information organize the human mind, develop intelligence and determine human logic (reason) and psychology (emotion). Information is extended into communication (language) and organized into knowledge. Knowledge develops into technology and economy which are used by human beings for the management and organization of their interactions and the development of personal and community life, culture and civilization.
15. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 75
Vladimir S. Funtusov Faith, Hope and Love as Meaning-of-Life Frames of the Dialectic Nature of the Conceptual Principle of All Encompassing Unity
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This paper analyzes the conceptual principle of all-encompassing unity in the context of global trends of the modern civilization and scientific cognition, with special emphasis placed on the axiological character of the nature of this principle. Structural elements of this principle are identified and their profound connection with the axiological world of the man is described. It is demonstrated that the conceptual principle of all-encompassing unity representatively accumulates in itself both super-complex natural composition of the Universum in the unity of hologramity and matricity properties and spiritual components: faith, hope, love. In such understanding, the conceptual principle of all-encompassing unity is such symphonic ensemble of the developing man’s cognitive and spiritual practices in the cosmic and natural Universum in which his ethical essential fundamentals and fragile complexity of varying-quality substantive nature reveal themselves most fully. From this point of view, faith, hope and love are defined as the man’s spiritual vectors in his temporal (the past, the present and the future) life environment, implicitly entwined into the principle and its supporting goal-motivated benchmarks.
16. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 75
Carlos A. Garzón Contexts of Assertion and Degrees of Justification
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In the paper, I present the basis for a pragmatic, contextualist and inferentialist strategy for understanding the concept of degrees of justification. I argue that each context has certain inferential criteria in order to do correct assertions, and that there are different standards of justification for an assertion to be regarded as highly, moderately or poorly justified in that context. What is a high, medium or low standard of justification is relative to the community in which certain inferential practices take place. Finally, I identify the methods of justification that in every social context confer different degrees of justification to certain assertions.
17. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 75
Amihud Gilead Why do Individual Pure Possibilities Necessarily Exist?
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This paper defends the view that the primary necessary ontological conditions for any existents and for their knowledge are individual pure (“mere”) possibilities. As being such conditions, pure possibilities exist absolutely independently of actualities, possible worlds, or minds. Pure possibilities are exempt from spatiotemporal and causal restrictions or conditions, whereas any actuality is inescapably subject to them. Each actuality is an actualization of an individual pure possibility, which also serves as its identity. The existence of individual pure possibilities is necessary because it is ontologically indispensable for the existence of anything, possible or actual, and because there are some existents instead of nothing. Ignoring or not acknowledging relevant pure possibilities may result in overlooking their actualities without recognizing or identifying them and, thus, this has hindered the progress of science and knowledge. Hence, the knowledge of actual possibilities, too, depends on their pure possibilities.
18. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 75
Steven Hales Virtue Epistemology and the Value of Knowledge
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Virtue epistemologists like Ernest Sosa and John Greco have attempted to explain why knowledge is more valuable than mere true belief. In this talk I demonstrate that both of their accounts fail so profoundly that it is difficult to see how virtue epistemology alone contains the resources to explain the value of knowledge. According to the virtue theoretic approach, knowledge is a kind of success from ability. Knowledge constitutes a competent epistemic performance, and some performances are better than others; not better because they are more accurate, but better because they exhibit the skill of the performer. It is in this way that the performance of knowledge is better than the lucky success of mere true belief. I will show that the Sosa/Greco model entails the false result that the blind review of scholarship should be abolished. This entailment is, by modus tollens, a counterexample to their view. Since it is often held that a comprehensive theory of knowledge ought to explain the value question, the failure of virtue epistemology to do so is a black mark against the virtue approach altogether.
19. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 75
Priyedarshi Jetli Gettier Vindicated Against All His Blemishes
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First, ‘Is Justified True Belief Knowledge’ is imprecise but Gettier is explicit that ‘know’ is analysed as the definiendum is ‘S knows that P’. Second, Gettier does not misrepresent (a) as Plato’s definition as the expressions used are ‘Plato considers’ and ‘seems to accept’. Third, Gettier is not mistaken to apply Plato’s definition to propositions since propositional knowledge is a species of Plato’s definition. Fourth, for Plato true belief temporally precedes an account. ‘Jones owns a Ford’ is never a true opinion, hence no account for it can be given. The counterexample is reconstructed with temporality built into it. Fifth, Gettier does not fail to establish the equivalence of ‘believe’, ‘accepts’ and ‘sure’ in the three versions as this is implicitly established in the shifts made in the paper. Sixth, ‘entails’ logically is used only when the entailing proposition is true, but in the counterexamples a false proposition is taken to imply a true one. ‘Entail’ is to be taken in the ordinary sense of implies. Seventh, in Case I, the implication is preserved with the proper representation: (Gj & Tj) → (y)[Gy ↔ (y=j)], which implies ($x){(Gx & Tx) → (y)[Gy ↔ (y=x)]}’. Eighth, the counterexample is reworked to avoid the objection that justification for p and justification for q may not be sufficient justification for ‘p & q’.
20. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 75
Ilya Kasavin Underdetermination of Knowledge by Context: A Challenge for Social Epistemology
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Social epistemology presents now a multiplicity of approaches, more or less closely connected with philosophical analysis of knowledge. Taken as primarily philosophical approach, it seeks at least general definition. I suppose that socio-epistemological analysis essentially consists in contextualizing problems and problematizing contexts. No other manifestations of cognition but problems deserve philosophical attention. And it is context that endows a problem with meaning. At the same time different context theories in the social sciences and humanities demonstrate two polar trends – an explanatory power of context and endless regress of contextual explanation. Further I will dwell upon this main challenge for social epistemology, which even justifying the autonomy of its own, cannot ignore these scientific developments.