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Displaying: 11-20 of 2350 documents


book symposium
11. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 88 > Issue: 1
Sergio Tenenbaum, The Perils of Earnest Consequentializing
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12. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 88 > Issue: 1
Douglas W. Portmore, Replies to Gert, Hurley, and Tenenbaum
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13. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 88 > Issue: 1
Recent Publications
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articles
14. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 87 > Issue: 3
Robert Audi, Testimony as a Social Foundation of Knowledge
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Testimony is the mainstay of human communication and essential for the spread of knowledge. But testimony may also spread error. Under what conditions does it yield knowledge in the person addressed? Must the recipient trust the attester? And does the attester have to know what is affirmed? A related question is what is required for the recipient to be justified in believing testimony. Is testimony-based justification acquired in the same way as testimony-based knowledge? This paper addresses these and other questions. It offers a theory of the role of testimony in producing knowledge and justification, a sketch of a conception of knowledge that supports this theory, a brief account of how trust of others can be squared with critical habits of mind, and an outline of some important standards for intellectual responsibility in giving and receiving testimony.
15. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 87 > Issue: 3
Mikkel Gerken, Internalism and Externalism in the Epistemology of Testimony
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16. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 87 > Issue: 3
Tatjana Von Solodkoff, Richard Woodward, Noneism, Ontology, and Fundamentality
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In the recent literature on all things metaontological, discussion of a notorious Meinongian doctrine—the thesis that some objects have no kind of being at all—has been conspicuous by its absence. And this is despite the fact that this thesis is the central element of the noneist metaphysics of Richard Routley (1980) and Graham Priest (2005). In this paper, we therefore examine the metaontological foundations of noneism, with a view to seeing exactly how the noneist's approach to ontological inquiry differs from the orthodox Quinean one. We proceed by arguing that the core anti-Quinean element in noneism has routinely been misidentified: rather than concerning Quine's thesis that to be is to be the value of a variable, the real difference is that the noneist rejects what we identify as Quine's "translate-and-deflate" methodology. In rejecting this aspect of Quinean orthodoxy, the noneist is in good company: many of those who think thatquestions of fundamentality should be the proper focus of ontological inquiry can be read as rejecting it too. Accordingly, we then examine the differences between the noneist's conception of ontology and that offered by the fundamentalist. We argue that these two anti-Quinean approaches differ in terms of their respective conceptions of the theoretical role associated with the notion of being. And the contrast that emerges between them is, in the end, an explanatory one.
17. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 87 > Issue: 3
Oliver Rashbrook, An Appearance of Succession Requires a Succession of Appearances
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A familiar slogan in the Hterature on temporal experience is that 'a succession of appearances, in and of itself, does not amount to an experience of succession'. I show that we can distinguish between a strong and a weak sense of this slogan. I diagnose the strong interpretation of the slogan as requiring the support of an assumphon I call the 'Seems Seemed' claim. I then show that commitment to this assumphon comes at a price: if we accept it, we either have to reject the extremely plausible idea that experience is as it seems, or we are forced to provide an account of temporal experience that isn't compatible with the phenomenology. I conclude by nohng that the only plausible interpretahon of the slogan is the weak interpretation, and outhne a positive account of temporal experience, according to which an appearance of succession requires a succession of appearances.
18. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 87 > Issue: 3
Gunnar Björnsson, A Unified Empirical Account of Responsibility Judgments
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Skeptical worries about moral responsibility seem to be widely appreciated and deeply felt. To address these worries—if nothing else to show that they aremistaken—theories of moral responsibility need to relate to whatever concept of responsibility underlies the worries. Unfortunately, the nature of that concept hasproved hard to pin down. Not only do philosophers have conflicting intuitons; numerous recent empirical studies have suggested that both prosaic responsibilityjudgments and incompatibilist intuitions among the folk are influenced by a number of surprising factors, sometimes prompting apparently contradictory judgments. In this paper, we show how an independently motivated hypothesis about responsibility judgments provides a unified explanation of the more important results from these studies. According to this 'Explanation Hypothesis', to take an agent to be morally responsible for an event is to take a relevant motivational structure of the agent to be part of a significant explanation of the event. We argue that because of how explanatory interests and perspectives affect what we take as significant explanations, this analysis accounts for the puzzling variety of empirical results. If this is correct, the Explanation Hypothesis also provides a new way of understanding debates about moral responsibility.
19. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 87 > Issue: 3
Justin A. Capes, Mitigating Soft Compatibilism
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20. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 87 > Issue: 3
Ryan Preston-Roedder, Faith in Humanity
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