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1. The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 3
Eugene Afonasin Pythagorean Symbolism and the Philosophic Paideia in the Stromateis of Clement of Alexandria
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This paper discusses certain aspects of the philosophy of education developed by the second century Christian writer Clement of Alexandria. Special attention is given to the place of his philosophy in the context of both pagan and Christian philosophical and theological movements as they relate to the Neopythagorean tradition that was revived in the first century.
2. The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 3
Nicolas K. Angélis Axiologie et Pedagogie du Droit
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Le droit, considéré comme un ensemble de régles-normes ayant force ogligatoire et contraignante, régit les rappoerts entre les hommes dans une société donnée. En même temps, il est porteur à la fois de l'image d'organisation des rapports sociaux familiaux, économiques et politiques (structure de base de la societé), et des valeurs. A ce titre, le droit constitue un type-idéal qui, inscrit dans les textes (droit positif-objectif) et enraciné dans la conscience des individus, remplit les fonctions générales de la régulation sociale, de la résolution des conflits, de l'intégration sociale et de la reproduction des structures sociales. En suivant l'enseignement d'Aristotle, le droit en tant que véhicule de valeurs peut et doit contenir la valeur suprême de la vertu qui est au principe du bonheur humain. L'État est, donc, tâché d'enseigner moyennant la loi (droit positif) la vertu tant intellectuelle qu'éthique. Ainsi, le droit devient un moyen d'éducation et remplit, outre ses fonctions générales, les fonctions pédagogique et axiologique en contribuant de cette manière à la réalisation du bonheur des citoyens, La vertu, incorporée dans le droit, s'avère la condition sine qua non de l'actualisation de toutes les valeurs contenues dans le droit, telles que démocratie, liberté, justice sociale, respect de la personne et ainsi de suite.
3. The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 3
Robert Arp The Double Life of Justice and Injustice in Thrasymachus’ Account
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This paper has a two-fold task. First, I show that there are three types of individuals associated with the Thrasymachean view of society: (a) the many, i.e., the ruled or those exploited individuals who are just and obey the laws of the society; (b) the tyrant or ruler who sets down laws in the society in order to exploit the many for personal advantage; (c) the "stronger" individual (kreittoon) or member of the society who is detached from the many and aspires to become the tyrant. Second, I argue that if Thrasymachus’s account of the perfectly unjust life of the tyrant is to be more than a theoretical ideal, then the stronger individual who aspires to the tyrant’s position would do well to lead a double life—namely, pursuing private injustice while maintaining the public ‘appearance’ of justice. My interpretation accords with that of Glaucon, noted at the beginning of Republic II. I want to extend Glaucon’s interpretation to include the stronger individual as well. I argue that the standpoint of the stronger individual, as distinct from the standpoints of the tyrant and the many, shows Thrasymachus’s three statements regarding justice to be consistent with one another.
4. The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 3
Evelyn M. Barker Aristotle’s Reform of Paideia
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Ancient Greek education featured the pedagogical exercise of dialectic, in which a student defended a thesis against rigorous questioning by an instructor. Aristophanes’ Clouds, as well as Plato and Aristotle, criticize the practice for promoting intellectual skepticism, moral cynicism, and an eristic spirit - the desire to win in argument rather than seek the truth. I suggest Aristotle’s logic is meant to reform the practice of dialectic. In the first part of my paper, I defend the thesis that Aristotle’s syllogistic is an art of substantive reasoning against the contemporary view that it is a science of abstract argument forms. First, I show that Aristotle’s exclusive distinction between art and science makes syllogistic a techne for the higher forms of knowledge, science and practical wisdom. Then I argue that Aristotle’s treatment of demonstrative and dialectical syllogisms provides rigorous standards for reasoning in science and public debate. In particular I discuss a) the requirement that a demonstration use verifiable premises whose middle term points out a cause for the predicate applying to the conclusion; b) how his analysis of valid syllogisms with a "wholly or partly false" universal premise applies to dialectical syllogisms.
5. The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 3
Amélie Frost Benedikt Runaway Statues: Platonic Lessons on the Limits of an Analogy
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Plato’s best-known distinction between knowledge and opinion occurs in the Meno. The distinction rests on an analogy that compares the acquisition and retention of knowledge to the acquisition and retention of valuable material goods. But Plato saw the limitations of the analogy and took pains to warn against learning the wrong lessons from it. In this paper, I will revisit this familiar analogy with a view to seeing how Plato both uses and distances himself from it.
6. The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 3
D. R. Bhandari Plato’s Concept Of Justice: An Analysis
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In his philosophy Plato gives a prominent place to the idea of justice. Plato was highly dissatisfied with the prevailing degenerating conditions in Athens. The Athenian democracy was on the verge of ruin and was ultimately responsible for Socrates's death. The amateur meddlesomeness and excessive individualism became main targets of Plato's attack. This attack came in the form of the construction of an ideal society in which justice reigned supreme, since Plato believed justice to be the remedy for curing these evils. After criticizing the conventional theories of justice presented differently by Cephalus, Polymarchus, Thrasymachus and Glaucon, Plato gives us his own theory of justice according to which, individually, justice is a 'human virtue' that makes a person self-consistent and good; socially, justice is a social consciousness that makes a society internally harmonious and good. According to Plato, justice is a sort of specialization.
7. The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 3
Abraham P. Bos Aristotle’s Psychology: The Traditional (hylomorphistic) Interpretation Refuted
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The psychology of Aristotle has never been understood in a historically correct way. A new interpretation of the De anima will be proposed in which this work can be seen as compatible with the psychology that can be reconstructed from the fragments of Aristotle's lost dialogues and the De motu animalium and other biological works (in which the notions of pneuma and 'vital heat' play a crucial role) and the doxographical data gathered from ancient writers besides the commentators. In De anima, II, 412b5, where psychè is defined as 'the first entelecheia of a natural body that is organikon,' the words 'natural body' should not be taken to mean 'the body of a living plant, animal or human being' but to stand for 'elementary body.' And the qualification 'organikon' should not be understood as 'equipped with organs' (as it always has) but in the sense of 'serving as an instrument to the soul.' This 'instrumental body' that is inseparably connected with the soul is the seat of desire (orexis), which physically influences the parts of the visible body. Besides those two corrections there are the words ta merè in 412b18 that should be taken as meaning not 'parts of the body' but 'parts of the soul.' Aristotle is arguing there that even those parts of the soul that are not yet actualized in the embryo of a new living being can be said to be 'not without body.'
8. The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 3
Victor Boutros Spelunking with Socrates: A Study of Socratic Pedagogy in Plato’s Republic
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Though Plato never wrote a dialogue that explicitly asks, "What is education?", few argue that he is uninterested in the subject; after all, Plato, like Socrates, was a teacher. In his magnum opus, the Republic, Plato deals with education repeatedly. The eduction of the guardian class and the allegory of the cave present two landmark pedagogical passages. Yet to catch a glimpse of Socratic pedagogy, we must first sift through the intricacies of dialogue. In addition to the complexity inherent in dramatic context, it seems clear that Socrates’ remarks are often steeped in irony. Thus, we stumble upon a problem: how should we read these passages on education? Does Plato mean for us to read them genuinely or ironically? I will argue that Plato uses the dramatic context of the Republic to suggest that Socrates presents the education of the guardians ironically, while reserving the allegory of the cave for a glimpse of Socrates’ genuine pedagogy.
9. The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 3
Anne-Marie Bowery Responding to Socrates’ Pedagogical Provocation
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In this paper I examine the text of the Symposium to illustrate two non-philosophical responses to Socrates’ pedagogical provocation. While Apollodorus and Aristodemus, two Socratic disciples, demonstrate their erotic commitment to Socrates, they do not practice philosophy. They manifest their non-philosophical behavior in two ways. First, they idolize and imitate Socrates. Second, they constantly tell stories about Socrates. In the first section I analyze Aristodemus’ and Apollodorus’ emotional attachment to Socrates. While both disciples are genuinely protective of Socrates, their behavior often precludes the practice of philosophy. In the second section, I examine the nuances of the narrative frame of the Symposium. Apollodorus and Aristodemus both express their commitment to Socrates by telling stories about him. While their stories do preserve knowledge about Socrates, they are unpersuasive spokespersons for the philosophical life. They remain mired in their personal love for Socrates. In the third section, I interpret Plato’s rhetorical use of anonymity as a strategy designed to mitigate against the dangers of discipleship.
10. The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 3
Francesca Calabi The Law of God and the Laws of the Cities in Philo of Alexandria
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I evaluate the position of philosophy within Philo’s theory of education as well as its relation to encyclical studies and to the highest forms of knowledge. According to Philo, true knowledge is knowledge of the law of God. Such is the role of philosophy. There exists a strong relation among the various fields of study reflecting the order that exists in all spheres of reality. Order and harmony are the same in an individual, in a state, and in the cosmos. Order and harmony reflects the law set down by God, who is both creator and foundation of such an order. The study of higher truth and the attempt to reach wisdom enlightens secular knowledge and behavior as well. The question is not merely one of maintaining political order; it is, rather, one of adhering to the order established by God. Such order is not open to discussion or alteration.
11. The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 3
John J. Cleary Mathematics as Paideia in Proclus
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I examine one aspect of the central role which mathematics plays in Proclus's ontology and epistemology, with particular reference to his Elements of Theology. I focus on his peculiar views about the ontological status of mathematical objects and the special faculties of the soul that are involved in understanding them. If they are merely abstract objects that are "stripped away" from sensible things, then they are unlikely to reorient the mind towards the intelligible realm, as envisioned by Plato in the Republic. Thus, in order to defend the function of mathematics as a prodaideutic to dialectic, Proclus rejects Aristotelian abstractionism in favor of an elaborate account in terms of Nous projecting images of its Forms through the medium of the imagination. In metaphorical terms, he replaces the Aristotelian image of the soul as a blank tablet with that of a tablet that has always been inscribed and is always writing itself, while also being written on by Nous. The mediating function of mathematics for understanding the higher realities is grounded in the fact that its central principles of Limit and Unlimited have a universal provenance in Proclus's whole system of reality.
12. The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 3
Jonathan Cohen Philosophy is Education is Politics: A Somewhat Aggressive Reading of Protagoras 334d-338e
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The passage in question begins with a breakdown in the discussion between Socrates and Protagoras because of disagreement about what its ground rules will be and concludes with the discussion’s restoration. Though formally a mere hiatus from the main line of argument, this passage in fact contains a parable about politics, addressing the question, "How can people of differing abilities and preferences come together to form a community?" Since the passage appears in the middle of a dialogue explicitly concerned with education, the parable extends to education as well. The passage thus provides a springboard for insight into some essential interconnections between and among philosophy, education, and politics. On the one hand, a genuine practitioner of any of the three is ipso facto a engaged in the other two at the same time. And on the other hand, the three share an internal structure which is reflexive and transitive at the same time.
13. The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 3
Manuel A. Correia The Doctrine of the Indefinite Terms in the Ancient Commentators of Aristotle
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The ancient commentaries on Aristotle's Peri Hermeneias (= De Interpretatione) give us important elements to understand more clearly some difficult passages of this treatise. In the case of the indefinite names and verbs (i.e. 'not-man', and 'does not recover', respectively), these commentaries reveal a doctrine which explains not only the nature of the indefinites, but also why Aristotle introduces these kinds of term in Peri Hermeneias. The coherence and explanatory capacity of this doctrine is entirely absent in modern exegesis of Peri Hermeneias. This fact has important implications: it can make us to think whether there will be another topics in which the ancient commentators are still indispensable to understand Aristotle. It can also make us to think to what extent a profounder reflection of the ancient commentators can modify our idea of Aristotle and the ancient world.
14. The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 3
Carmen Cozma The Ethical Values of the Music Art of the Ancient Greeks: A Semiotic Essay
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Humanity requires for its satisfaction Beauty and Good, that is, love, wisdom, and courage. Put differently, the necessity of order, equilibrium, and harmony. These values ground one of the most elevated planes of the spiritual life: music. Its moral force in the education of the mind, soul, and behavior of the human person has been emphasized by the ancient Greek philosophers. This important message exists as a pattern crossing the centuries. I will try to reveal the unity ‘ethics’/ethike - ‘music’/melos by using the semiotic organon.
15. The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 3
Howard J. Curzer To Become Good
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Aristotle says that we learn which acts are virtuous, choose virtuous acts for their own sake, and acquire virtuous habits by performing virtuous acts. According to Burnyeat, Aristotle thinks this works successfully because virtuous acts are pleasant. The learner’s virtuous choices and passions are positively reinforced. I argue that Burnyeat’s interpretation fails because virtuous acts are not typically pleasant for learners or, perhaps surprisingly, even for virtuous people. Instead, I maintain that according to Aristotle moral progress is motivated by different sorts of pain associated with vicious acts. I find a series of stages in Aristotle. First, the many come to choose virtuous acts for their own sake by internalizing punishment and becoming generous-minded. Second, motivated by shame, they gain knowledge of which acts are virtuous, becoming incontinent. Third, learners gain habits of virtuous action by regretting their vicious acts and thus become continent. Fourth, they gain habits of virtuous passions by regretting their vicious passions and become well-brought-up. Finally, they are fully virtuous by being taught why virtuous acts are virtuous.
16. The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 3
Sandro D’Onofrio The Metaphor of Light and the Active Intellect as Final Cause: De Anima III.5
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The classical unresolved problem of the active intellect, raised by Aristotle in De Anima III.5, has received several interpretations in the history of philosophy. In this paper, I will recover the old hypotheses according to which the active intellect is the god of Aristotle's metaphysics. I propose that if the active intellect is god, it is not an efficient cause but the final cause of human thought-the entelecheia of the human rational soul. Nevertheless, the problem of the active intellect is insoluble simply because we do not count with all the elements required to obtain a sound solution. Yet it can be attenuated by an approach that renders much more coherence to De Anima III.5 than other attempts. To this end, I will (1) analyse the classical conception of Aristotle's two intellects, (2) work on the explanation par excellence of the active intellect, the metaphor of light, distinguishing the double conception of potency and act that may be found in it, and (3) analyse the concept of entelecheia as the process by which the active intellect actualizes intelligibles in the sense of the final cause.
17. The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 3
David Fortunoff Dialogue, Dialectic, and Maieutic: Plato’s Dialogues As Educational Models
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Plato’s Socrates exemplies the progress of the dialectical method of inquiry. Such a method is capable of actualizing an interlocutor’s latent potential for philosophizing dialectically. The dianoetic practice of Plato’s Socrates is a mixture of dialectical assertions and questions arising out of his ethical concern for the interlocutor. The Dialogues act as educational models exhibiting how one inquires and learns as well as how one must teach in order that others learn to be participants in (or practitioners of) the dialectic. This is the maieutic art of Plato’s Socrates with which he draws his interlocutors into stating and reflecting upon the implications of their uncritically held opinions. We could say that the real subject-matter of many of the Dialogues is at least as much education in the dialectical process while still respecting the literary form of the Dialogues as exhibitive construction. The lack of philosophical closure that often characterizes many of the Dialogues lends additional credence to this position. The subject-matter of many of the dialogues is, therefore, reflexive: it is about itself in the sense that the tacit lesson (practicing the dialectic) will be remembered after its ostensible subject (some philosophical problem) has ceased to be debated. Dialectic is, then, renewable and replicable as an educational method, using "psychagogy"—an instrument of maieutic—to determine first each student’s individual needs for guiding him toward understanding.
18. The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 3
Alessandra Fussi The Dramatic Setting of the Gorgias
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I analyse the dramatic setting of the Gorgias by contrasting it with that of the Protagoras. The two dialogues are closely related. In the Gorgias Socrates states that the rhetorician and the sophist are basically indistinguishable in everyday life. In both the Protagoras and the Gorgias, his confrontation with his interlocutors is metaphorically related to a descent to Hades. However, while the events in the Protagoras are narrated by Socrates himself, the Gorgias has readers face the unfolding events without mediation. The temporal and spatial framing of the Gorgias is indeterminate, while both aspects are described in detail in the Protagoras. I maintain that the magical passage from an indeterminate "outside" to an indeterminate "inside" in the Gorgias is significantly related to the characters' attitude towards the boundaries of each other's souls, which are constantly ignored or attacked. As a matter of fact, the dialogue presents a very impressive amount of anger and exchange of abuse, which never ceases until the end. I suggest that the temporal framing demonstrates that the beginning and the end of the dialogue are closely connected. Socrates unexpectedly arrives and refutes Gorgias by asking him unexpected questions. The last myth of judgment indicates that Gorgias' attitude is comparable to that of the mortals who lived during Kronos' age, while Socrates brings about a liberation from appearance which is analogous to the innovations brought about by Zeus.
19. The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 3
Marie I. George Aristotle on Paideia of Principles
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Aristotle maintains that paideia enables one to judge the method used by a given speaker without judging the conclusions drawn as well (I.1 De Partibus Animalium). He contends that this "paideia of principles" requires three things: seeing that principles are not derived from one another; seeing that there is nothing before them within reason; and, seeing that they are the source of much knowledge. In order to grasp these principles, one must respectively learn to recognize what distinguishes the subject matters studied in different disciplines, see first principles as coming from experience and acquire the habit of seeking them in one’s experience and, finally, see first principles as being the source of conclusions. While the second and third points might at first seem to pertain to "nous" and science, respectively, rather than to paideia, the case can be made that paideia involves more of a firm grasp of principles than "nous" and a less perfect way of relating conclusion to principles than science.
20. The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 3
Edward Halper Poetry, History, and Dialectic
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Twice in the Poetics, Aristotle contrasts poetry with history. Whatever its didactic value, the contrast has not seemed to readers of special philosophical interest. The aim of this paper is to show that this contrast is philosophically significant not just for our understanding of tragedy but also for the light it sheds on Aristotle’s overall methodology. I shall show how he uses the method sketched in the Topics to define tragedy and explain why the same method will not define history. In particular, tragedy admits of definition because its parts constitute a unity, and much of the Poetics aims to show how, despite being defined through six distinct parts, tragedy can be one. In contrast, history, though a proper preliminary to poetics and concerned also with human action, does not admit of scientific treatment because it contains no essential unities. Aristotle’s understanding of ‘science’ is used here to explain why any attempt to create a scientific history would turn history into poetry.