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1. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 33 > Issue: 3
José Manuel Muñoz Causalidad mental y neurociencia: el modelo de la poda semántica
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In this paper I propose a hypothetical model of mental causation that I call semantic pruning and which could be defined as the causal influence of contents and meanings on the spatial configuration of the network of synapses of an individual. I will be guided by two central principles: 1) the causal influence of the mental occurs by virtue of external semantic constraints and consists in the selective activation of certain physical powers, 2) when the selective activation is continual, it triggers a process of synaptic pruning in the neural and neuromuscular network.
2. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 33 > Issue: 3
Federico Castellano Non-conceptualism, observational concepts, and the given
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In “Study of Concepts”, Peacocke puts forward an argument for non-conceptualism derived from the possession conditions of observational concepts. In this paper, I raise two objections to this argument. First, I argue that if non-conceptual perceptual contents are scenario contents, then perceptual experiences cannot present perceivers with the circumstances specified by the application conditions of observational concepts and, therefore, they cannot play the semantic and epistemic roles Peacocke wants them to play in the possession conditions of these concepts. Second, I argue that if non-conceptual perceptual contents are protopropositions, then Peacocke’s account of the possession conditions of observational concepts falls into the Myth of the Given.
3. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 33 > Issue: 3
Leonardo Ivarola A plea for realistic assumptions in economic modelling
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The use of unrealistic assumptions in Economics is usually defended not only for pragmatic reasons, but also because of the intrinsic difficulties in determining the degree of realism of assumptions. Additionally, the criterion used for evaluating economic models is associated with their ability to provide accurate predictions. This mode of thought involves —at least implicitly— a commitment to the existence of unvarying invariant factors or regularities. Contrary to this, the present paper presents a critique to the use of invariant knowledge in economics. One reason for this analysis lies in the fact that economic phenomena are not compatible with the logic of invariance, but with the logic of "possibility trees" or "open-ended results". The other reason is that the use of invariant knowledge may entail both external validity problems and negative exposures to a "black swan". Alternatively, an approach where models are understood as possible scenarios is proposed. It is argued that the realism of (substantive) assumptions is crucial here, since it helps to ascertain the degree of resemblance between the different models and the target system.
4. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 33 > Issue: 3
Mario Bacelar Valente What do light clocks say to us regarding the so-called clock hypothesis?
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The clock hypothesis is taken to be an assumption independent of special relativity necessary to describe accelerated clocks. This enables to equate the time read off by a clock to the proper time. Here, it is considered a physical system—the light clock—proposed by Marzke and Wheeler. Recently, Fletcher proved a theorem that shows that a sufficiently small light clock has a time reading that approximates to an arbitrary degree the proper time. The clock hypothesis is not necessary to arrive at this result. Here, one explores the consequences of this regarding the status of the clock hypothesis. It is argued in this work that there is no need for the clock hypothesis in the special theory of relativity.
5. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 33 > Issue: 3
Bruno Borge Realismo estructural epistémico, modalidad y leyes de la naturaleza
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El realismo estructural epistémico (REE) afirma que el conocimiento que nos brindan las teorías científicas es acerca de la estructura del mundo inobservable, y no sobre su naturaleza. La objeción más importante que esta posición ha enfrentado es el llamado problema de Newman. En el presente trabajo ofrezco una objeción alternativa al REE. Sostengo que su formulación conduce a posiciones escépticas indeseables en dos campos próximos al realismo científico: los debates sobre la modalidad y las leyes de la naturaleza. Muestro además que hay un sentido interesante en el que mi objeción es más fuerte que la formulada por Newman.
monographic section
6. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 33 > Issue: 3
Genoveva Martí Guest editor’s presentation
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7. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 33 > Issue: 3
Robin Jeshion Katherine and the Katherine: On the syntactic distribution of names and count nouns
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Names are referring expressions and interact with the determiner system only exceptionally, in stark contrast with count nouns. The-predicativists like Sloat, Matushansky, and Fara claim otherwise, maintaining that syntactic data indicates that names belong to a special syntactic category which differs from common count nouns only in how they interact with ‘the’. I argue that the-predicativists have incorrectly discerned the syntactic facts. They have bypassed a large range of important syntactic data and misconstrued a critical data point on which they ground the-predicativism. The right data offers new compelling syntactic grounds for referentialism.
8. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 33 > Issue: 3
Robert Stalnaker Diagnosing sorites arguments
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This is a discussion of Delia Fara’s theory of vagueness, and of its solution to the sorites paradox, criticizing some of the details of the account, but agreeing that its central insight will be a part of any solution to the problem. I also consider a wider range of philosophical puzzles that involve arguments that are structurally similar to the argument of the sorites paradox, and argue that the main ideas of her account of vagueness helps to respond to some of those puzzles.
9. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 33 > Issue: 3
Timothy Williamson Supervaluationism and good reasoning
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This paper is a tribute to Delia Graff Fara. It extends her work on failures of meta-rules (conditional proof, RAA, contraposition, disjunction elimination) for validity as truth-preservation under a supervaluationist identification of truth with supertruth. She showed that such failures occur even in languages without special vagueness-related operators, for standards of deductive reasoning as materially rather than purely logically good, depending on a context-dependent background. This paper extends her argument to: quantifier meta-rules like existential elimination; ambiguity; deliberately vague standard mathematical notation. Supervaluationist attempts to qualify the meta-rules impose unreasonable cognitive demands on reasoning and underestimate her challenge.
book reviews
10. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 33 > Issue: 3
Fernando Rudy Hiller Building better beings: A theory of moral responsibility
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