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1. Res Philosophica: Volume > 101 > Issue: 1
Jun Young Kim Orcid-ID

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In this article, I examine Leibniz’s criticism of Spinoza’s notion of priority by nature based on the first proposition in Spinoza’s Ethics. Leibniz provides two counterexamples: first, the number 10’s being 6+3+1 is prior by nature to its being 6+4; second, a triangle’s property that two internal angles are equal to the exterior angle of the third is prior by nature to its property that the three internal angles equal two right angles. Leibniz argues that Spinoza’s notion cannot capture these priority relations. Although this text has received some scholarly attention, Leibniz’s objection in this text has not been fully explained yet. I argue that evaluating Leibniz’s objection relies on how to understand Spinoza’s notion of conception: first, whether conception is co-extensive with inherence and causation; second, whether conception is mental.
2. Res Philosophica: Volume > 101 > Issue: 1
Norman K. Swazo

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Heidegger’s thought presents us with the possibility of, as well as a call for, a “retrieval” (Wiederholung) of what is “unthought” (das Ungedachte) and “unsaid” (das Ungesagte) in the political philosophy of the ancient Greeks. A successful retrieval would lead to an “originary” (ursprünglich) political thinking that enables the “enactment” (Vollzug) of an originary politics, consistent with the possibility of a “second beginning” such as Heidegger deemed necessary and imminent. The task here is to identify “hermeneutic signposts” present in Heidegger’s reading of Plato’s Sophist as a basis for a “prolegomenon” to thinking the unthought. After the signposts are identified, a “Postscript” engages briefly several salient queries that arise from the effort to think about the political with reference to Heidegger’s thought, thus pointing to what remains to be thought beyond the signposting of this prolegomenon.
3. Res Philosophica: Volume > 101 > Issue: 1
Juan Garcia Torres Orcid-ID

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Call ‘a substance’ a person who is at home in a relatively stable and unified sense-making framework: a social structure that to some degree specifies which categories are important for interpreting reality, which goals are worth pursing, which character traits are admirable, etc. Call ‘an accident’ a person who is not at home in one such framework. It is tempting to think that being a substance is preferable, but I present some considerations for thinking otherwise. Mexican philosophers Emilio Uranga and Jorge Portilla, I argue, present notions of accidentality as decolonial tools. Uranga’s account enables Mexicans to have positive valuation of their being independently of the approving gaze of the colonizers and their standards of value. Portilla’s thought distinguishes between pernicious accidentality resulting from the disintegration of sense-making frameworks and authentic accidentality as a condition for freedom, self-creation, and ultimately for individual and communal liberation.
4. Res Philosophica: Volume > 101 > Issue: 1
Paolo Pitari

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In Beyond Language (Oltre il linguaggio), Emanuele Severino argues that “language reveals the meaning that man confers to the world.” Accordingly, this article infers that reflecting on the meaning of the most important words of philosophy will enable us to understand the foundation of the concrete history of our civilization. Severino offers a unique analysis of these words and their history, and consequently an original framework for interpreting the world. What follows thus presents a discursive glossary according to Emanuele Severino with the aim to open new outlooks for understanding not only Severino’s thought, but also the problems of philosophy and our relationship with existence.
5. Res Philosophica: Volume > 101 > Issue: 1
Timothy Perrine

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Plantinga develops an ambitious theistic religious epistemology on which theists can have non-inferential knowledge of God. Central to his epistemology is the idea that human beings have a “sensus divinitatis” that produces such knowledge. Recently, several authors have urged an appropriation of the sensus divinitatis that is more friendly to internalist views, such as Phenomenal Conservativism. I argue that this appropriation is too timid and tepid in a variety of ways. It applies only to a small fraction of theistic beliefs; it fails to play the theological role Plantinga intended the sensus divinitatis to play; it fails to imply that most theistic beliefs, most of the time, are justified; when combined with a standard form of Evidentialism, it actually implies that most theistic beliefs are, if justified, inferentially justified; and it is consistent with substantive criticisms of theistic belief originating in work from the Cognitive Science of Religion.

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6. Res Philosophica: Volume > 101 > Issue: 1
Chris Heathwood

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7. Res Philosophica: Volume > 101 > Issue: 1
Ben Bradley Orcid-ID

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8. Res Philosophica: Volume > 101 > Issue: 1
Dale Dorsey

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res phil short

9. Res Philosophica: Volume > 101 > Issue: 1
Scott Aikin, John Casey

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Arguments are weakly meta-argumentative when they call attention to themselves and purport to be successful as arguments. Arguments are strongly metaargumentative when they take arguments (themselves or other arguments) as objects for evaluation, clarification, or improvement and explicitly use concepts of argument analysis for the task. The ambitious meta-argumentation thesis is that all argumentation is weakly argumentative. The modest meta-argumentation thesis is that there are unique instances of strongly meta-argumentative argument. Here, we show how the two theses are connected and both are plausible.