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Displaying: 1-10 of 46 documents


1. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 112 > Issue: 12
Miriam Schoenfield Bridging Rationality and Accuracy
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This paper is about the connection between rationality and accuracy. I show that one natural picture about how rationality and accuracy are connected emerges if we assume that rational agents are rationally omniscient (have credence 1 in all of the facts about rationality). I then develop an alternative picture that allows us to relax this assumption, in order to accommodate certain views about higher order evidence.
2. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 112 > Issue: 12
Manolo Martínez Modalizing Mechanisms
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It is widely held that it is unhelpful to model our epistemic access to modal facts on the basis of perception, and postulate the existence of a bodily mechanism attuned to modal features of the world. In this paper I defend modalizing mechanisms. I present and discuss a decision-theoretic model in which agents with severely limited cognitive abilities, at the end of an evolutionary process, have states which encode substantial information about the probabilities with which the outcomes of a certain Bernoulli process occur. Thus, in the model, a process driven by very simple, thoroughly naturalistic mechanisms eventuates in modal sensitivity.
book reviews
3. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 112 > Issue: 12
Michael Kremer Penelope Maddy: The Logical Must: Wittgenstein on Logic
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4. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 112 > Issue: 12
Daniel Stoljar Uriah Kriegel: The Varieties of Consciousness
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5. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 112 > Issue: 12
Index to Volume CXII
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6. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 112 > Issue: 11
Lina Jansson Explanatory Asymmetries: Laws of Nature Rehabilitated
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The problem of explanatory non-symmetries provides the strongest reason to abandon the view that laws can figure in explanations without causal underpinnings. I argue that this problem can be overcome. The solution that I propose starts from noticing the importance of conditions of application when laws do explanatory work, and I go on to develop a notion of nomological (non-causal) dependence that can tackle the non-symmetry problem. The strategy is to show how a strong notion of counterfactual dependence as guaranteed by the laws is a plausible account of what we aim towards when we give law-based explanations. The aim of this project is not to deny that causal relations can do explanatory work but to restore laws of nature as capable of being explanatory even in the absence of any knowledge of causal underpinnings.
7. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 112 > Issue: 11
Juan Comesaña Normative Requirements and Contrary-to-Duty Obligations
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I argue that normative requirements (like “If you believe that it is raining, you ought to believe that it is precipitating”) should be interpreted as the conditional obligations of dyadic deontic logic. Semantically, normative requirements are conditionals understood as restrictors, the prevailing view of conditionals in linguistics. This means that Modus Ponens is invalid, even when the premises are known.
book reviews
8. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 112 > Issue: 11
Ralf M. Bader Mark Jago: The Impossible: An Essay on Hyperintensionality
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9. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 112 > Issue: 11
New Books
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10. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 112 > Issue: 10
Nick Zangwill Logic as Metaphysics
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I defend logical realism. I begin by motivating the realist approach by underlining the difficulties for its main rival: inferentialism. I then focus on AND and OR, and delineate a realist view of these two logical constants. The realist view is developed in terms of Alexander’s Principleshowing that AND and OR have distinctive determining roles. After that, I say what logic is not. We should not take logic to be essentially about the mind, or language, or exclusively about an abstract realm, or about reasoning, truth, truth-tables, truth-functions, topic-neutrality or form. Lastly, I turn to consider NEGATION and argue that we cannot escape negative facts, and facts conjoining and disjoining negative facts with positive facts. I then give NEGATION a distinctive role, one that contrasts with AND and OR. I reflect on the notion of logic in the coda.